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Abstract
Chapter 1 revisits the classic mechanism design question of when buyers with private information
in an auction setting can expect to receive economic rents. It is well known that under standard
assumptions, the seller can fully extract rent for generic prior distributions over the valuations of
the buyers. However, a crucial assumption underlying this result is that the buyers are not able
to acquire any additional information about each other. This assumption can be seen as a special
case of a general model where buyers have access to some information acquisition technology.
We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information acquisition technology for the
seller to be able to guarantee full rent extraction.
Chapter 2 studies auctions when there is ambiguity over the joint information structures gener-
ating the valuations and signals of players. We analyse how two standard auction effects interact
with ambiguity. First, a ‘competition effect’ arises when different beliefs about the correlation
between bidders’ valuations imply different likelihoods of facing competitive bids. Second, a
‘winner’s value effect’ arises when different beliefs imply different inferences about the winner’s
value. In private value auctions, only the first effect exists, and the distribution of bids first order
stochastically dominates the distribution of bids in the absence of ambiguity. In common value
auctions both effects exist, and the seller’s revenue decreases with ambiguity.
Chapter 3 characterises the equilibrium payoff set of a repeated game with local interaction and
local monitoring. A Nash threats folk theorem holds without any restrictions on the network
structure when players are arbitrarily patient, i.e. any feasible payoff above the Nash equilibrium
point can be approximated arbitrarily well in sequential equilibrium. When players discount the
future, the folk theorem cannot hold unless further restrictions are made either on payoffs or the
network structure.
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Chapter 1
Rent Extraction and Information Acquisition
1.1 Introduction
Agentswithprivate informationwho interact in strategic situations oftenhave incentives to acquire
information about each other before making their decisions, and in many relevant environments,
it is also plausible that they have the opportunity to do so. This paper explores the implications of
this observation for a seller in an auction setting who wishes to implement some allocation rule
and fully extract rent from the buyers.
It is well known that in the absence of information acquisition, full rent extraction is possible
for generic prior distributions of the buyers’ valuations. For example, consider a mechanism
where the payment of each buyer consists of two terms. First, each buyer pays the product of her
valuation for the object and the probability of winning for each profile of her opponents’ types
(so that without the second term, she always receives exactly zero payoff ex post). The second
term is a ‘side bet’ with the seller about the types of the other buyers. As long the valuations are
correlated, it is possible to design these bets to have zero expected value under the belief of the
reported type, and strictly positive expected value under the belief of every other type. As the
bets become large, the incentive constraints for each type of buyer will be satisfied, since any type
that pretends to be another type will have to pay the side bet, which can be made arbitrarily large
in expectation.
Under this ‘side bet’ mechanism, each buyer’s payoff will depend on the types of the other
buyers, and the payment can be very large for some types and very small for others. This implies
that buyers may have a strong incentive to learn about the types of their opponents, and having
acquired this information, misreport their own type or drop out of the mechanism altogether.
Thus, if buyers are able to acquire information, then this ‘side bet’ mechanism may fail to fully
extract rent. However, this does not necessarilymean that the seller cannot extract rent using some
other mechanism that exploits the buyers’ information. For example, if each buyer can perfectly
learn the other buyers’ types, the seller can extract rent using a mechanism in which each buyer
reports the types of all the other buyers. With this information acquisition technology, the seller
can even extract rent when the underlying valuations are independent. On the other hand, if the
information acquisition technology is such that each buyer independently receives a signal with
probability p < 1, which perfectly reveals the types of the other buyers including whether they
have received a signal, then the seller cannot always extract rent. For example, if the seller wishes
to implement the efficient allocation rule, then a high type who learns that her opponents are low
type and have no signal must earn positive rents.
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Thus, the ability to acquire information may help or hurt the buyers in the presence of a
seller who wishes to fully extract rent, depending on the information acquisition technology that
is available, and so it is natural to ask which types of information acquisition technology can
guarantee full rent extraction for the seller. In this paper, we will give an exact answer to this
question by characterising the necessary and sufficient conditions on the information acquisition
technology such that the seller is able to guarantee full rent extraction.
In our model, buyers observe not only their private valuations but also some payoff irrelevant
signals that may be correlated with their opponents’ types (where a type is both the valuation
and the additional signal). After observing their valuations, the buyers are able to choose an
information acquisition action. The profile of the chosen information acquisition actions and the
realised valuations then determine the joint distribution of the payoff irrelevant signals according
to the information acquisition technology, which is represented by a function Σ : V × A 7→ ∆S,
where V is the set of valuations, A is the set of information acquisition actions, and S is the set of
payoff irrelevant signals. V and S are assumed to be finite, but we make no restrictions on A.
We address the question of when the seller can fully extract rent using a mechanism design
framework. However, a nonstandard feature of our setup is that the distribution over the type
space is not exogenously given, but determined as the result of buyers’ choices. In particular, the
buyers choose their information optimally, given the seller’s choice of mechanism. Furthermore,
the buyers are able to deviate not only by misreporting their types in the mechanism, but also by
choosing alternative information acquisition actions. Thus, in designing themechanism, the seller
must take into account the optimal information choices of the buyers.
Following the optimal choice of information, the revelation principle implies that we can
restrict attention to incentive compatible direct mechanisms. However, when buyers deviate to
other information acquisition actions they will not necessarily report truthfully. We define a game
between the buyers at the ex ante stage where the payoffs to each information acquisition strategy
is the expectation of the maximum payoff from the mechanism, given the profile information
acquisition strategies, and we require that the choice of information is a Nash equilibrium of this
game. A seller who wishes to implement a particular allocation rule can fully extract rent if there
exists a mechanism that implements that allocation rule such that following the optimal choice of
information, the buyers report truthfully and receive zero payoffs.
Without information acquisition, Crémer and McLean (1988) show that a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the seller to be able to fully extract rent for any allocation rule is that for each
buyer i with valuation vi , the belief of type vi about v−i does not lie in the convex hull of the
beliefs of any type v′i , such that v
′
i , vi . When this condition holds, there exists a hyperplane that
separates each type’s belief from the beliefs of all other types. This is equivalent to the existence
of lotteries, one for each type, with zero expected value for that type and strictly positive expected
value for every other type. As we discussed previously, this implies that the condition is sufficient
for full rent extraction.
Note that the condition depends only on the beliefs, and not on the valuations associated with
each belief. This makes necessity less obvious. For example, if the only type whose belief lies in
the convex hull of the beliefs of the other types also happens to have the highest valuation, then
perhaps the seller can still fully extract rent even though the condition fails. Even though there
does not exist a hyperplane separating the belief of the highest type from the beliefs of all other
types, the seller does not need such a lottery for the highest type. In any mechanism where the
highest type gets zero ex post payoff for every profile of her opponents’ types, no type will deviate
by pretending to be the highest type. Intuitively, ‘side-bets’ are required to prevent high types
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from deviating down, not low types deviating up.
In Crémer andMcLean (1988), type vi ’s valuation for the object is given by a function wi : Vi 7→
R+, and the condition is necessary and sufficient to guarantee rent extraction for every possible wi ,
which is the reasonwhy it does not depend on the valuation associatedwith each belief. However,
in our model, since the seller can use a different information acquisition strategy to extract rent
for each specification of the payoffs, the conditions on beliefs will retain some dependence on the
type that holds each belief.
We show that a necessary and sufficient condition on the information acquisition technology
for the seller to be able to guarantee full rent extraction is that for every complete and transitive
ordering on i onVi , there exists an information acquisition strategy α : V 7→ A such that for each
type (vi , si) that receives the object with positive probability in equilibrium and does not have the
highest valuation under :
1. (vi , si)’s belief is not in the relative interior of C(α−i), the convex hull of the beliefs of all
types that could arise from any unilateral deviation to an alternative information acquisition
strategy, given that the other players are following α−i
2. The smallest exposed face of the closure ofC(α−i) containing (vi , si)’s belief does not intersect
with the closure of the set of beliefs of all types with a strictly higher valuation than vi under
i that could arise from any unilateral deviation to an alternative information acquisition
strategy, given that the other players are following α−i .
The first condition ensures that for each type, there exists a lotterywith zero expected value for
that type, andweakly positive expected value for every type that could arise from any information
acquisition strategy. The second condition ensures that the lottery can be chosen to have strictly
positive expected value that is bounded away from zero for any type that has a strictly higher
valuation than vi under i . Note that our conditions involve the beliefs of all types that could arise
from any information acquisition strategy. This ensures that there is no profitable deviation to
another information acquisition strategy and is a much stronger requirement than in the standard
model, since there can be (infinitely) many beliefs that arise from any information acquisition
strategy. If this set of beliefs is open (for example, if it is alwayspossible to acquiremore information
about each type of every opponent) then the seller will not be able to extract rent.
1.2 Related Literature
Crémer and McLean (1988) is the classic reference on full surplus extraction. Several papers have
considered mechanism design with information acquisition. For example, Bikhchandani (2011)
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of extraction lotteries that are robust
to the possibility of information acquisition. However, in Bikhchandani (2011), buyers can only
acquire signals that are independent conditional on the profile of valuations. Our model differs
in that the information acquisition stage is modelled as game, and we allow buyers to acquire
information not just about each others’ valuations, but also about each others’ information.
A closely related paper is Obara (2008), which extends the Crémer and McLean (1988) result
to a setting where agents take some hidden action that determines the distribution of their
payoff relevant types. Obara (2008) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus
extraction, and argues that the conditions are not necessarily satisfiedwhen there aremany actions
to which the agents can deviate. In our setting, the distribution of the payoff relevant type is fixed,
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but the buyers can determine the distribution of payoff irrelevant signals after learning their
payoff relevant type. Bikhchandani and Obara (2017) provides sufficient conditions for efficient
implementation and full surplus extraction when buyers are able to acquire information about an
unknown payoff relevant state of nature.
Yamashita (2018) considers a related question about the highest revenue the seller can guar-
antee when the buyers have access to additional information. The seller considers the worst case
information structure for each choice of mechanism, and chooses the mechanism to maximise
the worst case revenue. One interpretation is the buyers commit to some information structure,
and then the seller offers the mechanism. A key difference in our approach is that the seller first
commits to a mechanism, and then the buyers choose their information optimally. Thus, the seller
is better off.
Finally Heifetz and Neeman (2006) argue that the result that full surplus extraction is possible
for generic type spaces of a fixed and finite size that admit a common prior hinges on the non-
convexity of the set of priors, and generic priors on the universal type space do not allow for full
surplus extraction. In our model, the type space is endogenous and depends on the information
acquisition decisions of the buyers.
1.3 Model
There is a finite set I of n buyers who may buy a single indivisible object from a seller. Each
i ∈ I has a payoff relevant valuation vi ∈ Vi and a payoff irrelevant signal si ∈ Si , where Vi
and Si are finite. Let θi  (vi , si) ∈ Vi × Si ≡ Θi be buyer i’s type. The profile of valuations
v ∈ V ≡ V1 × . . . ×Vn is distributed according to Π, and buyer i’s valuation for the object is given
by a function wi : Vi 7→ R+. We assume that utility is quasilinear in transfers. After observing vi ,
each buyer chooses an information acquisition action ai ∈ Ai , where Ai can be an arbitrary set.
A function Σ : A × V 7→ ∆S determines a distribution over signals for each action profile a. Note
that the distribution depends on the entire action profile a.
Let αi : Vi 7→ Ai be an information acquisition (pure) strategy for buyer i, and define Γ :
A |V | 7→ ∆(V × S) as γ(v , s |α)  pi(v)σ(s |α(v), v). That is, for any profile of information acquisition
strategies α, the resulting distribution over Θ  V × S is given by Γ(α). Let ΓΘi (α) denote the
marginal distribution on Θi given α:
γΘi (θi |αi , α−i) ≡
∑
θ−i
γ(θi , θ−i |αi , α−i)

∑
v−i
∑
s−i
pi(vi , v−i)σ(si , s−i |αi(vi), α−i(v−i), vi , v−i).
Finally, let Θi(α)  {θi : γΘi (θi |α) > 0} be the set of θi that arises with positive probability under
α.
Remark 1.3.1. Our framework is general enough to incorporate mixed strategies over a finite set
of actions as follows. Fix a finite set of actions A f , a finite set of signals S f , and an information
acquisition function Σ f : A f ×V 7→ ∆S f . Now suppose that each i may randomise among actions
in A fi . This is equivalent to each i choosing a pure strategy from Ai  ∆A
f
i , and receiving a signal
from Si  S
f
i × A fi . Then Σ : A × V 7→ ∆S is given by σ(s |a , v)  Pr(a f |a)σ f (s f |a f , v).
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Adirectmechanism (x , t) is an allocation rule x : V×S 7→ ∆I and a transfer rule t : V×S 7→ Rn .
The timing is as follows:
1. Seller commits to a mechanism
2. Each buyer observes the mechanism and vi
3. Each buyer chooses ai
4. Each buyer observes si and reports θi  (vi , si) to seller
5. Seller implements the mechanism and payoffs are realised.
Note that the seller commits to amechanismfirst, and then the buyers choose their information
acquisition actions. This is unlike the approach in the robust mechanism design literature where
the seller considers the worst case information structure, which can be interpreted as the result
of an optimal choice by buyers who commit to an information structure before the seller chooses
the mechanism.
For θi ∈ Θi(α) and θ′i ∈ Θi , define Ui(θ′i , θi ; α) as i’s expected utility when Player i reports θ′i ,
Player i is type θi , and the players are following the information acquisition strategy α. That is:
Ui(θ′i , θi ; α) 
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)xi(θ′i , θ−i)wi(vi) −
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)ti(θ′i , θ−i).
Note that γ(θ−i |θi , α)  pi(v−i |vi)σ(s−i |si , α(v)). Thus,Ui(θ′i , θi ; α)depends only on αi(vi) and α−i ,
but to simplify notation we let Ui(θ′i , θi ; α) depend on the entire strategy α. Also note that given
α, Ui(θ′i , θi ; α) is defined only for θi such that γΘi (θi |α) > 0; hence our restriction to θi ∈ Θi(α).
Finally, define U∗i (θi ; α)  maxθ′i Ui(θ′i , θi ; α).
Given a mechanism (x , t), buyers optimally acquire information α if α is a Nash equilibrium of
the game given by payoffs:
u˜i(αi , α−i) 
∑
θi∈Θi (αi ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |αi , α−i)U∗i (θi ; αi , α−i).
A mechanism is incentive compatible given α if for all θi ∈ Θi(α) and for all θ′i ∈ Θi :
Ui(θi , θi ; α) ≥ Ui(θ′i , θi ; α).
A mechanism is individually rational given α if for all θi ∈ Θi(α):
Ui(θi , θi ; α) ≥ 0.
A mechanism fully extracts rents given α if for all θi ∈ Θi(α):
Ui(θi , θi ; α)  0.
An information structure is (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)), and for each valuation function w  (w1 , . . . ,wn),
(Θ,Π, (A,Σ), w) is the associated allocation problem. A social choice function f : V 7→ ∆I maps a
profile of payoff relevant types to a probability distribution over the set of players.
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Definition 1.3.1. The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent extraction for the
social choice function f : V 7→ ∆I if for all allocation problems (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)), w), there exists a
mechanism (x , t) and an information acquisition strategy α such that:
• (x , t) is incentive compatible, individually rational, and fully extracts rent given α
• Buyers optimally acquire information α given (x , t)
• x(v , s)  f (v) for all v , s such that γ(v , s |α) > 0.
Definition 1.3.1 of rent extraction requires that for a given social choice function f : V 7→ ∆I,
the seller is able to fully extract rent for all possible valuation functions w. This approach is
standard in the literature and simplifies the conditions on beliefs. Definition 1.3.1 is justified by
the revelation principle, which we now prove for our environment.
Let (x′, t′) be an arbitrary mechanism, where x′ : M 7→ ∆I and t′ : M 7→ Rn , and for each i,
let µi : Vi × Si × Ai 7→ Mi be a strategy in the mechanism. Following the information acquisition
strategy α, for θi ∈ Θi(α), let U′i (m′i , θi ; α, µ−i) be i’s payoff when Player i reports m′i , Player i is
type θi , and the other players are following the strategy µ−i in the mechanism:
U′i (m′i , θi ; α, µ−i) 
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)xi(m′i , µ−i(θ−i , α−i(v−i)))wi(vi)
−
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)ti(m′i , µ−i(θ−i , α−i(v−i))).
Define m∗∗(θi , α, µ−i)  arg maxm′i U′i (m′i , θi ; α, µ−i), and U∗∗i (θi ; α, µ−i)  U′i (mi , θi ; α, µ−i) for
mi ∈ m∗∗(θi , α, µ−i).
Proposition 1.3.1. Suppose that there exists an information acquisition strategy α, a mechanism (x′, t′),
and for each player i, a strategy µi in the mechanism such that for all α′i ∈ A |Vi |i :
1. µi(θi , αi(vi)) ∈ m∗∗(θi , α, µ−i) for all θi ∈ Θi(α)
2.
∑
θi∈Θi (α) γΘi (θi |αi , α−i)U∗∗i (θi ; α, µ−i) ≥
∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i ) γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i , µ−i).
Then there exists a direct mechanism (x , t) such that (x , t) is incentive compatible given α, buyers optimally
acquire information α given (x , t), and (x(θ), t(θ))  (x′(µ(θ, α(v))), t′(µ(θ, α(v)))) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Appendix. 
Remark 1.3.2. Conditions 1 and 2 in Proposition 1.3.1 are equivalent to (α, µ) being a Nash equi-
librium of the game G′  (A |V | ×M |Θ×A| , u′), where
u′(αi , µi ; α−i , µ−i) 
∑
θi∈Θi (αi ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |αi , α−i)U′i (µi(θi , αi(vi)), θi ; αi , α−i , µ−i).
1.4 Examples
In the next section, we will establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the information
structure to guarantee full rent extraction. First, we provide some examples.
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Example 1.4.1 (Crémer-McLean). Suppose S  , so there is no possibility of information ac-
quisition. Then ((V,),Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent extraction for all social choice functions
f : V 7→ ∆I if and only if for all vi :
pi(V−i |vi) < co{pi(V−i |v′i) : v′i , vi}.1
With information acquisition, Π exhibiting correlation is not sufficient for rent extraction, as
the following example shows:
Example 1.4.2. Let n  2, Vi  {vL , vH}, Si  {, (vL ,), (vL , s), (vH ,), (vH , s)}, wi(vL)  v > 0,
wi(vH)  1, Π > 0 (Π can be any full support distribution), Ai  {N,Y}. If ai  N , then
player i receives the null signal. If ai  Y, then with probability p < 1 player i receives a signal
that perfectly reveals the valuation of her opponent and whether her opponent has received
a null signal. Players receive signals independently. Note that for player i, types (vL , (vL ,))
and (vH , (vL ,)) have the same beliefs over Θ−i , namely that player −i has valuation vL and
the null signal. Thus, there exists an allocation rule where type (vH , (vL ,)) of player i must
receive positive rents. Let xi((vL , (vL ,)), (vL ,)) ≡ x > 0. Since type (vL , (vL ,)) of player i
knows the type of player −i for sure, individual rationality implies ti((vL , (vL ,)), (vL ,)) ≤ xv.
Now a possible deviation is for player i to choose αi(vH)  Y, drop out for all types other than
(vH , (vL ,)), and for type (vH , (vL ,)), report (vL , (vL ,)). The utility of this deviation is at least
pi(vH)pi(vL |vH)p(1 − p)x(1 − v) > 0.
On the other hand, with information acquisition, sometimes rent extraction is possible even
when Π is independent:
Example 1.4.3. Let n  2, Vi  {vL , vH}, Si  {vL , vH}, Π uniform, Ai  {N,Y}. If ai  N , then
player i’s signal is uninformative. If ai  Y, player i’s signal perfectly reveals the valuation of her
opponent. That is, let σ(si  v−i , s−i  vi |vi , v−i , (Y,Y))  1, σ(si  v−i , s−i  vi |vi , v−i , (N,Y))  12 ,
σ(si , v−i , s−i  vi |vi , v−i , (N,Y))  12 . For any x and for any w, the following mechanism is
incentive compatible, individually rational, and fully extracts rent given αi(vi)  Y for all vi , and
αi(vi)  Y for all vi is optimal for both players:
• ti((vi , si), (v−i , s−i))  xi((vi , si), (v−i , s−i))wi(vi) if vi  s−i and si  v−i
• ti((vi , si), (v−i , s−i))  ∞ otherwise.
1.5 Main Result
In this section, we will characterise the necessary and sufficient conditions for the information
structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) to guarantee full rent extraction.
Let γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ≡
(
γ(θ1−i |θi , α), γ(θ2−i |θi , α), . . . , γ(θ |Θ−i |−i |θi , α)
)
be the belief of type θi about
Θ−i , given the profile of information acquisition strategies α. Let i be complete and transitive
1pi(V−i |vi)  (pi(v1−i |vi), . . . , pi(v
|V−i |
−i |vi)).
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binary relation over Vi , and let Ri be the set of all complete and transitive binary relations over
Vi . Let  (1 , . . . , n), and R  R1 × . . . × Rn . Define:
• C(α−i)  co{γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) : α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i)}
• D(θi , α−i , i)  {γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) : α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), v′i i vi}
• Θ+i (α, f )  {θi ∈ Θi(α) :
∑
v−i
∑
s−i γ(v−i , s−i |θi , α) fi(vi , v−i) > 0}
• v∗i (i)  {vi : vi i v′i for all v′i ∈ Vi}.
C(α−i) is the convex hull of the beliefs of every type of buyer i that could arise from any
information acquisition strategy of buyer i, fixing the information acquisition strategy of the other
buyers at α−i . D(θi , α−i , i) is the set of beliefs of every type of buyer i with a valuation strictly
greater than vi underi that could arise fromany information acquisition strategyof buyer i, fixing
the information acquisition strategy of the other buyers at α−i . Note that D(θi , α−i , i) ⊂ C(α−i).
If Ai is finite, then C(α−i) is a polytope. If Ai is compact and σ is continuous, then C(α−i) and
D(θi , α−i , i) are compact.Θ+i (α, f ) is the set of types of buyer i that that receives the object with
positive probability. v∗i (i) is the set containing the greatest elements of Vi under the relation i .
For any X ∈ Rn , let X denote the closure of X, and let ri(X) denote the relative interior of X.
Recall that for any X ⊂ Rn and x¯ ∈ X, p , 0 supports X at x¯ if p · y ≥ p · x¯ for all y ∈ X. The
hyperplane {y ∈ Rn : p · y  p · x¯} is a supporting hyperplane for X at x¯, and the support is proper
if p · y > p · x¯ for some y ∈ X.
Definition 1.5.1. For any convex set K ⊂ Rn , F is an exposed face of K if F satisfies any of the
following:
1. There exists a hyperplane H supporting K at some x¯ ∈ K and F  K ∩ H
2. F  K
3. F  .
If F , K , , then F is a proper exposed face of K.
Definition 1.5.2. For any convex set K ⊂ Rn and x¯ ∈ K, let FK(x¯) be the intersection of all exposed
faces of K containing x¯.
Proposition 1.5.1. The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent extraction for the social
choice function f : V 7→ ∆I if and only if for every ∈ R, there exists an α such that for all i and for all
θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si):
1. γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i))  
2. FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) ∩ D(θi , α−i , i)  .2
Proof. Appendix. 
2If we assume that Ai is compact and σ is continuous, then C(α−i) and D(θi , α−i , i) are closed, so we can drop
the closure from the conditions. When Condition 1 is satisfied, there is always a hyperplane properly supporting C(α−i)
at γ(Θ−i |θi , α), so FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) is a proper exposed face of C(α−i). On the other hand when Condition 1 fails,
FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α))  C(α−i), and Condition 2 cannot hold.
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Condition 1 requires that θi ’s belief does not lie in the relative interior of C(α−i), which is the
convex hull of the beliefs all of types of buyer i that could arise from any information acquisition
strategy of buyer i, fixing the information acquisition strategy of the other buyers at α−i . This
is equivalent to the existence of a hyperplane properly supporting C(α−i) at γ(Θ−i |θi , α). This
requirement is stronger than the analogous condition in the standard model to the extent that
there can be (possibly infinitely) many beliefs that arise from any information acquisition strategy,
even when there are a small number of types that arise in equilibrium.
Condition 2 requires that the smallest exposed face of the closure of C(α−i) that contains
γ(Θ−i |θi , α) does not intersect with the closure of the set of beliefs of all types of buyer i with a
valuation strictly greater than vi (i.e. θi ’s valuation) under i that could arise fromany information
acquisition strategy of buyer i, fixing the information acquisition strategy of the other buyers at
α−i . By definition, there is a hyperplane that supports C(α−i) at γ(Θ−i |θi , α) and intersects C(α−i)
at exactly this exposed face. Condition 2 is equivalent to this hyperplane strongly separating
γ(Θ−i |θi , α) from any belief in C(α−i)with a valuation strictly greater than vi under i .
For each , we require the existence of an α such that the conditions hold for every type
θi  (vi , si) such that si arises with positive probability in equilibrium, vi receives the object with
positive probability according to f , and vi is not the greatest element of Vi under i . If we want
to guarantee full rent extraction for every f , then we can drop the requirement that vi receives the
object with positive probability according to a particular f .
Corollary 1.5.2. The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent extraction for every social
choice function f : V 7→ ∆I if and only if for every ∈ R there exists an α such that for all i and for all
θi ∈ Θi(α) \ (v∗i (i) × Si):
1. γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i))  
2. FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) ∩ D(θi , α−i , i)  .
Remark 1.5.1. In the standard casewithout information acquisition S  , γ(Θ−i |θi , α)  pi(V−i |vi),
and hence Corollary 1.5.2 requires:
1. For all ∈ R and for all vi ∈ Vi \ v∗i (i), pi(V−i |vi) ∩ ri(co{pi(V−i |v′i) : v′i ∈ Vi})  
2. For all∈ R and for all vi ∈ Vi\v∗i (i), Fco{pi(V−i |v′i ):v′i∈Vi }(pi(V−i |vi))∩{pi(V−i |v′i) : v′i i vi}  
Note that this is equivalent to pi(V−i |vi) ∩ ri(co{pi(V−i |v′i) : v′i ∈ Vi})   for all vi ∈ Vi and
Fco{pi(V−i |v′i ):v′i∈Vi }(pi(V−i |vi))  {pi(V−i |vi)} for all vi ∈ Vi . Together they are equivalent to pi(V−i |vi)∩
co{pi(V−i |v′i) : v′i , vi}  , as we have stated in Example 1.4.1.
Remark 1.5.2. In Definition 1.3.1, the requirement that rent extraction is possible for all w simplifies
the conditions on beliefs in the standard model. In particular, as the last remark shows, the
conditions on beliefs do not depend on the valuation of the type holding each belief. However, this
reduction is not possible in our setting, since for each perturbation of the valuations, the seller can
induce a different information acquisition strategy to fully extract rent; hence for each information
acquisition strategy, the conditions on beliefs do not need to hold for every perturbation of the
valuations.
Proof Intuition
The intuitionbehind sufficiency is as follows.Condition1 implies that for eachθi ∈ Θ+i (α, f )\(v∗i (i
) × Si), there is a hyperplane {γ : τ · γ  τ · γ(Θ−i |θi , α)} supporting C(α−i) at γ(Θ−i |θi , α). That
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is, there exists a lottery τ(θi) that has weakly positive expected value for all types θ′i arising from
any information acquisition strategy. Condition 2 implies that for all θ′i such that w(v′i) > w(vi),
there exists an ε > 0 such that the expected value of τ(θi) for type θ′i is strictly larger than ε—that
is, the hyperplane τ(θi) strongly separates the belief of θi from the beliefs of types θ′i such that
w(v′i) > w(vi).
Now for each θi < Θ+i (α, f ), we can let ti(θi ,Θ−i)  0,3 in which case Ui(θi , θ′i , α′i , α−i)  0
for all α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i). This is saying that no type has an incentive to deviate by
pretending to be a type that does not receive the object. For θi ∈ (v∗i (i)×Si)∩Θ+i (α, f ), we can let
ti(θi ,Θ−i)  wi(vi)xi(θi ,Θ−i).4 Intuitively, if types with the highest valuation pay their valuation
for the object whenever they receive the object, they receive no rents, and no other type would
want to pretend to have the highest valuation as these other types value the object even less.
For types that do receive the object in equilibrium and do not have the highest valuation,
i.e. for θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si), we can add a scaled up version of the lottery τ(θi) to
the payment. So let ti(θi ,Θ−i)  wi(vi)xi(θi ,Θ−i) + Mτ(θi) for sufficiently large M. Now types
θ′i such that wi(v′i) > wi(vi) following α′i will not want to pretend to be type θi , since the
expected payment includes Mτ(θi) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i), which can be made arbitrarily large. For
types θ′i such that wi(v′i) ≤ wi(vi), it is possible that τ(θi) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)  0, but in that case
Ui(θi , θ′i , α′i , α−i) ≤ Ui(θi , θi , α)  0.
For necessity, first note that for any θi , it is without loss of generality to let ti(θi ,Θ−i) 
wi(vi)xi(θi ,Θ−i)+Mτ(θi) for some τ(θi). For the mechanism to fully extract rent, we need τ(θi) ·
γ(Θ−i |θi , α)  0. If Condition 1 fails, then there exists a type θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si) such
that for any τ(θi), either γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) · τ(θi)  0 for all α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), or
there exists α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i) such that γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) · τ(θi) < 0. But incentive
compatibility requires that γ(Θ−i |θ∗i , α) · τ(θi) > 0 for θ∗i ∈ v∗i (i) × Si , and for w such that
maxv′i wi(v′i) is sufficiently large,M must also be large. This means that there must exist α′i ∈ A
|Vi |
i ,
θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i) such that γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)·τ(θi) < 0. Then theutility from the followingdeviation
is strictly positive: choose α′i , drop out for all types other than θ
′
i , and report θi when type θ
′
i .
If Condition 2 fails, then there exists a type θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si) such that for any
τ(θi) that supports Ci(α−i) at γ(Θ−i |θi , α), for every ε > 0, there exists an information acquisition
strategy α′i ∈ A |Vi |i such that for some type θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i)with w(v′i) > wi(vi), the expected value
of τ(θi) after having chosen α′i is less than ε. Then a profitable deviation is to choose α′i , drop out
for all types other than θ′i , and report θi when type θ
′
i .
Simple Conditions
We now give simpler sufficient conditions and necessary conditions that depend only on the
beliefs, and not the valuations of the types holding each belief. Define:
• D∗(θi , α−i)  ∪i∈RiD(θi , α−i , i)  {γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) : α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), v′i , vi}
• B(vi , α−i)  {γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) : α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), v′i  vi}.
D∗(θi , α−i) is the set of beliefs of every type of buyer i with a valuation different from vi that
could arise from any information acquisition strategy of buyer i, fixing the information acquisition
strategy of the other buyers at α−i . B(vi , α−i) is the set of beliefs of all types of buyer iwith valuation
3ti(θi ,Θ−i)  (ti(θi , θ1−i), . . . , ti(θi , θ
|Θ−i |
−i )).
4xi(θi ,Θ−i)  (xi(θi , θ1−i), . . . , xi(θi , θ
|Θ−i |
−i )).
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vi that could arise from any information acquisition strategy of buyer i, fixing the information
acquisition strategy of the other buyers at α−i .
Corollary 1.5.3 (Sufficient Condition). The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent
extraction for every social choice function f : V 7→ ∆I if there exists an α such that for all i:
1. For all θi ∈ Θi(α), γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i))  
2. For all θi ∈ Θi(α), FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) ∩ D∗(θi , α−i)  .
Corollary 1.5.4 (Necessary Condition). The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent
extraction for every social choice function f : V 7→ ∆I only if there exists an α such that for all i and for
some v′i :
1. For all θi ∈ Θi(α) \ ({v′i} × Si), γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i))  
2. For all θi ∈ Θi(α) \ ({v′i} × Si), FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) ∩ B(v′i , α−i)  .
1.6 Surplus Extraction
A closely related question is when the seller can fully extract surplus.
Definition 1.6.1. The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full surplus extraction if for
all allocation problems ((Θ,Π, (A,Σ)), w), there exists a mechanism (x , t) and an information
acquisition strategy α such that:
• (x , t) is incentive compatible, individually rational, and fully extracts rent given α
• Buyers optimally acquire information given (x , t)
• x(v , s)  f ∗(v) for all v , s such that γ(v , s |α) > 0, where f ∗(v) ∈ arg max f ∈∆I ∑i∈I fiwi(vi).
Clearly, if (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full rent extraction for every social choice function f : V 7→
∆I, then (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full surplus extraction. However, the converse is not true. The
reason is that there is always a buyer such that the lowest type of that buyer values the object at
least as much as the lowest type of any other buyer. Then for every other buyer, the seller does not
need to allocate to the lowest types. Thus, the conditions are required to hold for a smaller set of
types. Let v∗ i(i)  {vi : v′i  vi for all v′i ∈ Vi} be the set containing the smallest elements of Vi
under i . Then:
Proposition 1.6.1. The information structure (Θ,Π, (A,Σ)) guarantees full surplus extraction if and only
if for every ∈ R and for every i ∈ I, there exists an α such that:
For all θi ∈ Θi(α) \ (v∗i (i) × Si):
1. γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i))  
2. FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) ∩ D(θi , α−i , i)  
For all j , i, and for all θj ∈ Θ j(α) \ ((v∗j( j) ∪ v∗ j( j)) × S j):
3. γ(Θ− j |θj , α) ∩ ri(C(α− j))  
4. FC(α− j )(γ(Θ− j |θj , α)) ∩ D(θj , α− j ,  j)  .
Proof. Appendix. 
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given a full characterisation of information structures that guarantee full
rent extraction when the buyers are able to acquire additional information about each other.
The standard result in mechanism design with correlated information is that the seller can fully
extract surplus. In other words, buyers do not earn any rents from their private information. With
information acquisition, buyers may earn positive rents. For example, a buyer who can always
learn more about each type of her opponents must earn positive rents whenever the seller wishes
to implement any allocation rule in which she receives the object with positive probability.
In our model, the additional signals do not contain any socially useful information since the
buyers already know their private valuations. We assume that information acquisition is costless;
otherwise, any information acquisition strategy that results in costly information acquisition
wouldbe inefficient. Itmaybe interesting to incorporate costly actions into ourmodel. For example,
full surplus extraction would then require the existence of an information acquisition strategy
which does not involve playing any costly actions such that the beliefs that arise from that strategy
do not lie in the convex hull of the beliefs that could arise from any information acquisition
strategy, including those with costly actions. That is, full surplus extraction would become even
harder for the seller.
Appendix 1.A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1. Assume that Condition 1 and Condition 2 of Proposition 1.3.1 are sat-
isfied for α, (x′, t′) and µ. Now define the direct mechanism (x , t) as x(θ)  x′(µ(θ, α(v))) and
t(θ)  t′(µ(θ, α(v))). First, note that (x , t) is incentive compatible given α since:
Ui(θ′i , θi ; α) 
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)xi(θ′i , θ−i)wi(vi) −
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)ti(θ′i , θ−i)

∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)x′i(µi(θ′i , αi(v′i))), µ−i(θ−i , α−i(v−i)))wi(vi)
−
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)t′i(µi(θ′i , αi(v′i)), µ−i(θ−i , α−i(v−i)))
 U′i (µi(θ′i , αi(v′i)), θi ; α, µ−i)
≤ U′i (µi(θi , αi(vi)), θi ; α, µ−i)

∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)x′i(µi(θi , αi(vi)), µ−i(θ−i , α−i(v−i)))wi(vi)
−
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)t′i(µi(θi , αi(vi)), µ−i(θ−i , α−i(v−i)))

∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)xi(θi , θ−i)wi(vi) −
∑
θ−i
γ(θ−i |θi , α)ti(θi , θ−i)
 Ui(θi , θi ; α).
To see that buyers optimally acquire information α given (x , t), note that for θi ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i):
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U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)  maxθ′i
Ui(θ′i , θi ; α′i , α−i)
≤ max
m′i
U′i (m′i , θi ; α′i , α−i , µ−i)
 U∗∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i , µ−i)
where the inequality followsbecause for allθ′i ,Ui(θ′i , θi ; α′i , α−i)  U′i (µi(θ′i , αi(v′i)), θi ; α′i , α−i , µ−i).
Also note that for θi ∈ Θi(α):
U∗i (θi ; α)  Ui(θi , θi ; α)
 U′i (µi(θi , αi(vi)), θi ; α, µ−i)
 U∗∗i (θi ; α, µ−i).
Thus:
u˜i(αi , α−i) 
∑
θi∈Θi (α)
γΘi (θi |αi , α−i)U∗i (θi ; αi , α−i)

∑
θi∈Θi (α)
γΘi (θi |αi , α−i)U∗∗i (θi ; α, µ−i)
≥
∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i , µ−i)
≥
∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)
 u˜i(α′i , α−i). 
Proof of Proposition 1.5.1. For sufficiency, take f : V 7→ [0, 1]N , and for any w, take  such that for
all i, vi i v′i if and only if wi(vi) ≥ wi(v′i). Then let information acquisition strategy α be such
that:
1. For all θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si), γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i))  
2. For all θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si), FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) ∩ D(θi , α−i , i)  .
Let x(θ)  f (v) for any θ that arises with positive probability under α, and let x(θ) 
0 otherwise. Now we argue that there exists transfers such that (x , t) is incentive compatible,
individually rational, and fully extracts rent given α, and α is optimally chosen given (x , t).
For each θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si), Condition 1 implies that there is a hyperplane:
{γ : τ · γ  τ · γ(Θ−i |θi , α)}
which properly supportsC(α−i) at γ(Θ−i |θi , α). Thus, FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)) is a proper exposed face
of C(α−i). Let τ(θi) be a lottery such that FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α))  {γ : τ(θi) · γ  0} ∩ C(α−i). This
implies that τ(θi) · γ  0 for all γ ∈ FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)). Without loss of generality, let τ(θi) · γ > 0
for all γ ∈ C(α−i) \ FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θi , α)).
For θi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si) let ti(θi ,Θ−i)  wi(vi)xi(θi ,Θ−i) + Mτ(θi),5 where M is
sufficiently large. Note that γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · τ(θi)  0. For θi < Θ+i (α, f ), let ti(θi ,Θ−i)  0. For
5Recall that ti(θi ,Θ−i) 
(
ti(θi , θ1−i), . . . , ti(θi , θ
|Θ−i |
−i )
)
and xi(θi ,Θ−i) 
(
xi(θi , θ1−i), . . . , xi(θi , θ
|Θ−i |
−i )
)
.
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θi ∈ (v∗i (i) × Si) ∩Θ+i (α, f ), let ti(θi ,Θ−i)  wi(vi)xi(θi ,Θ−i). By construction, (x , t) fully extracts
rent given α. We now show that (x , t) is incentive compatible given α, and α is chosen optimally.
First we show that for any θi ∈ Θi(α), θ′i ∈ Θi ,Ui(θ′i , θi ; α) ≤ Ui(θi , θi ; α). Wewill consider the
cases where θ′i ∈ Θ+i (α, f )\ (v∗i (i)×Si), θ′i < Θ+i (α, f ), and θ′i ∈ (v∗i (i)×Si)∩Θ+i (α, f ) separately.
Note that for θ′i ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si):
Ui(θ′i , θi ; α)  wi(vi)γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · xi(θ′i ,Θ−i) − γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · (wi(v′i)xi(θ′i ,Θ−i) +Mτ(θ′i))
 (wi(vi) − wi(v′i))γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · xi(θ′i ,Θ−i) −Mγ(Θ−i |θi , α) · τ(θ′i)
≤ 0.
The last inequality follows because γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∈ C(αi), so γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · τ(θ′i) ≥ 0, and when
γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · τ(θ′i)  0, wi(vi) ≤ wi(v′i) by Condition 2. To see this, first note that if γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ·
τ(θ′i)  0, then γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ∈ FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α), since FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α))  C(α−i) ∩ {γ :
τ(θ′i) · γ  0}. But then Condition 2 requires that γ(Θ−i |θi , α) < D(θ′i , α−i , i). Since θi ∈ Θi(α),
this implies that θi must be such that wi(vi) ≤ wi(v′i).
For θ′i < Θ
+
i (α, f ), Ui(θ′i , θi ; α)  0 since xi(θ′i ,Θ−i)  ti(θ′i ,Θ−i)  0. For θ′i ∈ v∗i (i) × Si , note
that wi(v′i) ≥ wi(vi). Then:
Ui(θ′i , θi ; α)  w(vi)γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · xi(θ′i ,Θ−i) − γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · (wi(v′i)xi(θ′i ,Θ−i))
 (wi(vi) − wi(v′i))γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · xi(θ′i ,Θ−i)
≤ 0.
Now we show that α is chosen optimally. That is, for any α′i ∈ A |Vi |i :∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i) ≤
∑
θi∈Θi (α)
γΘi (θi |α)U∗i (θi ; α).
Note that for all θi ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i):
U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)  maxθ′i
Ui(θ′i , θi ; α′i , α−i)
 max
θ′i
wi(vi)x(θ′i ,Θ−i) · γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i) − t(θ′i ,Θ−i) · γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i)
 max
{
max
θ′i∈Θ+i (α, f )\(v∗i (i )×Si )
wi(vi)x(θ′i ,Θ−i) · γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i)
− (wi(v′i)xi(θ′i ,Θ−i) +Mτ(θ′i)) · γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i), 0
}
 max
{
max
θ′i∈Θ+i (a , f )\(v∗i (i )×Si )
(wi(vi) − wi(v′i))x(θ′i ,Θ−i) · γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i)
−Mτ(θ′i) · γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i), 0
}
≤ 0.
The last inequality holds because for any α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θi ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), and θ′i ∈ Θ+i (a , f ) \ (v∗i (i
)×Si), either γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i)·τ(θ′i)  0 andw(vi) ≤ w(v′i), or γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i)·τ(θ′i) > ε for some
ε > 0 (i.e. ε is a uniform lower bound across all α′i).6 The former was shown when we established
6When we established incentive compatibility, we did not need this step because the set of θi is finite. However, since
there can be infinitely many α′i , it is not enough that γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i) · τ(θ′i ) > 0 for all α′i , because now there is the
possibility that γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i) · τ(θ′i ) can be made arbitrarily close to 0.
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incentive compatibility. To see the latter, suppose that for every ε > 0, there exists α′i ∈ A |Vi |i ,
θi ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i)wherewi(vi) > wi(v′i) such that γ(Θ−i |θi , α′i , α−i)·τ(θ′i) < ε. Let γε ∈ D(θ′i , α−i , i)
denote the sequence of such beliefs. SinceD(θ′i , α−i , i) is compact, as ε→ 0, there is a convergent
subsequence which converges to γ ∈ D(θ′i , α−i , i), with γ · τ(θ′i)  0. Note that γε ∈ C(α−i), so
γ ∈ C(α−i), and γ ∈ {γ : γ · τ(θ′i)  0}. Since FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α)  {γ : γ · τ(θ′i)  0} ∩ C(α−i),
γ ∈ FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α) contradicting Condition 2. Thus, for sufficiently large M, the inequality
holds.
Now we prove necessity. Suppose that there exists  such that Condition 1 is not satisfied.
Define w such that for all i, wi(vi) ≥ wi(v′i) if and only if vi i v′i , and for all i, for vi ∈ v∗i (i)
let wi(vi)  K, where K is sufficiently large. Take an arbitrary α and let θˆi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i
) × Si) such that γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α) ∩ ri(C(α−i)) , . Suppose for a contradiction that (x , t) is incentive
compatible, individually rational, and fully extracts rent given α, α is chosen optimally, and
xi(θi , θ−i)  fi(vi , v−i) for all θ such that γ(θ |α) > 0. Without loss of generality, let ti(θˆi ,Θ−i) 
wi(vˆi)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i)+Mτ(θˆi) for some τ(θˆi). For rent extraction, we need τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)  0. For
θi ∈ v∗i (i)×Si , incentive compatibility requires γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ·((K−w(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i)−Mτ(θˆi)) ≤ 0,
which implies:
γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ·Mτ(θˆi) ≥ γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · (K − w(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) > 0.
Since Condition 1 is not satisfied, there must exist γ ∈ C(α−i) such that γ · τ(θˆi) < 0. Thus,
there must exists α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i) such that γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) · τ(θˆi) < 0. The previous
displayed inequality implies that for large K, M must also be large. Then:∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)Ui(θˆi , θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
(
wi(v′i)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) − t(θˆi ,Θ−i)
) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
((wi(v′i) − wi(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) −Mτ(θˆi)) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
> 0.
Suppose that there exists  such that Condition 2 is not satisfied. Then define w as before, take
an arbitrary α, and let θˆi ∈ Θ+i (α, f ) \ (v∗i (i) × Si) be such that FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)) ∩D(θˆi , α−i , i
) , . Suppose for a contradiction that (x , t) is incentive compatible, individually rational, and
fully extracts rent given α, α is chosen optimally, and xi(θi , θ−i)  fi(vi , v−i) for all θ such that
γ(θ |α) > 0. Without loss of generality, let ti(θˆi ,Θ−i)  wi(vˆi)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) +Mτ(θˆi) for some τ(θˆi).
For rent extraction, we need τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)  0. Assume that τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α) ≥ 0 for all
γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i), otherwise by the same argument as in the previous paragraph, the strategy α′i
must yield strictly positive rents. Thus, τ(θˆi) is a supporting hyperplane for C(α−i), which implies
that FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)) ⊂ {γ : γ · τ(θˆi)  0}
Since Condition 2 fails, there exists γ ∈ FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)) ∩ D(θˆi , α−i , i). We show that
for every ε > 0, we can find γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) such that wi(v′i) > wi(vˆi), θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), and
τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) < ε. To see this, take any sequence γk ∈ D(θˆi , α−i , i) converging to γ.
As k → ∞, τ(θˆi) · γk → τ(θˆi) · γ  0. Since γk ∈ D(θˆi , α−i , i), for each k, γk  γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
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such that wi(v′i) > wi(vˆi), θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i). Take a sufficiently large k and we are done. Then:∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)Ui(θˆi , θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
(
wi(v′i)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) − t(θˆi ,Θ−i)
) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
((wi(v′i) − wi(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) −Mτ(θˆi)) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
> 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1.6.1. This proof is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 1.5.1 and is
included for completeness. For sufficiency, take any w, and let  be such that for all i, vi i v′i if
and only if wi(vi) ≥ wi(v′i). Let i∗ be such that minv′i∗ wi∗(v′i∗) ≥ minv′j w j(v′j) for all j. Note that
we can choose f ∗ such that for all i , i∗, and for vi ∈ v∗ i(i), f ∗i (vi , v−i)  0 for all v−i , since
w(vi) ≤ w(vi∗). Hence for i , i∗,Θ+i (α, f ∗) ⊂ Θi(α) \ (v∗ i(i)×Si), and for i  i∗,Θ+i (α, f ∗) ⊂ Θi(α).
Proposition 1.5.1 then implies that the seller can fully extract rent for the social choice function f ∗.
Now we prove necessity. Take an arbitrary α, and suppose that there exists  and a buyer i
such that Condition 1 or Condition 2 is not satisfied for some θi ∈ Θi(α) \ (v∗i (i) × Si). Define
w such that for all j ∈ I, w j(v j) ≥ w j(v′j) if and only if v j  j v′j , let maxv′j w j(v′j)  K, and for
j , i, let minv′j w j(v′j) < minv′i wi(v′i). Now we can replicate the steps in the proof of necessity in
Proposition 1.5.1.
If Condition 1 is not satisfied, let θˆi ∈ Θi(α)\(v∗i (i)×Si) be such that γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)∩ri(C(α−i)) ,
. Note that f ∗i (vˆi , v−i) > 0 for some v−i (in particular, when for all j , i, v j ∈ arg minv′j w j(v′j)).
Suppose for a contradiction that (x , t) is incentive compatible, individually rational, and fully
extracts rent given α, α is chosen optimally, and xi(θi , θ−i)  f ∗i (vi , v−i) for all θ such that
γ(θ |α) > 0. Without loss of generality, let ti(θˆi ,Θ−i)  wi(vˆi)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) +Mτ(θˆi) for some τ(θˆi).
For rent extraction, we need τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)  0. For θi ∈ v∗i (i) × Si , incentive compatibility
requires γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · ((K − w(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) −Mτ(θˆi)) ≤ 0, which implies:
γ(Θ−i |θi , α) ·Mτ(θˆi) ≥ γ(Θ−i |θi , α) · (K − w(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) > 0.
Since Condition 1 is not satisfied, there must exist γ ∈ C(α−i) such that γ · τ(θˆi) < 0. Thus,
there must exists α′i ∈ A |Vi |i , θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i) such that γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) · τ(θˆi) < 0. The previous
displayed inequality implies that for large K, M must also be large. Then:∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)Ui(θˆi , θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
(
wi(v′i)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) − t(θˆi ,Θ−i)
) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
((wi(v′i) − wi(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) −Mτ(θˆi)) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
> 0.
If Condition 2 is not satisfied, let θˆi ∈ Θi(α) \ (v∗i (i) × Si) be such that FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)) ∩
D(θˆi , α−i , i) , . Note that f ∗i (vˆi , v−i) > 0 for some v−i (in particular, when for all j , i,
v j ∈ arg minv′j w j(v′j)). Suppose for a contradiction that (x , t) is incentive compatible, individually
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rational, and fully extracts rent given α, α is chosen optimally, and xi(θi , θ−i)  f ∗i (vi , v−i) for all θ
such that γ(θ |α) > 0.Without loss of generality, let ti(θˆi ,Θ−i)  wi(vˆi)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i)+Mτ(θˆi) for some
τ(θˆi). For rent extraction, we need τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)  0. Assume that τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α) ≥ 0 for
all γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i), otherwise by the same argument as in the previous paragraph, the strategy
α′i must yield strictly positive rents. Thus, τ(θˆi) is a supporting hyperplane for C(α−i), which
implies that FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)) ⊂ {γ : γ · τ(θˆi)  0}
Since Condition 2 fails, there exists γ ∈ FC(α−i )(γ(Θ−i |θˆi , α)) ∩ D(θˆi , α−i , i). We show that
for every ε > 0, we can find γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) such that wi(v′i) > wi(vˆi), θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i), and
τ(θˆi) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i) < ε. To see this, take any sequence γk ∈ D(θˆi , α−i , i) converging to γ.
As k → ∞, τ(θˆi) · γk → τ(θˆi) · γ  0. Since γk ∈ D(θˆi , α−i , i), for each k, γk  γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
such that wi(v′i) > wi(vˆi), θ′i ∈ Θi(α′i , α−i). Take a sufficiently large k and we are done. Then:∑
θi∈Θi (α′i ,α−i )
γΘi (θi |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θi ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)U∗i (θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
≥ γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)Ui(θˆi , θ′i ; α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
(
wi(v′i)xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) − t(θˆi ,Θ−i)
) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
 γΘi (θ′i |α′i , α−i)
((wi(v′i) − wi(vˆi))xi(θˆi ,Θ−i) −Mτ(θˆi)) · γ(Θ−i |θ′i , α′i , α−i)
> 0.
Now suppose that there exists  and a buyer i such that Condition 3 or Condition 4 is not
satisfied for some j , i, and θj ∈ Θ j(α) \ ((v∗j( j) ∪ v∗ j( j)) × S j). Define w such that for all
j ∈ I, w j(v j) ≥ w j(v′j) if and only if v j  j v′j , and let minv′j w j(v′j)  κ and maxv′j w j(v′j)  K. If
Condition 3 is not satisfied, let θˆj ∈ Θ j(α) \ ((v∗j( j) ∪ v∗ j( j)) × S j) be such that γ(Θ− j |θˆj , α) ∩
ri(C(α− j)) , . If Condition 4 is not satisfied, let θˆj ∈ Θ j(α) \ ((v∗j( j) ∪ v∗ j( j)) × S j) be such
that FC(α−i )(γ(Θ− j |θˆj , α))∩D(θˆj , α− j ,  j) , . Note that f ∗j (vˆ j , v− j) > 0 for some v− j (in particular,
when for all k , j, vk ∈ arg minv′k wk(v′k)). Then by exactly the same argument as before, there
can be no (x , t) that is incentive compatible, individually rational, and fully extracts rent given α,
where α is chosen optimally, and x j(θj , θ− j)  f ∗j (v j , v− j) for all θ such that γ(θ |α) > 0. 
Chapter 2
Private and Common Value Auctions with
Ambiguity over Correlation1
2.1 Introduction
In auctions, as in many other strategic situations, individuals often have a good understanding
of their own private information but they might know less about others’ information sources.
For example, in auctions for drilling rights, a company can understand the test results that it
conducted but might be worried that its results are correlated with those of other firms. Similarly
the evaluation one gets about a piece of art on sale might be correlated in complex ways to the
evaluations other bidders get.
In these situations bidders might worry about their lack of understanding of the correlation
structure between their own information and that of other bidders.2 These considerations are
important for their bidding behaviour. In private value auctions, beliefs about correlation influence
the assessment of bidders about the competition they might face. In common value auctions, such
beliefs also affect the bidders’ valuation of the good, which implies an additional effect on the
bidders’ strategies.
In this paperwe analyse private and common value auctionswhen individuals have ambiguity
over the joint information structures generating valuations and signals. Specifically, we assume
that individuals know the marginal information structure generating a value or a signal to each
bidder, but that they are aware that their information sources might be correlated to a degree,
and face ambiguity over the possible correlation scenarios. We propose a simple model to analyse
ambiguity over correlation structures that is tailored to the comparison with the standardmodel.3
In particular, we use a single parameter, a , to bound the degree of pointwise mutual information of
the information structures.4 When an individual receives a signal and contemplates what strategy
to play, she faces ambiguity aversion (as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) about the set of potential
joint information structures that are bounded by a.
Specifically, we analyse two-bidder, binary-value and binary-signal auctions (in Section 5 we
1This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
under grant agreement number 681579. We thank Subir Bose and Francesco Nava for helpful comments.
2Here we consider sophisticated individuals who entertain the possibility that such correlation might exist. A recent
literature looks at naive individuals who are not aware of the correlation between sources of information, i.e., correlation
neglect. See Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015), Glaeser and Sunstein (2009), Levy and Razin (2015a,b), Eyster andWeizsäcker.
(2011), Kallir and Sonsino (2009), and Enke and Zimmermann (2017).
3Auctions are typically analysed under the assumption of conditionally-independent private information, with the
bidders aware of this fact.
4See Church and Hanks (1991).
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extend the analysis to models with continuous signals and with many bidders). In this model, the
set of information structures that the bidders consider is centred around the true canonical case
of independent values and signals, and takes the following form. Consider the two bidders, 1 and
2, with values v  (v1 , v2) each receiving a signal, s1 and s2 respectively. Let q(s|v) denote a joint
probability of the signal vector s  (s1 , s2) conditional on the valuations for the good, and q1(s1 |v)
and q2(s2 |v) denote the marginal probabilities of s1 and s2 conditional on v. Similarly, let p(v)
denote the prior over v, with pi(vi) the marginal prior. We assume that individuals’ ambiguity is
over the set of joint information structures satisfying 1a ≤ p(v)q(s|v)∏i1,2 pi (vi )∏i1,2 qi (si |v) ≤ a for some finite
parameter a ≥ 1, for any s, v.5 In other words, the (exponential) pointwise mutual information
(ePMI) is bounded. The higher is a , the larger is the ambiguity. When a  1 we are back in the
standardmodel with conditionally independent signals and no ambiguity. This framework allows
us to analyse ambiguity in the private value auction (where we focus on ambiguity over p(v)),
and in the common value auction (where we focus on ambiguity over q(s|v)).
In the model, ambiguity over information structures is exogenous but ambiguity over the
valuations or the equilibrium bids of opponents is endogenous, and depends on the strategic
interaction. An ambiguity averse bidder focuses attention on beliefs that minimise her expected
utility. This will be reflected in beliefs that either put weight on more competition, believing
the other bidders have similar valuations, or on a low value of the good. The former effect, the
“competition effect”, is present in both private and common value auctions. The second effect, a
“winner’s value effect”, exists only in common value auctions.
We analyse the equilibria in the second-price and first-price auctions. We first focus on the
competition effect. We show how this effect implies overbidding in the private values case; the
distribution of bids in the first price auction in the face of ambiguity first-order stochastically
dominates that in the standard model. This implies that ambiguity is beneficial for the seller
as her revenue increases with a. In contrast, the “winner’s value effect” generally implies that
bidders should shade their bids. We show that in common-value auctions, in which both effects
are present, the “winner’s value effect” is stronger and the seller’s revenue decreases in ambiguity.
In particular, the low type always shades her bids while the high type does so unless ambiguity
is small and signals too imprecise. In Section 5 we show that this result (and the intuition behind
it) also holds when we consider an environment with many bidders, as well as an environment
with continuous signals.
We then turn to consider optimal auction design in the face of ambiguity over correlation
structures. We first show that the above results about the seller’s revenue also hold for the optimal
auction; the seller’s optimal revenue increases in ambiguity in the private values case but decreases
in the common value case. In the private values case our results are consistent with Bose, Ozde-
noren and Pape (2006) who show that the optimal mechanism fully insures the bidders against
ambiguity. In Bose et al (2006) bidders believe that valuations are independently drawn, but face
ambiguity regarding the particular distributions of valuations that others have. In contrast, in our
model bidders know the marginal distribution of valuations but face ambiguity about the joint
distribution of valuations. Nevertheless, the full insurance result holds in our setting when values
are private.
The full insurance result implies that the competition effect does not arise in equilibrium in
the optimal auction. However, there is a sense in which the seller exploits the competition effect to
increase her revenue. Since under the worst case belief the high type believes that her opponent
5Levy and Razin (2018) show that this restriction provides a meaningful way to constrain the set of ambiguous beliefs.
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is likely to also be a high type, she is less willing to deviate than when there is no ambiguity, so
that the seller is able to extract more rent from the high type. Thus, the seller’s revenue increases
in ambiguity.
In the common value case, insuring the buyers against ambiguity is not necessarily optimal.
In the standard case without ambiguity, any optimal mechanism must allocate the good with
probability 1 and fully extract rent. However, any such mechanism cannot be a full insurance
mechanism. To prevent the high type from deviating, the seller has to conduct side bets with the
low type. Under ambiguity, these side bets are costly since the expected payment to the seller
is smaller under the seller’s belief than under the worst case belief of the buyer. However, if
ambiguity is small or if the signals are very precise, these side bets remain optimal and the low
type is not insured against ambiguity.
Furthermore, even though there is no need to conduct side bets with the high type to satisfy
any incentive constraint, it is also not necessarily optimal to fully insure the high type. This is
because to fully insure the high type, the allocation rule needs to be independent of the type of
her opponent. Otherwise, the winner’s value effect implies that the high type will underestimate
the value of the object. However, when the ambiguity is small or the signals are precise, the seller
will allocate the good to the high type with higher probability when her opponent is a low type in
order to slacken the incentive constraint. In this case, the seller provides partial insurance by also
asking the high type to pay more when her opponent is low type. Under the worst case belief, the
high type does not care about the type of her opponent, but undervalues the object conditional
on winning. In other words, the seller insures the buyer against the competition effect but not the
winner’s value effect.
On the other hand if the signals are very imprecise and the ambiguity large, the seller finds it
optimal to fully insure the buyers against the ambiguity, so that the allocation of the good does not
depend on their signals. As a result, the high type earns positive rents in equilibrium. Finally, we
show that the seller’s revenue in the optimal mechanism is decreasing in the amount of ambiguity,
as we found in both the first and second price auctions.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a recent literature on ambiguity and auctions. As far as we know, our paper
is the first to analyse ambiguity in common-value auctions. For private-value auctions, Salo and
Weber (1995) and Chen, Katušcák and Ozdenoren (2007) show how ambiguity aversion translates
to higher bids as individuals underestimate their winning probabilities.6 We complement their
analysis by defining ambiguity differently, and more importantly, by considering the common-
values case and the comparison with the private-values case, both positively and normatively.
Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape (2006) analyse optimal auction mechanisms for private-value auctions
with ambiguity over other bidders’ valuations. They show that the seller will fully insure the
buyers against ambiguity. Again, our key contribution is to analyse the common-values case and
compare it to the private-values case. Specifically, we show that in the common value auction
sometimes only partial insurance arises. Lo (1998) shows that the first-price auction dominates the
second-price auction in some environments. He uses a multiple priors approach and shows that
equilibrium bids are simply determined as if all players hold the worst-case prior. In our analysis
6Chen, Katušcák and Ozdenoren (2007) however provide experimental evidence that bids are lower in the presence
of ambiguity in first and second-price auctions with independent private values.
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players with different signals focus on different beliefs so the model is not equivalent to one in
which players start for example from a mis-specified model with wrong beliefs.
Bose and Renou (2014) study how principals can use ambiguous mechanisms to implement
socialwelfare functions that arenot attainableunderunambiguousmechanisms. Inparticular, they
construct ambiguous communication mechanisms between the agents and a moderator resulting
with agents updating to sets of beliefs. Hanany, Klibanoff and Mukerji (Forthcoming) is a recent
contribution to the study of incomplete information games and ambiguity. Finally, Bergemann,
Brooks andMorris (2017) consider private values auctions and study the set of achievable utilities
when considering, as modellers, the set of different feasible information structures. Our analysis
is different as in our approach it is the economic agents, rather than the modeller, who span the
possible information structures. In addition, we restrict the set of possible information structures
using the notion of pointwisemutual information.We showhow this shifts equilibrium behaviour
in a non-trivial way.
2.3 Model
We consider a simple symmetric auction with two bidders (1 and 2), each with two possible
valuations v ∈ {L,H} where 0 ≤ L < H  1. For expositional purposes we will focus on the case
of L  0 in the body of the paper. Results are easily generalised to L > 0 (see the Appendix).
Wewill consider two cases, private values and commonvalues. In the private value casewewill
assume that valuations are independent across bidders and distributed uniformly. In the common
value case we will assume that the valuations are fully positively correlated with a uniform prior.
Bidders know if they are in the private or common values case.
The paper focuses on ambiguity over joint information structures. We model this ambiguity
by spanning a set of possible symmetric information structures around the true information
structures mentioned above for the private and common value cases. In particular, we assume
that bidders know the following aspects of the environment:
1. The state space. A state is a vector of valuations v  (v1 , v2) ∈ {L,H}2.
2. Priors about the state. Each bidder knows that the marginal prior distributions are uniform;
that is, the probability that each bidder has a low value is a half.
3. Signals. Each bidder i  1, 2 observes a private signal si ∈ {l , h}.
Bidders entertain a set of possible joint information structures that are consistent with the
above three aspects of the environment. A joint information structure is ({L,H}2 , {l , h}2 , q(s|v), p(v))
where q(s|v) is a joint probability on {l , h}2 conditional on v ∈ {L,H}2 and p(v) a distribution
over {L,H}2 that is consistent with uniform marginals.
To define the level of ambiguity, we use a simple one-parameter characterisation for the set of
joint information structures introduced in Levy and Razin (2018). This characterisation uses the
exponent of the pointwise mutual information (ePMI) to define bounds on the correlation between
information structures. Specifically, for each bidder let qi(si |v) denote the marginal conditional
probability of receiving the private signal si ∈ {l , h} given state v and let pi(vi)denote themarginal
prior. We assume the following:
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Assumption A1: There is a parameter 1 ≤ a < ∞, such that each bidder only considers joint information
structures, ({L,H}2 , {l , h}2 , q(s|v), p(v)), so that at any state v ∈ {L,H}2 and for any vector of signals
s ∈{l , h}2 ,
1
a
≤ p(v)q(s|v)∏
i1,2 pi(vi)
∏
i1,2 qi(si |v) ≤ a.7
The parameter a, the PMI-bound, describes the extent of the ambiguity a bidder faces over the
set of correlation scenarios. It is straightforward to see that ambiguity is largerwhen a is larger. The
formulation of the set is general in the sense that it is detail-free in terms of the underlying distri-
bution functions. It also captures the maximal set of joint information structures with correlation
bounded by a. Note that a joint information structure which satisfies independence would have
a  1 at any point; whenever a joint information structure does not satisfy independence then the
ePMI is less than 1 for some (s, v), and is greater than 1 for some (s′, v′).8 A higher a implies that
bidders consider information structures that are more concordant; for more on pointwise mutual
information as a measure of correlation see Levy and Razin (2018).
In Section 3 we will analyse first-price and second-price auctions for the private values and
common values cases, while Section 4 will provide the optimal auction analysis. In all these cases,
an equilibrium is denoted by a pair of bidding strategies for the two players, (b1(s1), b2(s2)), and
a symmetric equilibrium has b1(.)  b2(.) ≡ b(.).We consider max-min behaviour. Specifically, in
equilibrium, given an observed signal, a bidding strategy maximises the utility of the individual
under the worst-case information structure.
Our framework is flexible enough to consider different types of underlying correlations, which
will be tied to the private/common values environment (indeed in Section 5 we consider environ-
ments with continuous signals and with many bidders). To complete the model, we now specify
the feasible information structures considered by bidders in these two environments.
Private values
In the private values model bidders know their values (and know they are in the private values
model). As signals are fully informative about one’s own value, ambiguity will arise about the
correlation in the prior distribution p(v). Specifically, each prior distribution must be consistent
with the uniform marginal prior distributions, so that the set of functions p(v) for v ∈{0, 1}2 is
represented by:
Table 2.1: Joint information structures for the private value case
p(v) 0 1
0 α 12 − α
1 12 − α α
Ambiguity is then over the parameter α. Given a , the ePMI constraints impose the following
restrictions on α:
1
a
≤ 4α ≤ a , 1
a
≤ 4(12 − α) ≤ a
It is easy to see that the higher is a , the larger is the set of possible information structures that
are considered by bidders. From the above it is also easy to see that each bidder can consider α
7All the results can be easily generalised if instead of the lower bound 1a we use some finite b < 1.8It is then impossible to consider only priors/information structures with ePMI that is only higher (lower) than 1.
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satisfying
1
4a  α(a) ≤ α ≤ α¯(a) 
1
2 (1 −
1
2a )
Common values
In the common values case, the ambiguity of the bidders will affect their perception about the
correlation between their signals and those of their opponents, through q(s|v). In the previous case
we hadfixed themarginal priors; herewefix themarginal distributions of the signals. In particular,
there are two states of theworld, v ∈ {(1, 1), (0, 0)}. The probability of receiving the signal l in state
v  (0, 0), or the signal h in state v  (1, 1), is q > 12 i.e., q(s  l |(0, 0))  q(s  h |(1, 1))  q.9 We
assume that the true joint probability distribution, q(s1 , s2 |v), satisfies conditional independence,
so that q(s1 , s2 |v)  ∏i1,2 qi(si |v). However,while individuals know the truemarginal probability
distribution generating both their signals, they have ambiguity over the set of joint information
structures.
With the above specification, we can represent the family of information structures the bidders
entertain by:10
Table 2.2: Joint information structures for the common value case
q(s|(0, 0)) l h
l α0 q − α0
h q − α0 1 − 2q + α0
q(s|(1, 1)) l h
l α1 1 − q − α1
h 1 − q − α1 2q − 1 + α1
Under independence (a  1), α0  q2 and α1  (1 − q)2. In this case then, α0 and α1 are the
parameters over which there is ambiguity, as we define below. It is then easy to derive the bounds
for these parameters using the ePMI constraints. Specifically, for a general a, the ePMI constraints
imply the following bounds on the values of the αs:
α0(a) ≤ α0 ≤ α0(a)
α1(a) ≤ α1 ≤ α1(a)
where:
α0(a) 
1
a
(1 − q)2 + 2q − 1, α1(a) 
1
a
(1 − q)2
α0(a) 

a(1 − q)2 + 2q − 1 a ≤ q1−q
q − 1a q(1 − q) a > q1−q
, α1(a) 

a(1 − q)2 a ≤ q1−q
1 − q − 1a q(1 − q) a > q1−q
.
2.4 The competition and winner’s value effects
Wenow showhowambiguity over correlation can affect bids in two differentways. The competition
effect arises as ambiguitywill play a role in shaping beliefs about the probable bids of the opponent.
The winner’s value effectwill arise as ambiguity may play a role in shaping beliefs about one’s own
valuation given the information held by the opponent. Naturally, only the first effect will arise in
the private values case while both will arise in the common values case.
9The analysis can be extended to non-symmetric marginal probability distributions.
10The table describes an information structure so for each state, all cell entries are non-negative and all entries sum up
to one.
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Private-values
In the private value case, for each bidder i, the signal si ∈ {l , h} fully reveals her value. Ambiguity
will then play a role in shaping beliefs about the probable bids of the opponent but not about
the value of the good. Below we show that the competition effect implies higher bids. The results
in this section are closely related to Salo and Weber (1995) and Chen, Katušcák and Ozdenoren
(2007) who analyse auctions with ambiguity about the distribution of values in the case of private
values. For concreteness, and in order to compare this environment to that of common values, we
replicate these results in our setting.
Consider the first-price auction. When a  1, this is the standard model and the unique
equilibrium has the low type submitting a bid of zero, and the high type mixing between bids
in [0, 12 ] according to the distribution F(b)  b1−b . When a > 1, the low type still bids zero—her
value—in equilibrium.
We now consider the high type, when a > 1. Let p be the belief of the high type of bidder 1 that
bidder 2 is a high type. From Table 1 we have that p  2α, and thus given the ePMI constraints
for the high type of bidder 1, given a mixed strategy F(.) of the other player, the expected utility
for some bid b is given by:
min
p2α, α(a)≤α≤α¯(a)
Pr(Bidder 1 wins)(1 − b)  min
p2α, α(a)≤α≤α¯(a)
((1 − p) + pF(b))(1 − b)
From this expression we see that the expected utility depends on beliefs only through the
probability of winning. Moreover, it is easy to see that for any b , the unique minimiser of utility is
the highest p feasible, which is easily derived as p(a)  2α¯(a)  1− 12a . Let ε(a) ≡ p(a) − 12 .We can
then describe the strategy of the high type in the unique equilibrium as mixing on the interval
[0, 12 + ε(a)], for ε(a)  12 (1− 1a ), according to the distribution Fa(b)  12a−1 b1−b which stochastically
dominates Fa(b) for a  1.
Intuitively, ambiguity together with max-min preferences makes the high bidder believe that
the other bidder is more likely a high type and so induces the bidder to bid more aggressively.
This is the competition effect. Ambiguity over correlation through the prior implies that one can
consider different possibilities for the type of the other bidder (and hence her bid). An ambiguity
averse bidder will consider the worst case scenario and hence will believe that she faces the
toughest possible competition, which will lead her to bid more aggressively, thus increasing the
seller’s revenue.
In the second-price auction, this effect does not exist as it is still weakly dominant to bid your
value. Once the value is known, then the other’s bid is not relevant. We then have:
Proposition 2.4.1. For private value auctions: (i) In the first-price auction, the equilibrium distribution
of bids when a > 1 first order stochastically dominates that of the case in which a  1, with the seller’s
revenues increasing in a. (ii) In the second-price auction, the equilibrium distribution of bids when a > 1
is the same as that of the case in which a  1.
Proof. Appendix. 
Common values
We now analyse the common values case. In this case an additional effect of ambiguity emerges,
as players learn about their value from the equilibrium behaviour of others. Thus, in addition
to minimising their utility by envisaging a low probability of winning, bidders may also choose
beliefs that minimise the value of the good conditional on winning. This winner’s value effect will
CHAPTER 2. AUCTIONS WITH AMBIGUITY OVER CORRELATION 31
sometimes induce an opposite incentive comparedwith the competition effect; the competition ef-
fect can potentially induce bidders to bidmore aggressively perceiving a tougher competition; the
winner’s value effect can induce players to bid less aggressively if they perceive lower valuations
upon winning. Bidders can then shade their bids even further than they would in the absence of
ambiguity.
Recall that bidders perceive correlation structures as depicted in Table 2, and so ambiguity is
over the correlation parameters α0 , α1. Let us consider the low type of bidder 1. Suppose she uses
the equilibrium bid of the low type of bidder 2, denoted as ba(l), so that b  ba(l). In both the
first-price and the second price auction then, her worst-case expected utility is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
1
2 Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) − ba(l)),
where
Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))  α0 + α1
E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) 
α1
α1 + α0
And so:
Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) − ba(l))  (α0 + α1)(
α1
α0 + α1
− ba(l))
Note that the competition effect will imply that to minimise utility one has to minimise the
probability of winning, α1 + α0. On the other hand, the winner’s value effect will demand that
α1
α0+α1
is minimised, which is best achieved when α1 is minimised and α0 is maximised. When we
put the two together, the expression becomes
α1(1 − ba(l)) − α0ba(l)
which implies that the worst case scenario is indeed (α¯0 , α1), and so the winner’s value effect
dominates, as beliefs are chosen to minimise E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l). In the first-price auction the low type
will remain without rent, so that indeed b  ba(l)  E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l). This is also the bid that arises
in the second-price auction, where the players use the expected valuation that is based on both
bidders receiving their own signal. We therefore have derived that the bid of the low type is lower
than in the case with no ambiguity, in both types of auctions.
What about the high type? The intuition will be clearer in the second-price auction where
pure strategies are used (but the results are qualitatively similar as Proposition 2.4.2 illustrates).
Consider the high type of bidder 1. In the second-price auction, her expected utility when she
uses her opponent’s high type bid, so that b  ba(h) > ba(l) is
min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , h) − ba(l)) + (1/2)Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , h) − ba(h))
where:
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))  1 − α1 − α0 E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , h) 
1 − q − α1
1 − α1 − α0
Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))  α1 + α0 E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , h) 
2q − 1 + α1
α1 + α0
.
Putting these in the expression for the utility, we have:
min
(α0 ,α1)
[(α1 + α0)(ba(l) − 12 ba(h)) +
1
2 (2q − 1 + α1) + 1 − q − α1 − ba(l)].
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The competition and winner’s value effects now incorporate the possibility of winning both
against the low type and against another high type, as well as the magnitude of the equilibrium
bid of the low type. The terms 12 (2q − 1 + α1) + 1 − q − α1 express the expected valuation upon
winning. It is easy to see that to minimise utility, one needs to maximise α1. The first element,
(α1 + α0)(ba(l) − 12 ba(h)), denotes the expected payment given the two events in which the high
type bidder can win. Recall that ba(l)  E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l)  α1α1+α0 , which is lower than but related to
(1−q)2
(1−q)2+q2 . Thus, when q is low so that signals are imprecise, ba(l) can be relatively high, implying
that to minimise utility one has to minimise α1 and α0 , while when q is high, ba(l) is relatively
low, implying that to minimise utility, one has to maximise both. In the case when q is high,
both effects are then in tandem implying that the bidder chooses (α¯0 , α¯1). This means that the
bid is ba(h)  E(α¯1 ,α¯0)(v |h , h), which will be lower compared to the case of no ambiguity. Thus
the winner’s value upon winning against a high type, a more likely event, is indeed lower. In the
case of a low q , where the competition and winner’s value effect may clash, the latter dominates
implying that the bidder chooses (α0 , α¯1).The effect now ismore subtle;while this beliefminimises
E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , h), the winner’s value when she wins against a low type, it can, for a low a , increase
E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , h) beyond the canonical case. We then have:
Proposition 2.4.2. For common value auctions: (i) Second price auctions: In the unique symmetric pure-
strategy equilibrium, compared to the canonical model, the low type’s bid decreases in a , and the high type’s
bid decreases in a for either high enough a or high enough q and increases in a when both a and q are
low. (ii) First-price auctions: For sufficiently low a , in the unique symmetric equilibrium, compared to the
canonical model, the bid of the low type decreases in a, the maximal bid of the high type increases in a , with
the average bid of the high type increasing or decreasing depending on q.
Proof. Appendix. 
It is interesting to note that different types use different joint information structures, and thus the
model is not equivalent to one in which individuals simply have the wrong belief over correlation.
In other words, ambiguity interacts with equilibrium behaviour in a non-trivial manner. This was
harder to see in the private values case where the low type always bids her value; however in the
common value case, the low type is utilising a different belief to minimise her utility compared
with the high type, and moreover, as the result illustrates, the winner’s value effect dominates
so that the low type (and in most environments also the high type) end up lowering their bids
compared with the canonical model.
Seller’s revenue
In the case of private values we had seen that the seller’s revenue increases with ambiguity over
correlation, as bids increase (at least in the first-price auction). The case of common values yields
a different result, as can be gleaned from the fact that bids may decrease with a. As we show in
the Appendix, in the common value case, even when the high type increases her bid in the second
price auction, compared to the case of no ambiguity, her expected utility evaluated at the true
joint probability distribution will be higher compared to the canonical model. This arises as she
increases her bid when q is low, which implies she is more likely to encounter the low type and
hence pay the low type’s bid which is lower than in the canonical model. Thus, considering the
utility of bidders and the seller, we have:
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Proposition 2.4.3. For common value auctions: (i) Second price auction: The utility of both the high and
the low type increases in a and the seller’s revenue decreases with a. (ii) First price auction: For sufficiently
low a, the seller’s revenue decreases in a. (iii) The seller’s revenue is higher in the first-price rather than the
second-price auction.
Proof. Appendix. 
In the common values case, ambiguity implies that bidders decrease their bids; it therefore al-
lows them to gain a higher utility and implies that the seller’s revenue decreases with a. As
another illustration of this, consider the second-price auction equilibrium in the limit, where all
information structures are feasible, and so ambiguity is very large. It is the limit of the unique
symmetric pure-strategy equilibria that we characterise in the Appendix, and it is characterised
by ba(l)  0 and ba(h)  q.11 Specifically, the high type believes that signals are fully correlated
and so E(q ,1−q)(v |h , h)  E(v |h). These bids are the lowest among all equilibria and the seller’s
revenue is therefore substantially lower compared with the canonical model.
This result is different than in the private values case. Intuitively, in the former case ambiguity
increased the competitiveness of the bids, and thus these increased. In the common value case,
ambiguity in general induced the bidders to minimise their utility by minimising the value they
expect to gain when they win, implying lower bids at least on average.
The intuition for the result that the seller’s revenue is higher in the first-price auction is as
follows. In the second-price auction, an individual’s payment depends on the other’s bid and as
a result, there are more elements in her utility in which her beliefs play a role. For the case of no
ambiguity, this implies that she conditions her behaviour onmore information,which increases the
seller’s revenue.12 For the case of ambiguity, this implies that individuals have more possibilities
to condition on their worst-case beliefs, which decreases the seller’s revenue. Intuitively, the
competition effect is more pronounced in the first price auction than in the second price auction.
This is because in the first price auction the payment is directly related to the bid.
2.5 Optimal auctions
Our analysis here will focus on two results. First, consistent with results in the previous section,
the seller’s maximum revenue will increase with ambiguity in the private values case but will
decrease with ambiguity in the common values case. Second, the type of optimal auction will
also change when we switch from private to common values, and specifically, the seller will not
necessarily fully insure the bidders.
Indeed the key issue when considering optimal auctions under ambiguity is the level of insur-
ance provided by the seller to the bidders. Under independent private values, Bose, Ozdenoren
and Pape (2006) show that the optimal mechanism fully insures the bidders against ambiguity. In
Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape (2006) bidders believe that valuations are independently drawn, but
face ambiguity regarding the particular distributions of valuations that others have. In contrast, in
ourmodel bidders know themarginal distribution of valuations but face ambiguity about the joint
distribution of valuations. In Section 4.2 we replicate the full insurance result in our setting. When
reporting truthfully, the buyers are fully insured against ambiguity. However, the competition
11This is supported by the low type believing α0  q and α1  0, and the high type believing α0  q and α1  1 − q.
12With private values and ambiguity over the prior, Lo (1998) shows that the first-price auction dominates the second-
price auction in some environments.
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effect makes deviations less attractive, and the seller is able to exploit this by asking the high type
to pay more compared to the standard case without ambiguity.
In the common value case, however, the seller does not necessarily provide full insurance. We
show that when ambiguity is small or the signals sufficiently precise, the optimal mechanism fully
extracts rent (i.e. participation constraints are binding), using side bets with the low type to deter
the high type from deviating. These side bets expose the low type to ambiguity, and as a result
the seller cannot extract full surplus.
Moreover, the seller will allocate the object to the buyer with the highest signal, which exposes
the high type to ambiguity as well. As a result, the seller is then able to insure the high type
against the competition effect but not the winner’s value effect. Specifically, as we show in Section
4.3, when the two players receive different signals, the seller allocates the object to the high type;
the winner’s value effect then implies that the high type will undervalue the object, but the seller
is able to partially insure the high type by also asking her to pay more when her opponent is low
type. Under optimal transfers the high type does not care whether her opponent has received the
high or the low signal—that is, the high type is insured against the competition effect. On the
other hand when ambiguity is large and the signals imprecise, the seller fully insures the buyers,
leaving the high type with positive rents.
The seller’s problem
Wenow formalise the seller’s problem. A direct mechanism (x , t) is an allocation rule x : {l , h}2 7→
∆{1, 2} and a transfer rule t : {l , h}2 7→ R2. Let Uαi (s′, s) be i’s utility from reporting s′ when i’s
signal is s, given that the information structure is α. A direct mechanism is maxmin incentive
compatible if for all s ∈ {l , h}:
min
α
Uαi (s , s) ≥ minα U
α
i (s′, s)
for all s′ ∈ {l , h}. The revelation principle applies in this setting as long as we make the following
assumption:
No-hedging: The utility from playing the mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆{l , h} is ∑
s′
σ(s′)minα Uαi (s′, s) (as
opposed to minα
∑
s′
σ(s′)Uαi (s′, s)).
This assumption is standard in the literature on mechanism design with maxmin agents (see
for example, Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape (2006) or Wolitzky (2016)). In what follows, we restrict
attention to maxmin incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
Private values
In the private value case, qi(si  l |vi  L)  qi(si  h |vi  H)  1. For each signal s ∈ {l , h}, let
vs ∈ {L,H} be the valuation associatedwith the signal. That is, let v l  L and vh  H. Let p denote
a buyer’s belief that her opponent has received the same signal as her. The ePMI constraints imply,
following Table 1 in Section 3, that 12a ≤ p ≤ 1 − 12a . An optimal mechanism solves the seller’s
problem:
max
xi ,ti
2∑
i1
ti(l , l) + ti(l , h) + ti(h , l) + ti(h , h)
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subject to:
min
p∈[ 12a ,1− 12a ]
p [vsxi(s , s) − ti(s , s)] + (1 − p) [vsxi(s , s′) − ti(s , s′)]
≥ min
p∈[ 12a ,1− 12a ]
p [vsxi(s′, s) − ti(s′, s)] + (1 − p) [vsxi(s′, s′) − ti(s′, s′)]
min
p∈[ 12a ,1− 12a ]
p [vsxi(s , s) − ti(s , s)] + (1 − p) [vsxi(s , s′) − ti(s , s′)] ≥ 0
for all i, and for all s , s′ ∈ {l , h}.
As in Bose et al (2006), when values are private, the seller finds it optimal to fully insure the
buyers against ambiguity and is able to extract full surplus when the ambiguity is large:
Proposition 2.5.1. When buyers have private values:
(i) Any optimal mechanism is a full insurance mechanism
(ii) The optimal allocation rule depends on L: if L < 11+a , it is not optimal to sell to buyers with the low
valuation, but if L > 11+a , the seller always allocates the object.
(iii) The seller’s revenue is increasing in ambiguity, and as a →∞, converges to full surplus.
Proof. Appendix. 
In the Appendix, we fully characterise the set of optimal mechanisms under private values.
Common values
In the common values case, the possible joint information structures are described in Table 2 in
Section 3. The seller’s problem is:
max
xi ,ti
1
2
(
q2 + (1 − q)2) [ 2∑
i1
ti(l , l) + ti(h , h)
]
+ q(1 − q)
[
2∑
i1
ti(l , h) + ti(h , l)
]
subject to incentive and participation constraints:
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , h)
≥ min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(h , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(h , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(h , h)
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(h , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(h , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , h)
≥ min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , h)
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , h) ≥ 0
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(h , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(h , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , h) ≥ 0
For a given a, the optimal mechanism will depend on two cutoff values of q, which we now
define. Let q∗(a) be the solution to q2 + (1− q)2 − α0 − α1  α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1 that lies between 12
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and 1, and let q∗∗(a) be the solution to q2+(1−q)2−α0−α1  3q−2+α1+α1 that lies between 12 and
1.We derive the explicit expressions for q∗(a), q∗∗(a) in the Appendix. For 1 < a < ∞, q∗(a) < q∗∗(a).
We then have:
Proposition 2.5.2. When buyers have common values:
(i) When q ≤ q∗(a), an optimal mechanism allocates the good with equal probability for each player
disregarding their type, and a transfer of 12 (1 − q). The revenue of the seller is 1 − q, both types are
fully insured, and the high type earns positive rents.
(ii) When q ≥ q∗∗(a), the optimal mechanism allocates the good to the high type and with equal probability
to each player if both are of the same type. Transfers are such that the high type is partially insured,
the seller makes side bets with the low type, and the buyers earn no rents.
(iii) When q∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a), the optimal mechanism allocates the good to the high type and with equal
probability to each player if both are of the same type. There are no side bets with the low type, both
types are partially insured, and the high type earns positive rents.
(iv) As a →∞, both q∗(a) and q∗∗(a) converge to 12 (3−
√
3), and as a → 1, both q∗(a) and q∗∗(a) converge
to 12 .
(v) Seller’s revenue (weakly, and sometimes strictly) decreases with a.
Proof. Appendix. 
When q ≤ q∗(a), an implementation of the optimal mechanism is for the seller to first choose each
buyer with equal probability, and then sell to the chosen buyer at price 1− q. Since the decision to
sell is not based on the signal realisation, the good is worth 1− q to the low type and q to the high
type. Thus, the high type earns positive rents in equilibrium. Note that this mechanism is efficient,
and that given the seller’s design, ambiguity is not relevant or does not arise in equilibrium.
When q ≥ q∗∗(a), the participation constraint of the high type is binding: it is optimal to fully
extract rent. The seller engages in a side bet with the low type to prevent the high type from
deviating. Unlike in the classical case, side bets are costly to the seller, so the seller uses the
smallest bet that is sufficient to prevent the high type from deviating. To reduce this cost further,
the seller allocates the good to the high type when the players receive different signals, which
generates endogenous ambiguity over the expected value of the good. The seller is able to partially
insure the high type by asking her to pay more when the other player has received a low signal.
In this case, the expected payment from the high type is:
Thi 
1
2 (1 − (1 − q)
2) − 12 (q
2 − α0).
The expected payment from the low type is:
T li 
α1
2 −
[
q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1
] 1 − q − α1 − α1
2(α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1)
.
The low type chooses α0 and α1 both to minimise the perceived surplus from winning the object
and to maximise the perceived value of the transfers. Note that in the optimal mechanism, the
belief of the high type regarding α1 is irrelevant. The high type does not care about the type of
her opponent: she gets the same utility from any belief about α1. In this sense, she is insured
against the competition effect. On the other hand she believes that α0  α0. This gives rise to the
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winner’s value effect: her expectation of the value conditional on winning, 1−α12−α0−α1 , is lower than
true conditional expectation (for any belief α1 ∈ [α1 , α1]). When a converges to 1, only this case
remains.
The intuition why participation constraints must bind when a is small is as follows. If the
participation constraint of the high type is slack, the seller can achieve a first order increase in
revenue by increasing the payment of the high type. In order to ensure that the incentive constraint
is not violated, the seller can increase ti(l , h) and decrease ti(l , l) in such a way that keeps the low
type indifferent, but lowers the high type’s utility from deviating. Since the low type may have
different beliefs to the seller, these changes in transfers may decrease the seller’s revenue; however,
as the ambiguity becomes small, this fall in revenue converges to zero. On the other hand, the
increase in revenue from increasing the payment of the high type is fixed.
When q∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a), it is optimal to allocate the good to the high type when the players
receive different signals, but it is not optimal to conduct side bets with the low type. Instead,
the high type earns positive rents in equilibrium in order to satisfy the incentive constraint. The
winner’s value effect implies that the buyers underestimate the value of the object conditional on
winning. However, the seller partially insures both types, so that the competition effect does not
arise.13 This interval shrinks as a goes to either 1 or∞.
If buyers are fully insured against ambiguity, then the seller’s revenue is constant in ambiguity.
However, in the cases where buyers are not fully insured, the seller’s revenue is strictly decreasing
in ambiguity. The intuition is that as ambiguity increases, the largerwinner’s value effect forces the
seller to decrease transfers. Thus, the seller’s revenue is always (weakly) decreasing in ambiguity.
Note that Crémer and McLean (1988) show that some of the conclusions from the analysis
of optimal auctions with independent private values are not robust. For example, since surplus
extraction is possible when signals are correlated, the optimal mechanism is efficient and leaves
no rents to the buyers. Proposition 5 shows that these results continue to hold for a close to
1.14 On the other hand, when a is large, it is possible for buyers to earn positive rents in the
optimal mechanism. Note that in this environment, it is always possible to fully extract rent (see
Renou (2015)); however, as we have argued, rent extraction conflicts with full insurance and is not
necessarily optimal when ambiguity is large.
2.6 Extensions
We now extend themodel of Section 3 in twoways.We first consider the case of many bidders and
then that of continuous valuations. In each of these extensions we consider different models of
correlation which illustrate the flexibility of the framework. The key results of Section 3 extend to
these environments aswell: seller’s revenue decreaseswith ambiguity for common value auctions.
Many bidders
Our analysis above focused on the case of two bidders. In this section we consider a model with
commonvalues andmanybidders.Naturallywhen extending themodel tomore than twobidders,
many correlation patterns can be considered; we now extend the model in the simplest way that
13For the low type, any belief about α0 gives the same utility, but she believes that α1  α1, so that her expected value
of the object conditional on winning, α1α0+α1 is smaller than the true conditional expectation for any belief α0 ∈ [α0 , α0].
14The set of optimal mechanisms when a  1 is large. As a → 1, the optimal mechanism described in Proposition 5,
which is the unique symmetric mechanism when a is close to 1, converges to an optimal mechanism for the case when
a  1.
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also maintains symmetry and anonymity when a single bidder considers the correlation among
herself and all other bidders.
Specifically, consider a population of n bidders, who consider distributions of the following
form: with probability α0, all bidders receive the same signal in state 0, and with probability α1,
all bidders receive the same signal in state 1. This signal, s∗ ∈ {l , h}, is drawn from the same
marginal distribution as before; that is, Pr(s∗  h |v  1)  Pr(s∗  l |v  0)  q > 12 . With
the remaining probability, each bidder draws a (conditionally) independent signal, again, with
Pr(si  h |v  1)  Pr(si  l |v  0)  q > 12 for all i. Bidders have ambiguity then over α1 and α0 ,
as before.
To see that similar considerations are involved, consider a low type. Intuitively, a low typewins
only when she faces n − 1 low types. Minimising utility implies as before that she will minimise
her winning probability in state 1 and maximise it in state 0. This implies that she sets up the
correlation among bidders to be the highest in state 0, as positive correlation implies the highest
probability of having a vector of identical types. Alternatively, she uses the belief that correlation
is lowest in state 1; with independent signals the probability of any specific vector of valuations is
the lowest. But of course this means that conditioning on a vector of low types implies that state
0 is more likely, inducing a strictly lower bid, in line with the “winner’s value effect”. We are then
able to show:
Proposition 2.6.1. When ambiguity is not too large, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in the first-price
auction. Moreover, there exists n¯, such that for all n > n¯, in this equilibrium the high type conditions her
bid on the belief (α0 , α1)  (0, α¯1), and the low type conditions her bid on the belief (α0 , α1)  (α¯0 , 0). The
(expected) bids of both types are lower than in the independent case, and the seller’s revenues decrease with
ambiguity.
Proof. Appendix. 
For the high type (who uses a mixed strategy in equilibrium), the considerations are more com-
plicated as she needs to consider many vectors of types, each affecting both the probability of
winning and her valuation. For an h type, perceiving more correlation shifts the weight from the
set of events in which some types are also l , to the event in which they are all correlated (all h).
Consider for example the low state and hence α0, and its effect on the expected bid. Increasing α0
means reducing the probability of paying in all events in which there is at least one l type and
increasing the probability of paying when all are h. However the first set of events (where at least
one bidder is an l) happens with a much higher probability when n is large; thus increasing α0
reduces the average bid and as a result increases utility. Thus tominimise utility we have to reduce
correlation in the low state. Similar intuition arises in the high state. This belief implies that the
expected bid is lower than in the benchmark independent model, and as a result, seller’s revenue
is lower as well. While we can verify analytically that the above holds also for small n (e.g., n  3),
we have derived an analytical proof for large n only.
Note that we focus in this case on a first-price auction as symmetric equilibria in the second-
price auction may not exist in a common value environment with discrete types and many bid-
ders.15
15This is a general issue that does not relate to our specific model.
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Continuous signals
We show that the results of Section 3 are robust to the case of a continuum of signals. In the
common-value case, let the state of the world be v ∈ {0, 1}, with an equal prior. We revert to the
case of two bidders, where each now receives a signal s i ∈ [0, 1] about the state of the world. The
marginal distributions determining the signals given the state of the world, gv(s) for each player,
are known to the players. To simplify, let g0(s)  2(1− s) and g1(s)  2s (more generally we require
in the Appendix that g0(s) is decreasing and g1(s) is increasing, so that that G0(s) is concave and
G1(s) is convex). Note that G0(s) > G1(s) for all interior s , and hence MLRP is satisfied too.
Individuals have ambiguity over a set of joint distributions in each state v ∈ {0, 1}. We use
a simple set of joint distributions, the F-G-M transformation (copula), which was introduced by
Morgenstern in 1956. Specifically, given gv(s), we have:
fv(s)  [1 + λv(2Gv(s1) − 1)(2Gv(s2) − 1)]gv(s1)gv(s2).
For this to be a distribution, for any v we need |λv | ≤ 1.16 Note that when λv > 0 we have
positive correlation of signals in state v while when λv < 0 we have negative correlation. When
signals are conditionally independent, we have λv  0 for all v.Adding ePMI constraints, we then
have:
λv ∈ [1a − 1, 1 −
1
a
] for v ∈ {0, 1}.
We analyse a second-price auction and show very similar results to the one derived in Section
3. Let us first write the utility of a player for each bid b. This is
U(s1 , b) ∝ min
λ
(
∫ z
0
(1 − b(s′)) f1(s1 , s′)ds′ −
∫ z
0
b(s′) f0(s1 , s′)ds′)
where b(s′) is the bid used by the other player and z  b−1(b). In the Appendix we show that
when the level of ambiguity a is small enough, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which
b(s)  Eλ∗(s)(v |s , s)  [1 + λ
∗
1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)2]g21(s)
[1 + λ∗1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)2]g21(s) + [1 + λ∗0(s)(2G0(s) − 1)2]g20(s)
. (2.1)
where λ∗(s) minimises the equilibrium utility for each type. To do so, a player needs to consider
how correlation affects both the competition and the winner’s value effects, at each state.
As before, low types (specifically, below the median of G0)17 minimise their utility by postulat-
ing the highest possible positive correlation at state 0 and the highest possible negative correlation
at state 1, given the strong winner’s value effect. They therefore minimise their valuation upon
winning (as they only win when the other player has even lower signals). This “winner’s value
effect” implies underbidding.
For high types, positive correlation in state 1 and in state 0 decreases their utility as it implies
paying a higher bid (while their probability of winning is relatively high in any case). This implies
that they choose the maximum positive correlation in both states. This was also the case in the
discrete case and again implies underbidding as conditional on their signal, and asG0(s) > G1(s) >
1
2 for these types, f0(s , s) > f1(s , s) for any fixed positive λ. Thus b(s)  Eλ
∗(s)(v |s , s) < E(0,0)(v |s , s),
where E(0,0)(v |s , s) is the bid in the standard model with conditionally independent signals. We
therefore have:
16This implies that the highest correlation coefficient in this family is 13 in absolute value. See Schucany, Parr and Boyer
(1978).
17The median is important as the F-G-M copula is of the form 2G − 1.
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Proposition 2.6.2. When the level of ambiguity a is small enough, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in
the second-price auction in which b(s) is as defined in (2.1), where λ∗(s) minimises the utility of type s in
equilibrium, and the seller’s revenues decrease with ambiguity.
Proof. Appendix. 
In theAppendixwegeneralise for other symmetric gv(s), and characterise a sufficient condition for
themarginal distribution function forwhich revenues decreasemore generally.We also consider in
theAppendix for completeness the private value case, wherewe assume that valuations are drawn
from [0, 1] according to a uniform distribution, and individuals believe that the joint distribution
is f (v)  1 + λ(2vi − 1)(2v j − 1), for λ ∈ [ 1a − 1, 1 − 1a ]. We characterise a symmetric equilibrium
and show that bids in the first-price auction are uniformly higher compared to the case without
ambiguity (recall that bids in the second-price auction are not affected by ambiguity).
2.7 Conclusion
We have constructed a framework in which we can analyse ambiguity over correlation in infor-
mation structures of bidders both in the private and in the common value auctions. We have
illustrated in this paper that ambiguity over correlation induces different results in the private
values versus the common values auctions. Specifically, while seller’s revenue increases in the
private value auctions, it decreases in the common value auctions. The key insight of the analysis
is that in the common value auctions players choose worst-case beliefs that amount to minimising
the value of the good conditional on winning. This also leads to the optimal auction providing
less than full insurance to bidders.
Appendix 2.A Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. To prove Proposition 2.4.1, we first characterise the equilibrium in the
first price auction under private values and show that in this equilibrium, the seller’s revenue
increases in a. Then we note that in the symmetric equilibrium of the second price auction, under
private values, equilibrium behaviour is not affected by ambiguity.
We consider an equilibriumwhere the low type bids L and the high type mixes on the support
[L, b], according to a distribution function F(b). It can be shown that this equilibrium is unique.18
First note that the low type gets zero utility in equilibrium; any bid higher than L yields negative
utility, and any bid below L yields 0 utility.
As in the main text, the expected utility from bidding b for the high type is:
min
p2α,α(a)≤α≤α¯(a)
((1 − p) + pF(b))(1 − b),
18For uniqueness, first observe that there cannot be pure strategy equilibria, and that in any equilibrium the low type
cannot earn positive rents. In any equilibrium, the low type of both players must bid L. Suppose that the low type of
player 1 bids strictly less than L with positive probability; then the low type of player 2 can get positive rents. But this
contradicts the fact that the low type cannot earn positive rents in equilibrium. Thus assume that each low type bids at
least L (so the utility of the low type is at most zero). Suppose that at least one low type bids strictly more than L with
positive probability, and without loss of generality assume that the low type of player 1 wins the auction with positive
probability with a bid strictly higher than L (and receiving strictly negative utility). Then the low type of player 1 has a
profitable deviation to bidding L with probability 1. Thus assume that both low types bid L in equilibrium. The bottom
of the support of the mixed strategy for the high type must be L, otherwise a high type who is supposed to bid just above
the bottom of the support can bid just below the support and reduce expected payment without changing the probability
of winning. The indifference condition then uniquely determines the equilibrium.
CHAPTER 2. AUCTIONS WITH AMBIGUITY OVER CORRELATION 41
which is minimised by maximising α. As the ePMI constraints are:
1
4 a  α(a) ≤ α ≤ α¯(a) 
1
2 (1 −
1
2 a),
utility is minimised at α¯(a)  12 − 14a which implies a probability that the opponent has a high
value of 1 − 12a .
Now we compute the highest bid, b¯ , in the support of F(b). For the highest bid we have:
(1 − b¯)  ( 12a )(1 − L) ⇔ b¯  1 −
1
2a (1 − L).
Note that b¯ is increasing in a. Computing Fa(b) (making it explicit that Fa(b) depends on a),
we have:
Fa(b)  b − L(2a − 1)(1 − b)
Note that for a′ > a, Fa′(b) first order stochastically dominates Fa(b) and thus seller’s revenues are
higher when a > 1 and increase in a.
Note that in the second price auction, under private values, it is still a dominant strategy to bid
one’s value, and hence for all a, ba(l)  L and ba(h)  H is a symmetric equilibrium. of the second
price auction. 
Proof of Propositions 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. We first characterise the symmetric equilibrium in the second
price auction. Then we characterise the equilibrium in the first price auction, and finally we
compare the seller’s revenue from the two auction formats.19
Equilibrium in the second price auction
Lemma 2.A.1. In the common value second-price auction, the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
satisfies:
1. The low type bids ba(l)  E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l), a bid that decreases in a;
2. For all a ≤ q1−q , there exist cutoffs q , q¯ , with 0.5 < q < q¯ < 1, where:
a) For q ∈ (0.5, q), the high type bids ba(h)  E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h), a bid that increases with a.
b) For q ∈ (q¯ , 1), the high type bids ba(h)  E(α¯0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h), a bid that decreases with a.
c) For q ∈ (q , q¯), the high type bids ba(h)  E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h), where α0 satisfies E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) 
2E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l), a bid that decreases with a.
3. For all a ≥ a¯(q) ≥ q1−q , the high type bids ba(h)  E(α¯0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h).20
Proof of Lemma 2.A.1. We prove this Lemma by first conjecturing an equilibrium bid for the low
type. In all the equilibria we consider, the low type has the same equilibrium beliefs: (α0 , α1) 
(α0 , α1), and hence the bid is ba(l)  E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l]. Then we characterise the equilibrium beliefs
and bidding behaviour for the high type, and verify that neither type has an incentive to deviate.
We separate the analysis into two cases: equilibria where there is over-bidding for the high type
19For simplicity we set L  0 but the proof is easily extended to L > 0.
20When q is not too small, a¯(q)  q1−q . When q is sufficiently close to 0.5, a¯(q) > q1−q and symmetric pure-strategy
equilibria may not exist in the region [ q1−q , a¯(q)].
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(relative to baseline case of no ambiguity), and equilibria where there is under-bidding for the
high type. As in the statement of the Lemma, overbidding arises for small a and small q (which
implies that in equilibrium ba(l) > 12 ba(h)), and underbidding arises for large a or large q (which
implies ba(l) ≤ 12 ba(h)).
We consider monotone equilibria where ba(l) < ba(h), ba(l)  E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) for some (α0 , α1),
and ba(h)  E(α′0 ,α′1)[v |h , h] for some (α′0 , α′1).21
Let Uαi (b; s) be Player i’s utility from bidding b after receiving signal s, given that Player −i is
following the equilibrium strategy (ba(l), ba(h)):
Uαi (b; s) 

0 if b < ba(l)
1
2Pr(l |s , α)(Eα[v |l , s] − ba(l)) if b  ba(l)
Pr(l |s , α)(Eα[v |l , s] − ba(l)) if b ∈ (ba(l), ba(h))
Pr(l |s , α)(Eα[v |l , s] − ba(l)) + 12Pr(h |s , α)(Eα[v |h , s] − ba(h)) if b  ba(h)
Pr(l |s , α)(Eα[v |l , s] − ba(l)) + Pr(h |s , α)(Eα[v |h , s] − ba(h)) if b > ba(h)
Consider the following assumption:
No-hedging: The utility for type s of Player i from deviating to the mixed strategy represented
by the cdf F is
∫
b minα U
α
i (b , s)dF(b) (as opposed to minα
∫
b U
α
i (b , s)dF(b)).
Under the "no hedging" condition deviations to mixed strategies will have lower utility, and
thus equilibria are easier to sustain. We use this to characterise equilibria for large values of a.
Note that all equilibria derived without the "no hedging" condition will remain equilibria under
the "no hedging" condition.22
Consider first the low type. For any bid b ∈ [ba(l), ba(h)), we have:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρPr(l |l , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l))
 min
(α0 ,α1)
ρα1 − ρ(α1 + α0)ba(l)
where ρ  1 if b > ba(l) and 12 otherwise. This is minimised by (α¯0 , α1). Thus the conjectured
equilibrium bid is ba(l)  E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l). This will be the case for all equilibria considered.
Equilibrium with overbidding for the high type
Consider now the high type. Consider the case of an equilibrium that satisfies ba(l) > 12 ba(h).
Bidding b  ba(h) yields:
min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)) + 12Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − ba(h))
21Note that in any pure strategy equilibriumwhere ba(l) < ba(h), we must have ba(l)  E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) for some (α0 , α1)
and ba(h)  E(α′0 ,α′1)[v |h , h] for some (α
′
0 , α
′
1). For example, suppose that ba(l) > E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) for all (α0 , α1). Then the
low type gets negative utility, which contradicts ba(l) being an equilibrium strategy. Suppose that ba(l) < E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) for
all (α0 , α1). Then the equilibrium utility for the low type is min(α0 ,α1) 12Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)
)
> 0, but the
low type has a profitable deviation to ba(l) + ε, which yields utility min(α0 ,α1) Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l) − ε
)
.
The argument for the high type is similar.
22If there does not exist a profitable deviation in the absence of the ‘no hedging’ condition, there cannot exist a profitable
deviation under the ‘no hedging’ condition, since under the ‘no hedging’ condition the payoff from the equilibrium (pure)
strategy is the same, whereas the payoff to any mixed strategy is weakly lower.
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where the optimal (α0 , α1) is the same as the one that solves
min
(α0 ,α1)
−α0
(
ba(h)
2 − ba(l)
)
− α1
(
[1 − ba(l)] − [1 − ba(h)]2
)
Since by assumption ba(l) > 12 ba(h), the payoff isminimised by (α0 , α¯1). Thus the conjectured equi-
libriumbid for thehigh type is ba(h)  E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].Note thatE(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] 
2q−1+a(1−q)2
a(1−q)2+ 1a (1−q)2+2q−1
is increasing in a. The equilibrium will hold then only if E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l) > 12E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].
Note that the equilibrium payoff will be Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)) . This has to be
non negative and thus under (α0 , α¯1), we must have E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] ≥ ba(l).
We now consider deviations. For the low type, the payoff from any mixed strategy is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρ0Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)) + ρ1Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , l] − ba(h))
where 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ0 ≤ 1. Under the information structure (α¯0 , α1), the first term is 0. Note that
E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |h , l] < ba(h) is a necessary and sufficient condition for no deviation. In that case, players
bid b  ba(l), use (α¯0 , α1) as the information structure, and the equilibrium payoff is 0.
Let us now consider the high type. As long as the other player is playing the equilibrium (pure)
strategy, the payoff from any mixed strategy is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρ0Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)
)
+ ρ1Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − ba(h)
)
where 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ0 ≤ 1. Under the information structure (α0 , α¯1), E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h]  ba(h), which
implies that the payoff from the deviation is atmost Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))
(
E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)
)
, which
is the equilibrium payoff. Thus, it is not profitable to deviate to any mixed strategy.
Bringing together all the conditions, we now have:
E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] > E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l]
E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |h , l] < E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h]
E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] > 12E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].
For a ≤ q1−q , these conditions are:
(1) 1−q−a(1−q)
2
1−( 1a (1−q)2+2q−1)−a(1−q)2
− 1a (1−q)21
a (1−q)2+a(1−q)2+2q−1
> 0
(2) 2q−1+a(1−q)
2
a(1−q)2+ 1a (1−q)2+2q−1
− 1−q− 1a (1−q)21−(a(1−q)2+2q−1)− 1a (1−q)2 > 0
(3)
1
a (1−q)2
1
a (1−q)2+a(1−q)2+2q−1
− 12 2q−1+a(1−q)
2
a(1−q)2+ 1a (1−q)2+2q−1
> 0
Conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied for all q , while condition (3) is satisfied for all q < q(a).
For a ≥ q1−q , condition (3), now
1
a (1−q)2
1
a (1−q)2+q− 1a q(1−q)
− 12
2q−1+1−q− 1a q(1−q)
1−q− 1a q(1−q)+ 1a (1−q)2+2q−1
> 0, is not satisfied
for a which is above a cutoff a¯. Note that allowing for no hedging will not affect the existence of
this equilibrium for high a.
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Equilibria with underbidding for the high type
Next consider the case ba(l) < 12 ba(h). Consider the high type, and assume that the other player is
playing the equilibrium strategy (ba(l), ba(h)).
Bidding b  ba(h) yields:
min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)) + 12Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − ba(h))
which is like solving
min
(α0 ,α1)
−α1 + (α1 + α0)ba(l) + 12α1 −
1
2 (α1 + α0)ba(h)
 min
(α0 ,α1)
−α1(12−ba(l) +
1
2 ba(h)) + α0(ba(l) −
1
2 ba(h))
For ba(l) < 12 ba(h), this is minimised by (α¯0 , α¯1).
The equilibrium payoff is then Pr(l |h , (α¯0 , α¯1)) (E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)) .
We now consider deviations. Let us consider first the high type. The payoff from any mixed
strategy is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρ0Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)) + ρ1Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − ba(h))
where 0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ ρ0 ≤ 1. Under the information structure (α¯0 , α¯1), E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h]  ba(h). Note
that this bid decreases with a.
Note that in equilibrium we must have
(
E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] − E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l]
)
≥ 0, and that the
equilibrium maximises the probability of winning against the low type.
Consider now the low type. Under no "no hedging", we have that the payoff from any mixed
strategy is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρ0Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)
)
+ ρ1Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , l] − ba(h)
)
Under the information structure (α¯0 , α1), the first term is 0. Thus a necessary and sufficient
condition for the low type not to deviate is E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |h , l] < E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].
The equilibrium conditions as described above are therefore:
(4) E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] > E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l]
(5) E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |h , l] < E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h]
(6) E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] < 12E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].
Conditions (4) and (5) are satisfied for a ≤ q1−q , while condition (6) is satisfied for q > q¯(a).
To consider a > q1−q , consider deviations of the low type under the "no hedging" condition.
Her utility from a mixed strategy which wins against the low type only with probability β and
with probability 1− βwins against the low type with probability 1 as well as against the high type
with probability 12 is:
β min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)
)
+ (1 − β) min
(α0 ,α1)
(Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l))
+
1
2Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , l] − ba(h)
))
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Note that arg min(α0 ,α1) Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)
)
is (α0 , α1), and thus this part of
the utility is 0, and that
arg min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)
)
+
1
2Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , l] − ba(h)
)
(α0 , α1)
A necessary and sufficient condition under the no hedging condition is for the above utility to
be lower than 0, the equilibrium utility.
Thus, for a > q1−q , the equilibrium conditions are:
(4) E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |l , h] > E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l]
(5∗) Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))
(
Eα0 ,α1[v |l , l] − ba(l)
)
+
1
2Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , l] − ba(h)
)
< 0
(6) E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] < 12E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].
This equilibrium exists when a > a¯(q) ≥ q1−q , where a¯(q) > q1−q for a low enough q but
a¯(q)  q1−q otherwise.
Note also that the equilibrium converges to the equilibrium in the limit where all information
structures are allowed. To see the limit equilibrium, suppose that ba(l)  0. For the low type we
minimise α1 at 0 and set α0  q (note that the low type gets the same utility under any belief about
α0) and hence E(q ,0)(v |l , l)  0.We are therefore in the case in which ba(l) < 12 ba(h) and hence the
high type uses α0  q and α1  1 − q. As a result, ba(h)  q  E(v |h) < E(v |h , h). This yields the
lowest revenue to the seller.
Finally, consider the case ba(l)  12 ba(h).We will show that this equilibrium holds for a < q1−q , for
values q(a) < q < q¯(a). Let a and q satisfy: 12E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] < E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] < 12E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h].
Consider the high type, and assume that the other player is playing the equilibrium strategy
(ba(l), ba(h)). Bidding b  ba(h) yields:
min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)
)
+
1
2Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − ba(h)
)
Since ba(l)  12 ba(h), for any α′0, (α′0 , α¯1) achieves the minimum payoff.
The payoff from any mixed strategy is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρ0Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)) + ρ1Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − ba(h))
Since Pr(α0 ,α1)(l |h)
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)
)
> 0 for any (α0 , α1) and increasing ρ0 relaxes the con-
straint on ρ1, it is without loss to set ρ0  1. Using the fact that ba(l)  12 ba(h), the payoff becomes:
min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , h] − ba(l)
)
+ ρ1Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))
(
E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , h] − 2ba(l)
)
 min
(α0 ,α1)
1 − ba(l) − q + ρ1(2q − 1) + α0ba(l)(1 − 2ρ1) + α1 (ρ1[1 − 2ba(l)] − [1 − ba(l)])
The payoff is minimised by (α0 , α¯1)when ρ1 ≤ 12 and (α¯0 , α¯1)when ρ1 ≥ 12 .
Suppose that ρ1 > 12 . Then under (α¯0 , α¯1), the payoff is lower than when ρ1  12 , since
E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] < ba(h). If ρ1 < 12 , then under (α0 , α¯1), the payoff is lower than when ρ1  12 , since
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E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] > ba(h). Thus, for ρ1 , 12 , the payoff must be lower than when ρ1  12 , which is the
equilibrium payoff.
Now consider the low type. As before, the equilibrium payoff is 0. The payoff from any mixed
strategy is:
min
(α0 ,α1)
ρ0Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |l , l] − ba(l)) + ρ1Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1)) (E(α0 ,α1)[v |h , l] − ba(h))
Under the information structure (α¯0 , α1), the first term is 0 and the second term is negative
if E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |h , l] < ba(h). So we need 12E(α¯0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] < E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] < 12E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] and
1
2E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |h , l] < E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l], which is satisfied for the range of qs considered. 
Equilibrium in the first price auction
Lemma 2.A.2. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first price auction, the low type bids ba(l) and
the high type mixes on the support [ba(l), b¯a(h)] according to the distribution Fa(b), where:
ba(l)  E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l)
b¯a(h)  Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) + Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l)
Fa(b) 
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))(b − ba(l))
Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) − b)
.
Proof of Lemma 2.A.1. We first conjecture the bid of the low type, and then we solve for the equi-
librium beliefs and mixed strategy of the high type, checking that neither type has an incentive to
deviate. We show that for the high type, the maximum bid increases in a , and that the minimum
bid decreases in a , for a close to 1.
Consider a low type. For any ba(l), this type’s expected utility is perceived as
min
(α0 ,α1)
(α0 + α1)( α1α0 + α1 − ba(l))
 min
(α0 ,α1)
α0(−ba(l)) + α1(1 − ba(l))
which is resolved by setting α0 to be the highest possible value and α1 to be the lowest possible
value, given the ePMI constraints. Therefore for a sufficiently close to 1, the solution is (α¯0 , α1).
Note that the low type cannot earn positive rents in equilibrium, and thus we conjecture:
ba(l)  E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l) 
1
a (1 − q)2
1
a (1 − q)2 + a(1 − q)2 + 2q − 1
<
(1 − q)2
(1 − q)2 + q2
Since the derivative of E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l)with respect to a is negative, the bid of the low type decreases
with a.Wewill establish later that this type will not want to use any other bid given the behaviour
of the high type.
Now let us consider the high type. Without loss of generality we can consider a mixed strategy
with support on [ba(l), b¯a(h)], as bidding less than ba(l)will provide a zero utility.
First let us consider a bid just above ba(l) which allows the individual to win against the low
type only. We then need to solve the following:
min
(α0 ,α1)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , l) − ba(l))
 min
(α0 ,α1)
(q − α0)(−ba(l)) + (1 − q − α1)(1 − ba(l))
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whichyields the need tomaximise α1 and tominimise α0.The solution is (α0 , α¯1).Note that this bid
provides a utility of Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , l)−E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l)) > 0, and that α0+α1  α0+α1.
We now consider the highest bid in the support, b¯a(h). Such bid implies winning for sure and
thus unambiguous gain of E(v |h). To be indifferent, this bid has to satisfy:
E(v |h) − b¯a(h)  Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , l) − E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l))
Thus:
b¯a(h)  Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) + Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l)
 2q − 1 + α1 + (1 − α0 − α1)
α1
α0 + α1
 2q − 1 + α1 +
α1
α0 + α1
− α1
 2q − 1 + a(1 − q)2 +
1
a (1 − q)2
a(1 − q)2 + 2q − 1 + 1a (1 − q)2
− 1
a
(1 − q)2
 2q − 1 + (1 − q)2(a − 1
a
+
1
a
(a + 1a − 1)(1 − q)2 + q2
)
Note that the derivative of a − 1a +
1
a
( 1a +a−1)(1−q)2+q2
, evaluated at a  1, is (2q−1)
2
2q2−2q+1 > 0. Thus the
maximum bid increases in a.
We now continue to characterise the equilibrium distribution. Let us consider the worst case
scenario in terms of utility for some distribution F(b)with density f (b). The expected utility is∫
b
f (b)[Pr(l |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , l) − b) + Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))F(b)(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , h) − b)]db

∫
b
f (b)[E(v |h) − b − (1 − F(b))Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , h) − b)]db
To choose the information structure to minimise utility, we maximise
Pr(h |h , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |h , h) − b)  (2q − 1) + (α0(−b) + α1(1 − b))
and the solution is therefore, for all b, to maximise α1 and to minimise α0.
F(b) is characterised by using the indifference condition under the belief (α0 , α¯1):
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , l) − b) + Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))F(b)(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) − b)
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , l) − ba(l))
implying that
Fa(b) 
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))(b − ba(l))
Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) − b)
.
We complete the equilibrium characterisation by showing that given the strategy of the high
type, the low type will not deviate.
For the low type, bidding any b above ba(l), we choose the belief to minimise expected utility:
min
(α1 ,α0)
Pr(l |l , (α0 , α1))(E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , l) − b) + Pr(h |l , (α0 , α1))Fa(b)(E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , h) − b)
 min
(α0 ,α1)
(−b)(α0(1 − Fa(b)) + Fa(b)q) + (1 − b)(α1(1 − Fa(b)) + Fa(b)(1 − q))
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As Fa(b) ≤ 1, the solution is (α¯0 , α1). This gives us a utility of:
Pr(l |l , (α¯0 , α1))(E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l) − b)
+ Pr(h |l , (α¯0 , α1))
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))(b − E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l))
Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) − b)
(E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , h) − b)
 Pr(h |l , (α¯0 , α1))(b − E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , l))(
Pr(l |h , (α0 , α¯1))
Pr(h |h , (α0 , α¯1))
(E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , h) − b)
(E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) − b)
− Pr(l |l , (α¯0 , α1))
Pr(h |l , (α¯0 , α1))
).
Note that E(α¯0 ,α1)(v |l , h) 
1−q− 1a (1−q)2
1−α¯0−α1 <
2q−1+a(1−q)2
α0+α¯1
 E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h), for a sufficiently close to
1,23 and that
Pr(α0 ,α¯1)(l |h)
Pr(α0 ,α¯1)(h |h)

1−α0−α¯1
α0 ,α¯1
<
(α¯0+α1)
1−(α¯0+α1) 
Pr(l |l ,(α¯0 ,α1))
Pr(h |l ,(α¯0 ,α1)) , as α¯0 + α1  α¯1 + α0 >
1
2 for all a.
Thus the utility is negative and the low type does not deviate. 
Seller’s revenue in the first price auction
Now we show that the seller’s revenue in the first price auction is decreasing in a, for sufficiently
small a. We prove this using five preliminary facts that allow us to rewrite the revenue in a
convenient form, and then we take the derivative with respect to a, evaluated at a  1, and show
that it is negative.
The expected payment to seller, Π, is given by the linear combination of receiving the bid of
the low type (when both are l), the expected bid of the high type (when only one is h), and the
maximum bid of the two h types:
Π  Pr(l , l)E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] + 2 Pr(l , h)E[ba(h)] + Pr(h , h)E[maxi1,2 b
i
a(h)]
For expositional purposes we write this as
Π 
1
2γy + (1 − γ)
∫ αx+(1−α)y
y
b fa(b)db + γ2
∫ αx+(1−α)y
y
b2 fa(b)Fa(b)db ,
where γ  Pr(l |l), according to the true (independent) information structure, α  Pr(l |l , (α0 , α¯1))
according to the belief of thehighbidder, (α0 , α¯1), x  E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h], y  E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l]  ba(l).We
therefore also have b¯a(h)  αx + (1 − α)y , Fa(b)  1−αα b−yx−b and fa(b)  1α 1−α(x−b)2
(
x − y) .
We start by some preliminary results:
Fact 1
∂x
∂a
 −∂y
∂a
> 0
Proof. Note that:
x  E(α0 ,α¯1)(v |h , h) 
2q − 1 + a(1 − q)2
q2 − (1 − 1a )(1 − q)2 + a(1 − q)2
∂x
∂a

∂
∂a
( 2q − 1 + a(1 − q)
2
q2 − (1 − 1a )(1 − q)2 + a(1 − q)2
)

(
q − 1)2 2a + 2q + 2aq2 − 4aq − 1(
a2q2 − 2a2q + a2 + 2aq − a + q2 − 2q + 1)2 > 0
∂y
∂a

∂
∂a
1
a (1 − q)2
2q − 1 + a(1 − q)2 + 1a (1 − q)2
 − (q − 1)2 2a + 2q + 2aq2 − 4aq − 1(
a2q2 − 2a2q + a2 + 2aq − a + q2 − 2q + 1)2 . 
23In fact, this is true for all a.
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Fact 2
∂α
∂a |a1
 0
Proof. Note that:
α  Pr
(α0 ,α¯1)
(l |l)  α0 + α1  a(1 − q)2 +
1
a
(1 − q)2 + 2q − 1
∂α
∂a |a1
 (1 − q)2 ∂(a +
1
a )
∂a |a1
 (1 − q)2(1 − 1
a2
)|a1  0. 
Fact 3
(i) E[ba(h)]  x(1 + 1−αα ln(1 − α)) − y 1−αα ln(1 − α).
(ii) At a  1, the expected bid of the high type decreases in a for low q and increases in a for
high q.
Proof.
(i) Note that:∫
b
(x − b)2 db 
1
x − b (x − b ln (x − b) + x ln (x − b)) 
x − (b − x) ln (x − b)
x − b .
Therefore: ∫ αx+(1−α)y
y
b
(b − x)2 db 
αx
(1 − α)(x − y) + ln(1 − α).
Hence:
E[ba(h)]  1 − αα
(
x − y) ∫ αx+(1−α)y
y
b
(b − x)2 db  x(1 +
1 − α
α
ln(1 − α)) − y 1 − α
α
ln(1 − α).
(ii) As ∂α∂a |a1  0 and
∂x
∂a |a1  −
∂y
∂a |a1:
∂E[ba(h)]
∂a |a1

∂x
∂a |a1
(1 + 21 − α
α
ln(1 − α))|a1

∂x
∂a |a1
(1 + 21 − 2(1 − q)
2 − 2q + 1
2(1 − q)2 + 2q − 1 ln(1 − 2(1 − q)
2 − 2q + 1)).
For q > 12 , the expression (1 + 2 1−2(1−q)
2−2q+1
2(1−q)2+2q−1 ln(1 − 2(1 − q)2 − 2q + 1)) is strictly increasing,
negative for q < q∗ and positive for q > q∗ for some q∗ ∈ (0.5, 1). As ∂x∂a |a1 > 0, we are
done. 
Fact 4
(i) E[maxi1,2 b ia(h)]  −
(
x − y) 2(( 1−αα )2 ln (1 − α) + 1−αα ) + x
(ii) The expectation of the maximal bid when both are high types decreases in a for low q and
increases in a for high q.
Proof.
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(i)
∫ b(b−y)
(x−b)3 db 
1
2(x−b)2
(
2b2 ln (x − b) + 2x2 ln (x − b) − 4bx + 2by − xy + 3x2 − 4bx ln (x − b)) 
− ln (x − b)− −4bx+2by−xy+3x2
2(x−b)2 . Therefore,
∫ αx+(1−α)y
y
b(b−y)
(x−b)3 db  − ln (1 − α)−
α(2x−2y−3xα+2yα)
2(1−α)2(x−y) .
Hence,E[maxi1,2 b ia(h)]  2( 1−αα )2
(
x − y) ∫ αx+(1−α)yy b(b−y)(x−b)3 db  −2( 1−αα )2 (x − y) (ln (1 − α)+
α(2x−2y−3xα+2yα)
2(1−α)2(x−y) )  −
(
x − y) 2(( 1−αα )2 ln (1 − α) + 1−αα ) + x.
(ii) Recalling that ∂x∂a  − ∂y∂a and that ∂α∂a  0 we have,
∂E[maxi1,2 b ia (h)]
∂a 
∂x
∂a (−4( 1−αα )2 ln(1 − α) − 4 1−αα + 1), and
∂E[maxi1,2 b ia (h)]
∂a |a1 
∂x
∂a (−4( 2q(1−q)q2+(1−q)2 )2 ln(1 − α) − 4
2q(1−q)
q2+(1−q)2 + 1)
For the expression (−4( 2q(1−q)q2+(1−q)2 )2 ln(2q(1− q)) − 4
2q(1−q)
q2+(1−q)2 + 1) there is a q¯ ∈ (0.5, 1) such that
the expression is negative for q < q¯ and positive for q > q¯. As ∂x∂a > 0, we are done. 
Given the above facts we can write the profit function as:
Π 
1
2γy + (1 − γ)x +
1 − α
α
(
x − y) (1 − γ) ln(1 − α)
+ − 1 − α
α
2 (
x − y) γ ln(1 − α) − 1
α
γ(2x − 2y − 3xα + 2yα2 )
 x(γ2 +
α − γ
α
(1 − α
α
ln (1 − α) + 1)) + y(1 − γ2 −
α − γ
α
(1 − α
α
ln (1 − α) + 1))
Taking a derivative with respect to a , recalling that dαda |a1  0 and that
∂x
∂a  − ∂y∂a we get:
∂Π
∂a |a1

∂x
∂a
(γ − 1 + 2α − γ
α
(1 − α
α
ln (1 − α) + 1))

∂x
∂a
(γ − 1) < 0.
Seller’s revenue in the second price auction and a comparison across auctions
We now consider the seller’s revenue in the second price auction and show that the profits of the
seller are higher in the first-price auction, which is part (iii) of Proposition 2.4.3. We also show
that the seller’s revenue in the second price auction is decreasing in a, and that the expected
utility of both types of bidders in the second price auction, evaluated at the true joint probability
distribution, is increasing in a, which is part (i) of Proposition 2.4.3.
In the second price auction, the low type always bids E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l], and the high type bids
at most E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] (either ba(h)  E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] for low a and q, where E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] >
E(α¯0 α¯1)[v |h , h]  ba(h) for higher q and a, or where E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] > 2E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l]  ba(h)). Let
R¯SPA be the revenue from a virtual auction where the low type bids E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] and the high
type bids E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h]. Then the actual revenue in the second price auction must be weakly less
than R¯SPA.
The seller’s revenue in the second price auction satisfies:
RSPA ≤ R¯SPA  x
(γ
2
)
+ y
(
1 − γ2
)
where x  E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h], y  E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l], and γ  Pr(l |l). The seller’s revenue in the first price
auction is:
RFPA  x
[
γ
2 +
α − γ
α
(
1 − α
α
ln(1 − α) + 1
)]
+ y
[
1 − γ2 −
α − γ
α
(
1 − α
α
ln(1 − α) + 1
)]
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where α  Pr(l |l , (α0 , α¯1)). Thus, the difference in revenue between the two auctions is:
RFPA − RSPA ≥ RFPA − R¯SPA  (x − y)
[
α − γ
α
(
1 − α
α
ln(1 − α) + 1
)]
> 0.
Finally, to see that RSPA is decreasing in a, first note that when a and q are low:
∂RSPA1
∂a |a1

∂x
∂a
(γ
2
)
+
∂y
∂a
(
1 − γ2
)
 −(1 − γ)∂x
∂a
< 0
Let x′  E(α¯0, α¯1)[v |h , h]. Then the revenue when q is high and a is high:
RSPA2  x
′
(γ
2
)
+ y
(
1 − γ2
)
Therefore:
∂RSPA2
∂a |a1

∂x′
∂a
(γ
2
)
+
∂y
∂a
(
1 − γ2
)
< 0
since ∂x′∂a < 0. Finally in the last case:
∂RSPA3
∂a |a1 
∂y
∂a
(
1 + γ2
)
< 0.
We have argued that the seller’s revenue in the second price auction is lower than in the first
price auction and is decreasing in a. Now we argue that in the second price auction, the expected
utility of both types of bidders, evaluated at the true joint distribution, is increasing in a. Since the
allocation does not depend on a, it is sufficient to show that the expected payment of each type,
evaluated at the true joint distribution, is decreasing in a. Note that for low q and low a (the case
where the high type’s bid is increasing in a) E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] > 12E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h], and:
E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] >
1
2E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] ⇐⇒
α1
α¯0 + α1
>
1
2
2q − 1 + α¯1
α0 + α¯1
⇐⇒ 2α1 − α¯1 + 1 − 2q > 0
where the second line follows from the fact that α0+α1  α0+α1.The derivative of 2α1− α¯1+1−2q
with respect to a is negative; thus a necessary condition for 2α1 − α¯1 + 1 − 2q > 0 to hold is
(1− q)2+1−2q > 0,or q < 2−√2. But Pr(l |h) > 12 Pr(h |h) ⇔ q < 16
(
3 +
√
3
)
. Thus, E(α¯0 ,α1)[v |l , l] >
1
2E(α0 ,α¯1)[v |h , h] impliesPr(l |h) > 12 Pr(h |h). Pr(l |h) > 12 Pr(h |h) and ∂x∂a  −
∂y
∂a imply that the overall
expected payment (under the true joint distribution) for the high type, Pr(l |h)y + 12 Pr(h |h)x , is
decreasing in a. In all other cases, the high type reduces her bid with a, which implies that her
expected payment is decreasing in a. Finally the bid and expected payment of the low type is
always decreasing in a. 
Appendix 2.B Proofs for Section 2.5
We now prove two Propositions which are more detailed versions of Propositions 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
Proposition 2.B.1. Private value case: If L < 11+a , (x , t) is an optimal mechanism if and only if it satisfies:
• xi(l, l)  xi(l, h)  ti(l, l)  ti(l, h)  0
• xi(h , l)  1, ∑2i1 xi(h , h)  1
• ti(h, l)  1
• ti(h, h)  xi(h, h)
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That is, if both buyers have the low valuation, then the seller does not allocate the object. If a single buyer
has the high valuation, then she gets the object with probability 1. If both buyers have the high valuation, the
seller can allocate to either buyer. Transfers are such that both buyers are fully insured against ambiguity
and receive zero rents.
If L > 11+a , (x , t) is an optimal mechanism if and only if it satisfies:
• xi(l, h)  ti(l, h)  0
• ∑2i1 xi(l, l)  1
• ti(l, l)  Lxi(l, l)
• xi(h , l)  1, ∑2i1 xi(h , h)  1
• ti(h, h)  xi(h, h)− 12a (1 − L)xi(l, l)
• ti(h, l)  1− 12a (1 − L)xi(l, l)
That is, the seller allocates the object with probability 1. If the buyers have different valuations, the seller
allocates to the one with the high valuation. Otherwise the seller may allocate to either buyer. Low types
receive zero rents. Transfers for high types are pinned down by the binding incentive constraint and the full
insurance condition.
The revenue of the seller is:
1
4
2∑
i1
ti(l , l) + ti(l , h) + ti(h , l) + ti(h , h) 

3
4 if L <
1
1+a
1
2 +
L
2 +
(a−1)(1−L)
4a if L ≥ 11+a
which is increasing in ambiguity. As a →∞, the revenue converges to 34 + L4 , which is full surplus.
Proof. We prove Proposition 2.B.1 in two steps. First, we argue that any optimal mechanism must
be a full insurance mechanism, and then we solve the seller’s problem by finding the best full
insurance mechanism.
First, we argue that any optimal mechanismmust be a full insurance mechanism. Define a full
insurance mechanism as one in which the ex post payoff of each buyer is independent of the type
of her opponent:
Definition. The mechanism (x , t) is a full insurance mechanism if for each player i and for
each s , s′ ∈ {l , h}: vsxi(s , s) − ti(s , s)  vsxi(s , s′) − ti(s , s′).
Suppose that (x , t) is an optimal mechanism, but vsx1(s , s) − t1(s , s) > vsx1(s , s′) − t1(s , s′).
Then the equilibrium belief for type s of player 1 is that her opponent is type s with probability
1
2a and type s
′ with probability 1 − 12a . Consider the alternative mechanism (x′, t′)where:
• t′1(s , s)  t1(s , s) + δ
• t′1(s , s′)  t1(s , s′) − 12a−1 δ
• x′1(s′, ·)  x1(s′, ·) and t′1(s′, ·)  t1(s′, ·)
• x′2(·, ·)  x2(·, ·) and t′2(·, ·)  t2(·, ·)
For sufficiently small δ:
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• Type s of player 1 gets the same utility in (x′, t′) and (x , t) for every report
• Type s′ of player 1 gets the same utility in (x′, t′) and (x , t) from reporting s′
• Type s′ of player 1 gets weakly lower utility in (x′, t′) than in (x , t) from reporting s
• Both types of player 2 get the same utility in (x′, t′) and (x , t) for every report
• The seller gets a strictly higher revenue in (x′, t′) than in (x , t)
Thus, the new mechanism is incentive compatible, individually rational, and yields strictly
higher revenue to the seller.
Next, note that xi(l , h)  0. For example, suppose that x1(l , h) > 0. Consider the alternative
mechanism (x′, t′) that differs from (x , t) in the following way:
• x′1(l , h)  x1(l , h) − δ
• t′1(l , h)  t1(l , h) − δL
• x′2(h , l)  x2(h , l) + δ
• t′2(h , l)  t2(h , l) + δ
Note that (x′, t′) is incentive compatible, individually rational, and yields strictly higher rev-
enue to the seller.
We can ignore the participation constraint of the high type as it is implied by the incentive
constraint. The participation constraint of the low type must be binding, and full insurance then
implies that the transfers for the low type satisfy:
ti(l , l)  Lxi(l , l) (2.2)
ti(l , h)  0 (2.3)
We ignore the incentive constraint of the low type and check ex post that it is satisfied. Then
the incentive constraint of the high type must bind:
min
p∈Π p [xi(h , h) − ti(h , h)] + (1 − p) [xi(h , l) − ti(h , l)]  minp∈Π (1 − p) [xi(l , l) − ti(l , l)]
Since ti(l , l)  Lxi(l , l), minp∈Π(1−p) [xi(l , l) − ti(l , l)]  12a (1−L)xi(l , l). Full insurance implies
that xi(h , h) − ti(h , h)  xi(h , l) − ti(h , l), so we have:
ti(h , h)  xi(h , h) − 12a (1 − L)xi(l , l) (2.4)
ti(h , l)  xi(h , l) − 12a (1 − L)xi(l , l) (2.5)
Thus, we can write the seller’s problem as:
max
xi ,ti
2∑
i1
Lxi(l , l) + xi(h , h) + xi(h , l) − 1a (1 − L)xi(l , l)
Clearly, it is optimal to set xi(h , l)  1, ∑2i1 xi(h , h)  1, and ∑2i1 xi(l , l) to be either 1 or 0,
depending on the sign of L − 1a (1 − L).
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Therefore, (x , t) solves the seller’s problem if and only if the allocation rule satisfies:
xi(l , h)  0
xi(h , l)  1
2∑
i1
xi(h , h)  1
2∑
i1
xi(l , l) 

0 if L < 11+a
any w ∈ [0, 1] if L  11+a
1 if L > 11+a
and transfers are given by equations 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. 
Proposition 2.B.2. Common value case:
(i) When q ≤ q∗(a), an optimal mechanism is, for i ∈ {1, 2}:
• xi(l , l)  xi(h , h)  xi(l , h)  xi(h , l)  12
• ti(h , l)  ti(h , h)  ti(l , h)  ti(l , l)  12 (1 − q)
and the revenue of the seller is 1 − q.
(ii) When q∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a), an optimal mechanism is:
• xi(l , l)  xi(h , h)  12 , xi(l , h)  0, and xi(h , l)  1
• ti(l , l)  ti(l , h)  12α1
• ti(h , h)  q+α0+α1+α1−12
• ti(h , l)  q+α0+α1+α12
and the revenue of the seller is 12
(
α0 + 2α1 + α1 + q − q2 − (1 − q)2
)
.
(iii) When q ≥ q∗∗(a), an optimal mechanism is:
• xi(l , l)  xi(h , h)  12 , xi(l , h)  0, and xi(h , l)  1
• ti(h , l)  12 (1 + α0)
• ti(h , h) 
α0
2
• ti(l , h) 
α1
2 + (α0 + α1)
1 − q − α1 − α1
2(α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1)
• ti(l , l) 
α1
2 − (1 − α0 − α1)
1 − q − α1 − α1
2(α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1)
and the revenue of the seller is 12
(
1 − (q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1)
α0 + α0 − q
α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1
)
.
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Proof. The proof of Proposition 2.B.2 proceeds as follows. First we solve for the optimal symmetric
mechanism for the seller, and then we show that the optimal symmetric mechanism is fully
optimal.
Recall from themain text that q∗(a) is the solution to q2+ (1− q)2−α0−α1  α0+α1+α0+α1−1
that lies between 12 and 1, and q
∗∗(a) is the solution to q2 + (1− q)2 − α0 − α1  3q − 2+ α1 + α1 that
lies between 12 and 1. The expressions for q
∗(a) and q∗∗(a) are as follows:
q∗(a) 

1
2
(
6−7a+2a2
3−2a+a2 +
√
−12a+17a2−4a3
(3−2a+a2)2
)
1 < a ≤ 12 (−1 +
√
13)
1
4
(
−7+6a
−2+a +
√
1−12a+12a2
(−2+a)2
)
1
2 (−1 +
√
13) < a < 2
3
5 a  2
1
4
(
−7+6a
−2+a −
√
1−12a+12a2
(−2+a)2
)
a > 2
q∗∗(a) 

2−2a+a2
2−a+a2 +
√
−2a+3a2−a3)
(2−a+a2)2√
2
1 < a ≤ 12 (−1 +
√
17)
1
2
(
−5+3a
−3+a +
√
1−4a+3a2
(−3+a)2
)
1
2 (−1 +
√
17) < a < 3
5
8 a  3
1
2
(
−5+3a
−3+a −
√
1−4a+3a2
(−3+a)2
)
a > 3
First we find the optimal symmetric mechanism which will depend on the cutoff values of q
defined above. We will ignore the incentive constraint of the low type and check ex post that it is
satisfied. Therefore, the participation constraint of the low type must be binding.
Let Uhi be the utility of the high type in equilibrium and U
l
i be the utility of the low type in
equilibrium, that is:
U li ≡ minα0 ,α1 α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1))ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , h)
Uhi ≡ minα0 ,α1 (1 − q − α1)xi(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(h , h) − (1 − α0 − α1))ti(h , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , h)
Note that it is optimal to set U li  0. The incentive constraint of the high type is:
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1))ti(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , l) ≤ Uhi
The participation constraint of the low type is:
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1))ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , h)  0
We can subtract the latter from the former to get:
(1 − q − α1 − α1)xi(l , l) + (3q − 2 + α1 + α1)xi(l , h) −Uhi
α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1
≤ ti(l , h) − ti(l , l)
Define:
∆tl ,i ≡ ti(l , h) − ti(l , l)
∆th ,i ≡ ti(h , l) − ti(h , h)
CHAPTER 2. AUCTIONS WITH AMBIGUITY OVER CORRELATION 56
We can write the expected transfers to the seller from each type as:
T li  minα0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆tl ,i
Thi  minα0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(h , h) − (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆th ,i −Uhi
Let αl0 , α
l
1 and α
h
0 , α
h
1 be solutions to these minimisation problems. The seller chooses xi(l , l) ∈
[0, 12 ], xi(h , h) ∈ [0, 12 ], xi(l , h) ∈ [0, 1], xi(h , l) ∈ [0, 1 − xi(l , h)], ∆tl ,i ∈ R, ∆th ,i ∈ R, and Uhi ≥ 0 to
maximise T li + T
h
i subject to:
(1 − q − α1 − α1)xi(l , l) + (3q − 2 + α1 + α1)xi(l , h) −Uhi
α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1
≤ ∆tl ,i
Clearly, it is optimal to set xi(h , h)  12 and xi(h , l)  1 − xi(l , h). Thus, the seller’s problem is:
max
xi (l ,l),xi (l ,h),∆tl ,i ,∆th ,i ,Uhi
{
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆tl ,i
+ min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)(1 − xi(h , l)) + 12 (2q − 1 + α1) −
(
q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)
)
∆th ,i −Uhi
}
subject to:
(1 − q − α1 − α1)xi(l , l) + (3q − 2 + α1 + α1)xi(l , h) −Uhi
α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1
≤ ∆tl ,i
0 ≤ xi(l , l) ≤ 12
0 ≤ xi(l , h) ≤ 1
Define:
∆t∗l ,i(xi(l , l), xi(l , h),Uhi ) ≡ max
{
0,
(1 − q − α1 − α1)xi(l , l) + (3q − 2 + α1 + α1)xi(l , h) −Uhi
α0 + α1 + α0 + α1 − 1
,
xi(l , h) − xi(l , l)
}
We show that ∆tl ,i  ∆t∗l ,i(xi(l , l), xi(l , h),Uhi ) is optimal. Note that ∆tl ,i < 0 implies αl0  α0,
which implies that q2+ (1− q)2−αl0−αl1 < 0, so it is profitable to increase∆tl ,i (which also slackens
ICh). Similarly when ∆tl ,i < xi(l , h)− xi(l , l), αl1  α1, which implies that q2+ (1− q)2−αl0−αl1 < 0,
so it is profitable to increase ∆tl ,i . If ∆tl ,i > xi(l , h) − xi(l , l) ≥ 0, then it is profitable to decrease
∆tl ,i , which is possible if ∆tl ,i >
(1−q−α1−α1)xi (l ,l)+(3q−2+α1+α1)xi (l ,h)−Uhi
α0+α1+α0+α1−1 .
Define:
∆t∗h ,i(xi(l , h)) ≡ max
{
0, 12 − xi(l , h)
}
Similarly, it is optimal to set ∆th ,i  ∆t∗h ,i(xi(l , h)). Thus, the problem becomes:
max
xi (l ,l),xi (l ,h),Uhi
R(xi(l , l), xi(l , h),Uhi )
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where:
R(xi(l , l), xi(l , h),Uhi ) ≡ minα1
{
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h)
− (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆t∗l ,i(xi(l , l), xi(l , h),Uhi )}
+ min
α0 ,α1
{
(1 − q − α1)(1 − xi(l , h)) + 2q − 1 + α12
− (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆t∗h ,i(xi(l , h)) −Uhi }
Now we show that xi(l , l)  12 is optimal. Note that:
∂R
∂xi(l , l) 

α1 −
(q2+(1−q)2−α0−α1)(1−q−α1−α1)
α0+α0+α1+α1−1 > 0 xi(l , l) > max
{
xi(l , h), −xi (l ,h)(3q−2+α1+α1)+U
h
i
1−q−α1−α1
}
α1 > 0 xi(l , h) < xi(l , l) <
−xi (l ,h)(3q−2+α1+α1)+Uhi
1−q−α1−α1
q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 > 0
−xi (l ,h)(3q−1−α0−α0)+Uhi
α0+α0−q < xi(l , l) < xi(l , h)
α1 − (q
2+(1−q)2−α0−α1)(1−q−α1−α1)
α0+α0+α1+α1−1 > 0 xi(l , l) < min
{
xi(l , h), −xi (l ,h)(3q−1−α0−α0)+U
h
i
α0+α0−q
}
Thus, the problem becomes:
max
xi (l ,h),Uhi
R(xi(l , h),Uhi )
where:
R(xi(l , h),Uhi ) ≡ minα1
{
α1
2 + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h)
− (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆t∗l ,i(xi(l , h),Uhi )}
+min
α1
{
(1 − q − α1)(1 − xi(l , h)) + 2q − 1 + α12
− (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆t∗h ,i(xi(l , h)) −Uhi }
Now we find the optimal xi(l , h) as a function of Uhi :
∂R(xi(l , h),Uhi )
∂xi(l , h) 

− (q2+(1−q)2−α0−α1)(3q−2+α1+α1)α0+α0+α1+α1−1 < 0 xi(l , h) > max
{
− 12 (α0+α0−q)+Uhi
3q−1−α0−α0 ,
1
2
}
−(q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1) < 0 12 < xi(l , h) <
− 12 (α0+α0−q)+Uhi
3q−1−α0−α0
− (q2+(1−q)2−α0−α1)(3q−1−α0−α0)α0+α0+α1+α1−1 < 0
− 12 (1−q−α1−α1)+Uhi
3q−2+α1+α1 < xi(l , h) <
1
2
q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1 > 0 xi(l , h) < min
{
1
2 ,
− 12 (1−q−α1−α1)+Uhi
3q−2+α1+α1
}
Therefore:
x∗i (l , h)(Uh) 

0 Uhi ≤ 12 (1 − q − α1 − α1)
− 12 (1−q−α1−α1)+Uhi
3q−2+α1+α1
1
2 (1 − q − α1 − α1) < Uhi < 12 (2q − 1)
1
2 U
h
i ≥ 12 (2q − 1)
We can now write the problem just in terms of Uhi :
max
Uhi
R(Uhi )
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where:
R(Uhi ) ≡
α1
2 + (1 − q − α1)x
∗
i (l , h)(Uhi ) −
(
q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)
)
∆t∗l ,i(Uhi )
+ (1 − q − α1)(1 − x∗i (l , h)(Uhi )) +
2q − 1 + α1
2
− (q2 + (1 − q)2 − (α0 + α1)) ∆t∗h ,i(x∗(l , h)(Uhi )) −Uhi
∂R(Uhi )
∂Uhi


q2+(1−q)2−α0−α1
α0+α0+α1+α1−1 − 1 U
h
i <
1
2 (1 − q − α1 − α1)
q2+(1−q)2−α0−α1
3q−2+α1+α1 − 1
1
2 (1 − q − α1 − α1) < Uhi < 12 (2q − 1)
−1 Uhi > 12 (2q − 1)
Thus,
Uh 

0 q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1 ≤ α0 + α0 + α1 + α1 − 1
1
2 (1 − q − α1 − α1) α0 + α0 + α1 + α1 − 1 < q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1 < 3q − 2 + α1 + α1
1
2 (2q − 1) q2 + (1 − q)2 − α0 − α1 ≥ 3q − 2 + α1 + α1
This is equivalent to:
Uh 

0 q ≥ q∗∗(a)
1
2 (1 − q − α1 − α1) q∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a)
1
2 (2q − 1) q ≤ q∗(a)
Thus, in the optimal symmetric mechanism, xi(l , l)  xi(h , h)  12 , and:
xi(l , h) 

0 q ≥ q∗∗(a)
1
2 q
∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a)
1
2 q ≤ q∗(a)
∆tl ,i 

1−q−α1−α1
2(α0+α1+α0+α1−1) q ≥ q
∗∗(a)
0 q∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a)
0 q ≤ q∗(a)
∆th ,i 

1
2 q ≥ q∗∗(a)
1
2 q
∗(a) < q < q∗∗(a)
0 q ≤ q∗(a)
To recover the transfers ti(l , l), ti(l , h), ti(h , l), and ti(h , h), use:
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1))ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)(ti(l , l) + ∆tl ,i)  0
min
α0 ,α1
{
(1 − q − α1)xi(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(h , h)
− (1 − α0 − α1))(ti(h , h) + ∆th ,i) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , h)
}
 Uhi
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Now we show that the optimal symmetric mechanism is fully optimal. Suppose that there
exists an asymmetric mechanism (x , t) that is optimal. Define:
x(·, ·) ≡ 12x1(·, ·) +
1
2 x2(·, ·)
t(·, ·) ≡ 12 t1(·, ·) +
1
2 t2(·, ·)
Consider the following symmetric mechanism:
x′i(·, ·)  x(·, ·)
t′i(l , ·)  t(l , ·) + minα0 ,α1
{
α1x(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)x(l , h)
− (α0 + α1)t(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(l , h) − 12
2∑
i1
U li
}
t′i(h , ·)  t(h , ·) + minα0 ,α1
{
(1 − q − α1)x(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)x(h , h)
− (1 − α0 + α1)t(h , l) − (α0 + α1)t(h , h) − 12
2∑
i1
Uhi
}
By construction, the high type gets 12
∑2
i1 U
h
i in equilibrium and the low type gets
1
2
∑2
i1 U
l
i
in equilibrium; therefore both participation constraints are satisfied.
Define ∆x l ≡ x(l , h) − x(l , l), ∆t l ≡ t(l , h) − t(l , l), ∆xl ,i ≡ xi(l , h) − xi(l , l), and ∆tl ,i ≡ ti(l , h) −
ti(l , l). To see that ICh is satisfied, first note that:
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)x(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)x(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(l , l) − (α0 + α1)t(l , h)

1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , h)
+ min
α0 ,α1
α1∆x l − (α0 + α1)∆t l − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xl ,i − (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i
and by definition:
1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , h) −U li  0
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Therefore:
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)x(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)x(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(l , l) − (α0 + α1)t(l , h)
−
(
min
α0 ,α1
α1x(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)x(l , h) − (α0 + α1)t(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(l , h)
)
+
1
2
2∑
i1
U li

1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , h)
+ min
α0 ,α1
α1∆x l − (α0 + α1)∆t l − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xl ,i − (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i
+
1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(l , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , h) −U li
−
(
min
α0 ,α1
α1x(l , l) + (1 − q − α1)x(l , h) − (α0 + α1)t(l , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(l , h)
)
+
1
2
2∑
i1
U li

1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(l , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(l , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(l , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(l , h)
+ min
α0 ,α1
α1∆x l − (α0 + α1)∆t l − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xl ,i − (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i
+
1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
−α1∆xl ,i + (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i −min
α0 ,α1
−α1∆x l + (α0 + α1)∆t l ≤ 12
2∑
i1
Uhi
The last inequality follows because:
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆x l − (α0 + α1)∆t l − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xl ,i − (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i
+
1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
−α1∆xl ,i + (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i −min
α0 ,α1
−α1∆x l + (α0 + α1)∆t l
 min
α0 ,α1
α1∆x l − (α0 + α1)∆t l − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xl ,i − (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i
+max
α0 ,α1
α1∆x l − (α0 + α1)∆t l − 12
2∑
i1
max
α0 ,α1
α1∆xl ,i − (α0 + α1)∆tl ,i
 (α1 + α1)∆x l − (α0 + α0 + α1 + α1)∆t l −
1
2
2∑
i1
(α1 + α1)∆xl ,i − (α0 + α0 + α1 + α1)∆tl ,i  0
The proof that ICl is satisfied is analogous. Define∆xh ≡ x(h , l)− x(h , h),∆th ≡ t(h , l)− t(h , h),
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∆xh ,i ≡ xi(h , l) − xi(h , h), and ∆th ,i ≡ ti(h , l) − ti(h , h). Then:
min
α0 ,α1
α1x(h , l) + (1 − q − α1)x(h , h) − (α0 + α1)t(h , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(h , h)
−
(
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)x(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)x(h , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(h , l) − (α0 + α1)t(h , h)
)
+
1
2
2∑
i1
Uhi

1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(h , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(h , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(h , h)
+ min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xh − (α0 + α1)∆th − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xh ,i − (α0 + α1)∆th ,i
+
1
2
2∑
i1
(
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)xi(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)xi(h , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(h , l) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , h)
−Uhi
)
−
(
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q − α1)x(h , l) + (2q − 1 + α1)x(h , h) − (1 − α0 − α1)t(h , l) − (α0 + α1)t(h , h)
)
+
1
2
2∑
i1
Uhi

1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1xi(h , l) + (1 − q − α1)xi(h , h) − (α0 + α1)ti(h , l) − (1 − α0 − α1)ti(h , h)
+ min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xh − (α0 + α1)∆th − 12
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
α1∆xh ,i − (α0 + α1)∆th ,i
+
1
2
2∑
i1
min
α0 ,α1
−α1∆xh ,i + (α0 + α1)∆th ,i −min
α0 ,α1
−α1∆xh + (α0 + α1)∆th ≤ 12
2∑
i1
U li
Finally, note that 12
∑2
i1 t
′
i(l , l) ≥ t(l , l), 12
∑2
i1 t
′
i(l , h) ≥ t(l , h), 12
∑2
i1 t
′
i(h , l) ≥ t(h , l), and
1
2
∑2
i1 t
′
i(h , h) ≥ t(h , h), so the symmetric mechanism (x′, t′) is incentive compatible and yields
weakly greater revenue to the seller than (x , t). 
Appendix 2.C Proofs for Section 2.6
Many bidders
Each of n bidders has a common valuation v ∈ {0, 1} for an object, where Pr(v  0)  12 . A public
signal s∗ ∈ {l , h} is drawn so that Pr(s∗  h |v  1)  Pr(s∗  l |v  0)  q > 12 . With probability
αv , all bidders receive the signal s∗ in state v: that is, with probability αv each bidder’s signal is
si  s∗. Otherwise each bidder’s signal is drawn independently from the same distribution as the
public signal so that Pr(si  h |v  1)  Pr(si  l |v  0)  q > 12 . The bidders consider as possible
the following values of αv :
0 ≤ α0 ≤ α0
0 ≤ α1 ≤ α1
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Let α0  α1 ≡ a. Define P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1)) as the probability of k l signals (ordered), and
n − k − 1 h signals, conditional on an h signal under beliefs (α0 , α1), and let E(α0 ,α1)[v |k l , n − k h]
be the corresponding conditional expectation. That is:
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1))  (1 − q)((1 − α0)qk(1 − q)n−k−1 + α0I(k  0))
+ q((1 − α1)qn−k−1(1 − q)k + α1I(k  0))
and E(α0 ,α1)[v |k l , n − k h]  q((1−α1)q
n−k−1(1−q)k+α1I(k0))
(1−q)((1−α0)qk (1−q)n−k−1+α0I(k0))+q((1−α1)qn−k−1(1−q)k+α1I(k0))
Proposition 2.6.1 will be implied by Propositions 2.C.1 and 2.C.3.
Proposition 2.C.1. When ambiguity is not too large, there exists a symmetric equilibrium of the first price
auction where for sufficiently large n:
• The low type has beliefs (α0 , α1)  (α0 , 0) and bids ba(l)  E(α0 ,0)[v |l , . . . , l].
• The high type has beliefs (α0 , α1)  (0, α1) and mixes on the support [ba(l), bF] according to
distribution F(b), where:
bF 
n−2∑
k0
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (0, α1))E(0,α1)[v |k l , n − k h] + P(n − 1 l |h , (0, α1))ba(l)
and for b ∈ [ba(l), bF], F(b) solves:
n−2∑
k0
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (0, α1))(E(0,α1)[v |k l , n − k h] − b)F(b)n−k−1
 P(n − 1 l |h , (0, α1))(b − ba(l))
Proof. For each type we first find the equilibrium beliefs and then show that there does not exist
a profitable deviation.
Note that Pr(l , . . . , l |l , (α0 , α1))  (1 − q)(α1 + (1 − α1)(1 − q)n−1) + q(α0 + (1 − α0)qn−1), and
E(α0 ,α1)(v |l , . . . , l)  (1−q)(α1+(1−α1)(1−q)
n−1)
(1−q)(α1+(1−α1)(1−q)n−1)+q(α0+(1−α0)qn−1) . Thus, the equilibrium utility of the low
type is:
min
α0 ,α1
(1 − q)(α1 + (1 − α1)(1 − q)n−1)(1 − ba(l)) − q(α0 + (1 − α0)qn−1)ba(l)
Note that the derivative with respect to α0 has the same sign as −q(1− qn−1) < 0 and the derivative
with respect to α1 has the same sign as (1 − q)(1 − (1 − q)n−1) > 0. Thus, in equilibrium, the low
type’s beliefs are given by (α0 , α1)  (α0 , 0). Under the equilibrium bid, the low type gets zero
utility. Note that any bid below ba(l) yields zero utility, and any bid above ba(l) yields negative
utility under the equilibrium beliefs (for sufficiently small a). Therefore any deviation is also not
profitable evaluated under the utility minimising beliefs.
The equilibrium utility of the high type (under no ‘no hedging’) is:
min
α0 ,α1
n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1))
[
E(α0 ,α1)[v |k l , n − k h] −
(∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
)]
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The derivative of the utility with respect to α0 is:
n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
− ∂P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1))
∂α0
(∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]

n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
− (1 − q)
(
−(1 − q)n−k−1qk + I(k  0)
) (∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]

n−1∑
k1
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
(1 − q)n−kqk
(∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]
− 1
n
(1 − q) (1 − (1 − q)n−1) (∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn(b)
)
.
In Lemma 2.C.2 below we show that the above derivative is positive. The derivative of the
utility with respect to α1 is:
min
α0 ,α1
n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
∂P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1))E(α0 ,α1)[v |k l , n − k h]
∂α1
− ∂P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1))
∂α1
(∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]

n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
∂P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (α0 , α1))
∂α1
(
1 −
∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]

n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
q
(
−(1 − q)kqn−k−1 + I(k  0)
) (
1 −
∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]
< 0
 −
n−1∑
k1
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
(1 − q)kqn−k
(
1 −
∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
) ]
+
1
n
q
(
1 − qn−1) (1 − ∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn(b)
) ]
Note that by Lemma 2.C.2 this derivative is negative.
Note now that F is increasing, F(ba(l))  0, and F(bF)  1. Moreover, ba(l) < E[v |n −
1 l , h , (0, α1)] (which is true when ambiguity is not too large) ensures that the utility of high
type is greater than 0. Any bid below ba(l) gives zero utility, and any bid above bF gives strictly
lower utility than bidding bF . By construction, under beliefs (α0 , α1)  (0, α1), any bid in the
support [ba(l), bF] gives the same utility, and any other mixed strategy can give at most this
utility. 
Lemma 2.C.2. There exists an n¯ such that for all n > n¯ ,
n−1∑
k1
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
)
(1 − q)n−kqk
(∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b)
)
− 1
n
(1 − q) (1 − (1 − q)n−1) (∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn(b)
)
> 0.
Proof. Below we will focus just on some of the expressions in the sum above that are close to
k  nq. These expressions will have the term
∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(1−q)(b) in them. We next prove that this
term will be bounded away from zero.
Claim: limn→∞
(∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(1−q)(b)
)
> 0 and limn→∞
(∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(b)
)
> 0.
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Proof of Claim. Assume that a is very small and consider the equation for the high type to be
indifferent between any bid in [ba(l), bF] : for any b ∈ [ba(l), bF], F(b) solves:
n−1∑
k0
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (0, α1))(E(0,α1)[v |k l , n − k h] − b)F(b)n−k−1
 P(n − 1 l |h , (0, α1))(b − ba(l))
⇐⇒
(∗) qα1(1 − b)F(b)n−1 − (1 − q)nF(b)n−1b + (1 − α¯1)qnF(b)n−1(1 − b)
+
n−1∑
k1
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (0, α1))(E(0,α1)[v |k l , n − k h] − b)F(b)n−k−1
 P(n − 1 l |h , (0, α1))(b − ba(l))
Fact: For any b < bF , either F(b)n → 0 or F(b)n → ζ(b) < 1.
Proof of Fact. Suppose that for some b , bF > b > ba(l), F(b)n → ζ(b) > 0. Note that as n grows
large, by the law of large numbers, the LHS of (*) converges to
qα1(1 − b)ζ(b) + q(1 − α1)(1 − b)(ζ(b))q − (1 − q)b(ζ(b))1−q
while the RHS converges to zero. Therefore, (*) implies
α1(ζ(b))q + (1 − α1)(ζ(b))2q−1  1 − qq
b
1 − b
As bF  E[V |h]  q , if b < bF the solution will be ζ(b) < 1. 
Given the fact, for any b either F(b)n → 0 or F(b)n → ζ(b) < 1. Note that P(v0|h ,(0,α1)))P(v1|h ,(0,α1))) b1−b is
increasing in b and reaches its maximum for b  bF where the expression is equal 1. Therefore, we
conclude that for any b < bF limn→∞ F(b)n(2q−1) < 1 and so limn→∞
(∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(1−q)(b)
)
> 0 and
limn→∞
(∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(b)
)
> 0. This completes the proof of the Claim. 
For now look at the comparison between∑n−1
k1
1
n−k
(n−1
k
)(1 − q)n−kqk (∫ bFba (l) bdFn−k(b)) and 1n (1 − q) (1 − (1 − q)n−1) (∫ bFba (l) bdFn(b)) as n
grows large.
Above we have seen that
(∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(b)
)
is bounded from zero, therefore the second term is
the same magnitude as 1n .
We will consider only part of the first term. Consider the expression for k  nq. By Stirling’s
approximation:
(
n − 1
k
)

(n − 1)!
(n − k − 1)!k! '
√
2pin( ne )n√
2pin(1 − q)( n(1−q)e )n(1−q)
√
2pinq( nqe )nq

√
1
nq(1 − q)
1
(1 − q))n(1−q)(q)nq
so that the term in the sum relating to k  nq becomes: 1n−k
(n−1
k
) [(1 − q)n−kqk] ' 1n(1−q)√ 1nq(1−q) .
For any n take a sequence n1 such that n1n → 0 and n1√n → ∞. Consider all the terms in the sum
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k ∈ {nq − n1 , ..., nq + n1}, note that for all these we have that:∑
k∈{nq−n1 ,...,nq+n1}
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
) [
(1 − q)n−kqk
]
' 2n1 1n(1 − q)
√
1
nq(1 − q)
where
2n1 1n(1−q)
√
1
nq(1−q)
1
n

2n1 1(1−q)
√
1
q(1−q)√
n
→ ∞. As
(∫ bF
ba (l) bdF
n(1−q)(b)
)
is bounded from zero we are
done. 
Proposition 2.C.3. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 6A, the seller’s revenue is decreasing in a.
Proof. We show that the expected payment of each type, evaluated under the true joint probability
distribution, is decreasing in a. For the low type, the expectedpayment isP(l , . . . , l |l)E(α0(a),0)[v |l , . . . , l]
which is decreasing in a.
To make clear that the equilibrium strategy depends on n and a, denote the bidding strategy
for the high type by F(b; n , a). The expected payment of the high type is:
n−1∑
k0
1
n − k
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h)
∫ bF
ba (l)
bdFn−k(b; n , a)
As in the proof of Lemma 6A, consider the equation defining F(b; n , a):
qα1(1 − b)F(b; n , a)n−1 − (1 − q)nF(b; n , a)n−1b + (1 − α¯1)qnF(b; n , a)n−1(1 − b)
+
n−1∑
k1
(
n − 1
k
)
P(k l , n − k − 1 h |h , (0, α1))(E(0,α1(a))[v |k l , n − k h] − b)F(b; n , a)n−k−1
 P(n − 1 l |h , (0, α1))(b − ba(l))
By the law of large numbers, for large n, the LHS is close to:
qα1(1 − b)F(b; n , a)n−1 + q(1 − α1)(1 − b)F(b; n , a)q(n−1) − (1 − q)bF(b; n , a)(1−q)(n−1)
and the RHS is close to 0. Thus, F(b; n , a) is close to F∗(b; n , a), where for b ∈ [0, q], F∗(b; n , a) is
the unique positive solution to:
qα1(1 − b)F(b; n , a)n−1 + q(1 − α1)(1 − b)F(b; n , a)q(n−1) − (1 − q)bF(b; n , a)(1−q)(n−1)  0
Note that F∗(b; n , a) is increasing in a. Now when n is large, ∫ bFba (l) bdFn−k(b; n , a) is close to∫ q
0 bdF
∗n−k(b; n , a). Take a′ > a; since F∗n−k(b; n , a)first order stochasticallydominates F∗n−k(b; n , a′),∫ q
0 bdF
∗n−k(b; n , a′) < ∫ q0 bdF∗n−k(b; n , a),which implies ∫ bFba (l) bdFn−k(b; n , a′) < ∫ bFba (l) bdFn−k(b; n , a)
for sufficiently large n. Thus, the expected payment of the high type is decreasing in a. 
Continuous signals
Here we consider a general set of marginal distributions, gv(s). Specifically assume that g1 is
increasing and g0 is decreasing, and assume symmetry so that g1(s)  g0(1 − s).
Let us first write the utility of a player with signal s1 for each bid b , when the other player is
following an increasing bidding strategy b(s′). This is
U(s1 , b) ∝ min
λ
(
∫ z
0
(1 − b(s′)) f1(s1 , s′)ds′ −
∫ z
0
b(s′) f0(s1 , s′)ds′)
where z  b−1(b). Thus for each bid b , each player minimises utility by choosing a vector λ,
given the strategy of the other player. Recall that sv , for v ∈ {0, 1}, is the median of the cdf Gv().
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Lemma 2.C.4. Consider an equilibrium in which b(s) is increasing. Let λ∗(s) denote the information
structure which minimises the utility of the player for each s. Then:
(i) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmax , λmin) for all s < s0.
(ii) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmin , λmin) for all s ∈ [s0 ,min{sˆ , s1}].
(iii) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmin , λmax) for s ∈ [s1 , sˆ] if s1 < sˆ and (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmax , λmin) for
s ∈ [sˆ , s1] otherwise.
(iv) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmax , λmax) for all s > max{s1 , sˆ},
and sˆ < 1 satisfies ∫ sˆ
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1))ds′  0.
That is, λ∗(s) changes with s , so the behaviour as described cannot be rationalised with a
unique a priori λ.
Proof of Lemma 2.C.4 and Proposition 2.6.2. We first show in Claims 1-3 that λ∗(s) minimises the
equilibrium utility of each player for each s . We then show that the bidding function b(s) 
Eλ
∗(s)(v |s , s) is an equilibrium. Finally, we identify a sufficient condition under which the seller’s
revenue is decreasing in ambiguity.
Define:
I1(s) 
∫ s
0
(1 − b(s′))g1(s′)g1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′
I0(s)  −
∫ s
0
b(s′)g0(s′)g0(s)(2G0(s) − 1)(2G0(s′) − 1))ds′,
Thus:
Claim 1: In equilibrium, λ∗v(s)  λmin (λmax) iff Iv(s) > (<) 0.
Proof. Iv(s) is the derivative of the expected utility with respect to λv at b  b(s). Given max-min
behaviour, the statement follows. 
Claim 2: (i) I1(s) > 0 for s < s1 , I1(s) < 0 for all s > s1; (ii) I0(s) < 0 for s < s0 , I0(s) > 0 for all
s ∈ (s0 , sˆ), I0(s) < 0 for all s > sˆ .
Proof. (i) I1(s) : This function must be strictly positive for s < s1 as (2G1(s) − 1)(2G1(s′) − 1) > 0 for
s , s′ < s1. Note that I1(s1)  0, and that
∂I1(s)
∂s
|ss1 
∂g1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)
∂s
|ss1
∫ s1
0
(1 − b(s′))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′
 2(g1(s1))2
∫ s1
0
(1 − b(s′))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′ < 0
More generally:
∂I1(s)
∂s
 (g′1(s)(2G1(s) − 1) + 2(g1(s))2)
∫ s
0
(1 − b(s′))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′
+(1 − b(s))g1(s)g1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)(2G1(s) − 1)
 ( g
′
1(s)
g1(s) +
2(g1(s))
(2G1(s) − 1) )I1(s) + 2(g1(s))
2)(1 − b(s))(2G1(s) − 1)(2G1(s) − 1))
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So whenever I1(s) > 0 and s > s1 we have that ∂I1(s)∂s > 0 as g1(s) is increasing and 2(g1(s))2)(1−
b(s))(2G1(s) − 1)(2G1(s) − 1)) > 0. So now it suffices to check that I1(1) < 0 :
I1(1)  g1(1)
∫ 1
0
(1 − b(s′))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′
 g1(1)
∫ s1
0
(1 − b(s′))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′ + g1(1)
∫ 1
s1
(1 − b(s))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′
< g1(1)
∫ s1
0
(1 − b(s1))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′ + g1(1)
∫ 1
s1
(1 − b(s1))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′
 g1(1)
∫ s1
0
(1 − b(s1))g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′  0,
where the last inequality follows as b(s′) is increasing, (2G1(s′) − 1) > 0 (< 0) whenever s > s1
(s < s1). The last equality follows from
∫ 1
0 g1(s′)(2G1(s′) − 1)ds′  0.
(ii) I0(s) : This function must be strictly negative for s < s0 as (2G0(s) − 1)(2G0(s′) − 1) > 0 for
s , s′ < s0. Note that I0(s0)  0. Moreover,
∂I0(s)
∂s
|ss0  −
∂g0(s)(2G0(s) − 1)
∂s
|ss0
∫ s0
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′
−b(s′)g0(s′)g0(s0)(2G0(s0) − 1)(2G0(s′) − 1))
 −2(g0(s0))2
∫ s0
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′ > 0
So I0(s) < 0 for s ≥ s0. Note that −
∫ s
0 b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1))ds′ is decreasing for s > s0. Thus if
I0(1) < 0, we have the result. But
|I0(1)|  g0(1)
∫ 1
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′
> g0(1)
∫ s0
0
b(s0)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′ + g0(1)
∫ 1
s0
b(s0)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′
 g0(1)b(s0)
∫ 1
0
g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′  0.
Thus we know there exists sˆ < 1 such that:∫ sˆ
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1))ds′  0,
and we can conclude that I0(s) > 0 for s ∈ (s0 , sˆ) and that I0(s) < 0 for s > sˆ . 
Consider now the bidding functionEλ∗(s)(v |s , s).Note that overbidding, compared to the canonical
model, arises when
[1 + λ∗1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)2]g21(s)
[1 + λ∗1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)2]g21(s) + [1 + λ∗0(s)(2G0(s) − 1)2]g20(s)
>
g21(s)
g21(s) + g20(s)
which holds if and only if:
[1 + λ∗1(s)(2G1(s′) − 1)2]
[1 + λ∗0(s)(2G0(s′) − 1)2]
> 1.
We then have:
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Claim 3:When b(s)  Eλ∗(s)(v |s , s), a necessary condition for overbidding compared to the canon-
ical model is sˆ > 0.5, that is: ∫ 0.5
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′ < 0
If this holds, there is overbidding in the region [s0 , sˆ], and underbidding for any other s.
Otherwise, all types underbid compared to the canonical model.
Proof. Given Claims 1 and 2, we can then deduce the different values of λ∗v in equilibrium and
consider when overbidding/underbidding arises compared to the canonical model when the
bidding function is as described in the Proposition.
(a) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmax , λmin) for all s < s0. As a result, if this is an equilibrium, we would
have underbidding as
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]
[1 + λmax(2G0(s′) − 1)2] < 1,
which is indeed the case as λmin < 0 < λmax.
(b) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmin , λmin) for all s ∈ [s0 ,min{sˆ , s1}].We have underbidding iff:
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]
[1 + λmin(2G0(s′) − 1)2] < 1
If min{sˆ , s1} > 0.5, then we would have overbidding because in the region above 0.5, as
(2G1(0.5) − 1)2  (2G0(0.5) − 1)2 by symmetry, but because of convexity (concavity) of G1
(G0), the fraction would be greater than 1, as we would have (2G1(s′) − 1)2 < (2G0(s′) − 1)2
just above 0.5.
(c) (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmax , λmax) for all s > max{s1 , sˆ}. In this case we also have underbidding
as [1 + λmax(2G1(s′) − 1)2] < [1 + λmax(2G0(s′) − 1)2], because 12 < G1(s′) < G0(s′).
(d) If 0.5 < s1 < sˆ : in the region [s1 , sˆ] we have (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmin , λmax). In this case we
have overbidding as:
[1 + λmax(2G1(s′) − 1)2]
[1 + λmin(2G0(s′) − 1)2] > 1
For this we need s1 < sˆ , implying that 0.5 < sˆ .
(e) If sˆ < s1 : Then we have (λ∗0(s), λ∗1(s))  (λmax , λmin) in this region between the two values.
Then we have underbidding as:
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]
[1 + λmax(2G0(s′) − 1)2] < 1. 
Thus the structure of the equilibrium is therefore as above. So for overbidding we need:∫ 0.5
0
b(s′)g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′

∫ s0
0
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]g21(s′)
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]g21(s′) + [1 + λmax(2G0(s′) − 1)2]g20(s′)
g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′
+
∫ 0.5
s0
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]g21(s′)
[1 + λmin(2G1(s′) − 1)2]g21(s′) + [1 + λmin(2G0(s′) − 1)2]g20(s′)
g0(s′)(2G0(s′) − 1)ds′
< 0
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which is analogous to what is in the Proposition. Finally we need to show that the construction
above is an equilibrium:
Claim 4: The bidding function b(s)  Eλ∗(s)(v |s , s) is a symmetric equilibrium when a is low
enough.
Proof. We now show it is optimal for player 1 with signal s to bid b(s), when player 2 is following
the same strategy b(s′).
Let λˆ equal λ∗(s) and consider the virtual utility for player 1 with signal s from bidding b(z):
Uˆ(s , z) 
∫ z
0
(Eλˆ(v |s , s′) − b(s′))dFλˆ(s , s′)

1
2 (
∫ z
0
((1 − b(s′)) f1(λˆ, s , s′) − b(s′) f0(λˆ, s , s′))ds′
This is not player 1’s utility as it is evaluated at λˆ for all z. However, player 1’s utility from
bidding b(s) is indeed Uˆ(s , s), and player 1’s utility from bidding b(z), z , s is at most Uˆ(s , z).
Thus if z  s maximises Uˆ(s , z), then bidding b(s) is optimal for player 1 with signal s . Note that
when s′  s , then the integrand is zero. To see that the integrand equals 0 note that, as λˆ  λ∗(s),
(1 − b(s)) f1(λˆ, s , s)  b(s) f0(λˆ, s , s)
iff
[1 + λ∗0(s)(2G0(s) − 1)2]g20(s)[1 + λ∗1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)(2G1(s) − 1)]g1(s)g1(s)
 [1 + λ∗1(s)(2G1(s) − 1)2]g21(s)[1 + λ∗0(s)(2G0(s) − 1)(2G0(s) − 1)]g0(s)g0(s)
which holds.
The integrand when s′  s is the derivative of Uˆ(s , z) with respect to z evaluated at z  s;
thus, the first order condition with respect to z is satisfied for z  s. Moreover as we now show,
the second order condition evaluated at this point is negative, thus z  s is a maximum. To see
this, suppose that we have a z for which Uˆz(s , z)  0. Taking a second derivative w.r.t. z we get:
−b′(z)( f1(λˆ, s , z) + f0(λˆ, s , z)) + (1 − b(z)) f ′1(λˆ, s , z) − b(z) f ′0(λˆ, s , z). As Uˆz(s , z)  0, this implies
that (1 − b(z))  b(z) f0(λˆ,s ,z)
f1(λˆ,s ,z) , and thus the second order derivative at that z is
−b′(z)( f1(λˆ, s , z) + f0(λˆ, s , z)) + b(z) f0(λˆ, s , z)
f1(λˆ, s , z)
f ′1(λˆ, s , z) − b(z) f ′0(λˆ, s , z)
 −b′(z)( f1(λˆ, s , z) + f0(λˆ, s , z)) + b(z)( f0(λˆ, s , z)
f1(λˆ, s , z)
f ′1(λˆ, s , z) − f ′0(λˆ, s , z))
Note that the first element is always negative. The second element is negative iff:
g′1(z)g1(s)(1+λˆ1(2G1(z)−1)(2G1(s)−1))+g1(z)g1(s)λˆ12g1(z)(2G1(s)−1))
g′0(z)g0(s)(1+λˆ0(2G0(z)−1)(2G0(s)−1))+g0(z)g0(s)λˆ02g0(z)(2G0(s)−1))
<
g1(z)g1(s)(1+λˆ1(2G1(z)−1)(2G1(s)−1))
g0(z)g0(s)(1+λˆ0(2G0(z)−1)(2G0(s)−1))
Note thatwhen λˆ is small enough, this is always the case as the LHS is negative. Thus a solution
to the first order condition is unique.
But the above implies that player 1 can achieve this utility above and cannot improve upon it
when using other bids b(z), z , s .
So we know that the player bids up to the point where the integrand becomes negative, so,
written differently, until Eλˆ(v |s , s)  b(s), which gives us the equilibrium bidding function. 
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We now consider the seller’s revenue and show that it is decreasing in a , under the sufficient con-
dition identified. Consider the case when sˆ > s1 (in the other cases, all types underbid compared
to the canonical model, and hence revenue is also lower). Let
w(s′)  (1 − G1(s′))g1(s′) + (1 − G0(s′))g0(s′)
The seller’s revenue can be written as:
R(a) 
∫ s0
0
b(s′, λmax , λmin)w(s′)ds′ +
∫ s1
s0
b(s′, λmin , λmin)w(s′)ds′ +∫ sˆ
s1
b(s′, λmin , λmax)w(s′)ds′ +
∫ 1
sˆ
b(s′, λmax , λmax)w(s′)ds′
The derivative w.r.t. a is:
∂R(a)
∂a

∫ s0
0
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmin)w(s′)ds′ +
∫ s1
s0
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmin)w(s′)ds′ +∫ sˆ
s1
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmax)w(s′)ds′ +
∫ 1
sˆ
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmax)w(s′)ds′ +
∂sˆ
∂a
(b(sˆ , λmin , λmax) − b(sˆ , λmax , λmax))w(sˆ)
We note that
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmin)|a1  g1(s
′)2g0(s′)2[−(2G1(s′) − 1)2 − (2G0(s′) − 1)2]
(g1(s′)2 + g0(s′)2)2
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmin)|a1  g1(s
′)2g0(s′)2[−(2G1(s′) − 1)2 + (2G0(s′) − 1)2]
(g1(s′)2 + g0(s′)2)2
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmax)|a1  g1(s
′)2g0(s′)2[(2G1(s′) − 1)2 + (2G0(s′) − 1)2]
(g1(s′)2 + g0(s′)2)2
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmax)|a1  g1(s
′)2g0(s′)2[(2G1(s′) − 1)2 − (2G0(s′) − 1)2]
(g1(s′)2 + g0(s′)2)2
So that:
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmin)|a1  − ∂∂a b(s
′, λmin , λmax)|a1  − ∂∂a b(1 − s
′, λmin , λmax)|a1
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmax)|a1  − ∂∂a b(s
′, λmin , λmin)|a1  ∂∂a b(1 − s
′, λmin , λmin)|a1
And therefore we can write ∂R(a)∂a |a1 as:
∂R(a)
∂a
|a1  −
∫ 1−sˆ
0
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmax)w(s′)ds′ −
∫ s0
1−sˆ
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmax)[w(s′) − w(1 − s′)]ds′
−
∫ 0.5
s0
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmax , λmax)[w(s′) − w(1 − s′)]ds′ −
∫ 1
sˆ
∂
∂a
b(s′, λmin , λmin)w(s′)ds′.
Thus, a sufficient condition for revenue to be decreasing in a is for w(s′) to be decreasing over
[sˆ , 1 − sˆ]. Note that this sufficient condition is satisfied for g0(s)  2(1 − s) and g1(s)  2s . 
Private values: Consider the following model where each buyer has private valuation vi ∈ [0, 1],
independently distributed according to a uniform distribution. Suppose that the buyers believe
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that the joint distribution is given by the F-G-M copula f (vi , v j ; λ)  1+ λ(2vi − 1)(2v j − 1), where
λ ∈ Λ  [λ, λ¯]. Assume that 0 ∈ Λ, and define:
Gλ(z |vi) 
∫ z
0
(1 + λ(2vi − 1)(2v j − 1))dv j  z + λz(z − 1)(2vi − 1)
That is, Gλ(·|vi) is the distribution of v j conditional on vi , when the belief about the joint
distribution is given by λ. Let gλ(·|vi) denote the corresponding density. Define:
Lλ(y |vi)  exp
(
−
∫ vi
y
gλ(t |t)
Gλ(t |t)dt
)
Proposition 2.C.5. When ambiguity is not too large, a symmetric equilibrium in the first price auction is:
b(vi) 

∫ vi
0 ydLλ(y |vi) vi ≤ 0.5∫ vi
0 ydLλ¯(y |vi) +
∫ 0.5
0 yd(Lλ(y |0.5) − Lλ¯(y |0.5)) vi > 0.5
Bids in the first price auction are uniformly higher than the case without ambiguity.
Proof. Assume that player j is following the equilibrium strategy. Player i’s utility from bidding
b(z) ∈ [0, vi] is:
min
λ∈Λ Uλ(z |vi) ≡ Gλ(z |vi)(vi − b(z))
Note that Gλ(z |vi)  z + λz(z − 1)(2vi − 1). Thus, λ minimises this utility for types vi ≤ 0.5,
and λ¯ minimises this utility for types vi > 0.5. Thus, the utility from bidding b(z) is Uλ(z |vi) for
vi ≤ 0.5 and Uλ¯(z |vi) for vi > 0.5. First order conditions imply:
gλ(vi |vi)(vi − b(vi)) − Gλ(vi |vi)b′(vi)  0 vi ≤ 0.5
gλ¯(vi |vi)(vi − b(vi)) − Gλ¯(vi |vi)b′(vi)  0 vi > 0.5
Using boundary conditions b(0)  0 and b(0.5)  ∫ 0.50 ydLλ(y |0.5), the solution to these differential
equations is:
b(vi) 

∫ vi
0 ydLλ(y |vi) vi ≤ 0.5∫ vi
0 ydLλ¯(y |vi) +
∫ 0.5
0 yd(Lλ(y |0.5) − Lλ¯(y |0.5)) vi > 0.5
Consider type vi ≤ 0.5 deviating to a bid b(z).24 Note that for 0.5 > z > vi :
∂Uλ(z |vi)
∂z
 Gλ(z |vi)
[
gλ(z |vi)
Gλ(z |vi) (vi − b(z)) − b
′(z)
]
< Gλ(z |vi)
[
gλ(z |z)
Gλ(z |z) (z − b(z)) − b
′(z)
]
 0
The inequality follows because z > vi , and when λ is close to zero,
gλ(z |vi )
Gλ(z |vi ) and
gλ(z |z)
Gλ(z |z) are close.25
A similar argument shows that for z < vi ,
∂Uλ(z |vi )
∂z > 0.
When z > 0.5, note that if λ¯ and λ are close, then ∂Uλ¯(z |vi )∂z and
∂Uλ(z |vi )
∂z are close. Thus for some
ε > 0,
24The argument for v > 0.5 is analogous.
25The derivative of gλ (z |v)Gλ (z |v) with respect to v is
2λz2
Gλ (z |v)2 .
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∂Uλ(z |vi)
∂z
<
∂Uλ¯(z |vi)
∂z
+ ε
 Gλ¯(z |vi)
[
gλ¯(z |vi)
Gλ¯(z |vi)
(vi − b(z)) − b′(z)
]
+ ε
< Gλ¯(z |vi)
[
gλ¯(z |z)
Gλ¯(z |z)
(z − b(z)) − b′(z)
]
 0
where the last inequality follows because z > vi , and since λ¯ > 0,
gλ¯(z |z)
Gλ¯(z |z) >
gλ¯(z |vi )
Gλ¯(z |vi ) (see footnote
25).
To see that bids are uniformly higher under ambiguity, note that in the case without ambiguity,
the bid can be written as b0(vi) 
∫ vi
0 ydL0(y |vi). When vi ≤ 0.5,
∫ vi
y
gλ(t |t)
Gλ(t |t) dt is decreasing in λ
since the integrand gλ(t |t)Gλ(t |t) is decreasing in λ.26 Thus, Lλ first order stochastically dominates L0,
implying that for vi ≤ 0.5,
∫ vi
0 ydLλ(y |vi) ≥
∫ vi
0 ydL0(y |vi). A similar argument implies that for
vi > 0.5,
∫ vi
0.5 ydLλ¯(y |vi) ≥
∫ vi
0.5 ydL0(y |vi).27 Note that
∫ 0.5
0 ydLλ¯(y |vi) ≥
∫ 0.5
0 ydLλ¯(y |0.5) and∫ 0.5
0 ydLλ(y |0.5) ≥
∫ 0.5
0 ydL0(y |0.5), implying the result. 
26The derivative of gλ (t |t)Gλ (t |t) with respect to λ is
t2(2t−1)
Gλ (t |t)2 .27Integrating by parts and using the fact that for vi > y > 0.5, Lλ(y |vi) is decreasing in λ:∫ vi
0.5
ydLλ¯(y |vi) −
∫ vi
0.5
ydL0(y |vi)
 0.5(L0(0.5|vi) − Lλ¯(0.5|vi)) +
∫ vi
0.5
L0(y |vi) − Lλ¯(y |vi)dy ≥ 0.
Chapter 3
A Nash Threats Folk Theorem for Repeated
Games with Local Monitoring
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we will prove a Nash threats folk theorem for infinitely repeated games with local
monitoring and interaction. We assume that the monitoring and the interaction structure are both
determined by an undirected network. This means that for each player, her stage game payoffs
only depend on the actions of a subset of players, and these actions are the only actions that
she observes. We also assume that players are patient, and repeated game payoffs are given by
the Banach-Mazur limit of the sequence of average stage game payoffs. This latter assumption is
crucial for our results. Indeed, we show that under discounting, a folk theorem cannot hold in
our setting without further assumptions on the network structure or the payoffs. In particular, we
show without further assumptions on payoffs, a necessary condition for a folk theorem to hold
under discounting is that every connected component of the network is 2-connected.
Local monitoring prevents standard results from applying. For example, in a star network, the
core player may not wish to punish a single defecting peripheral player if that involves ending
cooperation in all relationships forever. Thus, grim trigger strategies may not be an equilibrium.
One way to view this problem is as follows. With local monitoring, it can be difficult for players to
distinguish between punishment and defection. Suppose that Player j defects, and Player j’s only
neighbour is Player i. Since Player i’s neighbours do not observe whether Player j has defected,
if Player i punishes Player j, then Player i’s neighbours will punish Player i. Now if Player i had
strict incentives to play on-path, she may prefer not to punish Player j to avoid getting punished
herself. A natural approach would be to construct strategies such that cooperating is only slightly
preferred to defecting. Indeed, in the equilibria we construct, players are indifferent between
cooperating and any finite sequence of defections.
The proof will be constructive: for any payoff above the Nash equilibrium point, we will
construct a strategy profile that achieves the target payoff. The strategies will be stable in the sense
that after any arbitrary history, everyone goes back to playing on-path after a finite number of
periods. Since players are arbitrarily patient, short term incentives are irrelevant, which means
that they can always achieve their equilibriumpayoff by following the strategy. Thus, the challenge
is to show that no deviation can achieve a payoff greater than the equilibrium payoff (note that
the one-shot deviation principle does not apply).
Stability is not a trivial requirement under local monitoring because different players may
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have different beliefs about when a punishment phase is supposed to end. We circumvent this
problem by constructing strategies that exploit the common knowledge of time—that is, rather
than requiring players to punish deviations for a fixed number of periods, we require punishment
to last until certain dates. Roughly speaking, we will divide the repeated game into T period
blocks, and each T period block into 2 parts. Deviations in the first part of a block are punished
until the end of the block, and deviations in the second part of the block are punished until the
end of the next block. As long as the second part is long enough, deviations will be punished
sufficiently harshly, and as long as the first part is long enough, the strategies will be stable.
Here is the intuition behind stability. Suppose that we are trying to sustainmutual cooperation
in the prisoners’ dilemma, so that C is played on-path and D is played if a deviation is observed
(by both the deviating player and her neighbours). At the end of the block following an arbitrary
history, it may be the case that some players are supposed to play C, whereas others have to play
D for one more block. But those who are supposed to play C and observe D from a neighbour
will start playing D themselves. In this way, the punishment will spread throughout the network,
and as long as the first part of the block is long enough, everyone will have seen D by the end
of the first part, and respond by playing D until the end of the block. Thus, everyone will end
punishment at the same time.
A different type of coordination problem is that even though players are punished effectively
when all of their neighbours play the Nash equilibrium action, they may benefit from being
‘punished’ by only some of their neighbours. In order to prevent players from exploiting this, our
strategies ensure that the number of periods in each length T block in which a player is punished
by only a proper subset of her neighbours is small relative to the number of periods in which she
is punished by every neighbour. This is achieved by requiring punishment to continue for an extra
block in some cases, and to end prematurely in others.
One final difficulty that could arise under local monitoring is that after observing a deviation,
players may try to infer the spread of the deviation in the network and the beliefs of others about
future play. We circumvent this difficult by constructing strategies that are optimal for every belief
that players might have about play outside their neighbourhood.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper continues the tradition of providing limiting results for repeated games on networks.
Nava (2016) provides a survey of of this literature, which has largely found that very weak
conditions on the network structure are required for a folk theorem to hold. In this paper, we
impose no restrictions on the network structure. An earlier and related strand of literature, which
focused on a randommatching environment, was pioneered by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994).
They establish that even when players are unable to recognise their opponents, cooperation can
be sustained as a sequential equilibrium supported by contagious punishments. In our setting,
interaction takes place on a stable network, and players know their neighbours and observe their
actions.
Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) showed that under the assumption that public communica-
tion is possible, a necessary and sufficient condition for a folk theorem to hold is that every player
is observed by at least two other players. Renault and Tomala (1998) and Tomala (2011) establish
Nash folk theorems under similar conditions without any explicit communication, and Laclau
(2012) and Laclau (2014) establish Nash and sequentially rational folk theorems, respectively,
under different assumptions about the communication possibilities. In this paper, we consider a
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restricted class of games, which allows us to establish a sequentially rational folk theorem for any
network structure.
Cho (2011) and Cho (2014) construct stable and sequentially rational equilibria that sustain
cooperation in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. Cho (2011) assumes that players have access
to a public randomisation device, and Cho (2014) allows players to communicate with their
neighbours. In this paper, players do not have access to a public randomisation device or any
method of communication.
This paper builds on Nava and Piccione (2014), who show that mutual cooperation is possible
for a broad class of two-action games. They also consider discounted payoffs as well as the case of
arbitrarily patient players. However, we extend their results to a folk theorem, and we construct
different strategies to support the equilibria.
The model is described in Section 3.3. Our main result, that any feasible payoff above the
Nash equilibrium point can be (approximately) sustained in sequential equilibrium, is stated as
Proposition 3.4.1 in Section 3.4. The strategies used to prove Proposition 3.4.1 are described in
Section 3.5, and the proof of Proposition 3.4.1 appears in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.3 Model
A set N contains n players who interact according to an undirected graph (N,G). We assume that
(N,G) is common knowledge. For each i ∈ N , define Ni  { j ∈ N \ {i} : i j ∈ G}. Note that j ∈ Ni
if and only if i ∈ N j . We interpret Ni as the neighbourhood of Player i. Define a path as ( j1 , . . . , jm)
such that jk+1 ∈ N jk , k  1, . . . ,m − 1, and jk , jl for k , l.
For M ⊂ N , define GM  {i j ∈ G : i , j ∈ M}. That is, (M,GM) is the subgraph with vertices in
M. (M,GM) is connected if for each j1 , jm ∈ M, there is a path ( j1 , . . . , jm) such that jk+1 ∈ N jk ∩M.
(M,GM) is 2-connected if for each i ∈ M, (M \ {i},GM\{i}) is connected. For M ⊂ N , (M,GM) is a
connected component of (N,G) if (M,GM) is connected and for all i ∈ N \ {M}, (M ∪ {i},GM∪{i})
is not connected.
The action set of Player i is a finite set Ai . Let AM  × j∈MA j . The stage game payoff for Player
i is given by the function vi : ANi∪{i} 7→ R, and we denote an element of ANi∪{i} by ai , aNi .
Assumption 1. For each Ai , there exists an action D ∈ Ai such that vi(D ,D , . . . ,D) > vi(a′i ,D , . . . ,D)
for all a′i ∈ Ai \ {D}.
This assumption says that the strategy profile (D , . . . ,D) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the stage
game. Without loss of generality, let vi(D , . . . ,D)  0 for all i ∈ N .
The stage game is repeated infinitely many times. Each player observes the past play of her
neighbours. The set of possible histories for Player i is:
Hi  {} ∪
{∪∞t1 [×ts1ANi∪{i}]} .
A (pure) strategy for Player i is a function σi : Hi 7→ Ai . The set of all strategies available to
Player i is given by Σi .
Given a strategy profile σN  (σ1 , . . . , σn), let {atN }∞t1 be the sequence of actions generated by
σN , and let {vi(ati , atNi )}∞t1 be the sequence of stage game payoffs for Player i. Players discount the
future without common discount factor δ ≤ 1, and repeated game payoffs are defined as:
Vi(σN ) 

Λ
({
1
t
∑t
s1 vi(asi , asNi )
}∞
t1
)
when δ  1
(1 − δ)∑∞t1 δt−1vi(ati , atNi ) when δ < 1,
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where Λ(·) denotes the Banach-Mazur limit of a sequence. A Banach-Mazur limit is a positive
linear functional Λ : `∞ → R, where `∞ is the space of all bounded sequences, such that Λ(e)  1,
where e  (1, 1, . . .), andΛ(x1 , x2 , . . .)  Λ(x2 , x3 , . . .) for each (x1 , x2 , . . .) ∈ `∞ (see Aliprantis and
Border (2006), pp. 550-551).
The set of histories for the entire game is:
H  {} ∪ {∪∞t1 [×ts1AN ]} .
For each observed history h¯i , we can define the information set of Player i as I(h¯i)  {h ∈ H : hi 
h¯i}. Let β(h |hi) denote the belief of Player i that the history is h, conditional on observing hi .
3.4 Folk Theorem
Let v(aN )  (v1(a1 , aN1), . . . , vn(an , aNn )). The set of feasible payoffs is F  co{v(aN ) : aN ∈ AN },
and the set of feasible payoffs such that each player receives strictly more than her stage game
Nash equilibrium payoff is FIR  F∩{v : vi > 0, ∀i}. Let F∗ be the subset of FIR where the weights
used in the convex combinations are rational numbers.
Proposition 3.4.1. If δ  1, any v∗ ∈ F∗ can be supported as a sequential equilibrium payoff.
In the next section, we will construct a strategy profile that supports v∗ as a sequential equilib-
riumpayoff for any v∗. For the remainder of this section,we discuss the necessity of the assumption
that δ  1.
Remark 3.4.1. The folk theorem does not hold in this setting when payoffs are discounted. In
order for a folk theorem to hold under discounting, additional restrictions must be made either
on payoffs or the network structure. The following example shows that when δ < 1, there exists a
stage game satisfying Assumption 1, a network structure, and a payoff v∗ ∈ F∗ such that v∗ is not
the payoff in any sequential equilibrium.
Example 3.4.1. Let four players connected on a line play the following stage game with common
action space A  {C,D}, and payoff function:
• v(D ,D ,D ,D)  (0, 0, 0, 0)
• v(C, C, C, C)  (1, 1, 1, 1)
• v(C,D , C, C)  (−1, 2, 1, 1)
• v(D ,D , C, C)  (0, 2, 1, 1)
• v(D , C, C, C)  (1, 1, 1, 1)
Otherwise the payoffs are such that Player 3 gets at most zero, Assumption 1 is satisfied (i.e.
(D ,D ,D ,D) is a strict Nash equilibrium of the stage game), and for each i, Player i’s payoffs
depends only on the actions of Player i and Player i’s neighbours. A complete specification of the
stage game payoffs are given in the Appendix.
The efficient payoff (1, 1, 1, 1) (which requires Player 2, Player 3, and Player 4 to play C)
cannot be sustained in any sequential equilibrium under discounting. To see this, note that in any
equilibrium in which Player 3 and Player 4 play C forever on the equilibrium path, Player 3 can
guarantee the payoff 1 by always playing C. Moreover, 1 is the highest payoff Player 3 can get in
the stage game. In order to prevent Player 2 from deviating from C, Player 2 must be punished
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for playing D. However, the only way Player 2 can be punished for playing D is if Player 3 plays
D (since if Player 3 plays C, Player 2 gets at least 1). But in this case, Player 3 will get strictly less
than 1, so Player 3 will not find it optimal to trigger this punishment. Thus, Player 2 will have an
incentive to deviate from C, and there cannot exist an equilibrium in which Player 2, Player 3, and
Player 4 play C forever.
Note that under perfect monitoring, the payoff (1, 1, 1, 1) can be sustained in sequential equi-
librium for high enough δ, for example by using grim trigger strategies. In this case, the problem
under networkmonitoring is that Player 4 does not observe Player 2, and fixing the action of Player
4 to be C, Player 3 can guarantee her maximum stage game payoff (which is 1). In other words,
the feasible and individually rational payoff set of Player 2’s neighbourhood has empty interior
when Player 4’s action is fixed at C.
This example generalises to the following Proposition, which establishes that a necessary
condition on the network structure for the folk theorem to hold under discounting is that every
connected component is 2-connected.
Proposition 3.4.2. For any (N,G) such that there exists a connected component that is not 2-connected,
there exists a stage game satisfying Assumption 1 and a payoff v∗ ∈ F∗ such that v∗ is not the payoff in any
sequential equilibrium for any δ < 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the entire network (N,G) is connected (if not, we
can just consider each connected component separately). Now suppose that the network is not
2-connected. Let i∗ be a player such that (N \ {i∗},GN\{i∗}) is not connected. First, we will define
NLi∗ and N
R
i∗ as two nonempty, disjoint subsets of Ni∗ with the property that for i ∈ NLi∗ and
j ∈ NRi∗ , every path (i , . . . , j) contains i∗. Let (NL ,GNL ) and (NR ,GNL ) be two distinct connected
components of (N \ {i∗},GN\{i∗}), and letNLi∗  NL∩Ni∗ andNRi∗  NR∩Ni∗ . We argue thatNLi∗ and
NLi∗ are non empty. By the assumption that (N,G) is connected, for i ∈ NL ⊂ N and j ∈ NR ⊂ N ,
there must be a path (i , . . . , j), where each element of the path is in N . Since (NL ,GNL ) and
(NR ,GNL ) are two disjoint connected components of (N \ {i∗},GN\{i∗}), there is no path from i
to j that does not contain i∗. Therefore, there must exist a path (i , . . . , iL , i∗ , iR , . . . , j). Now we
show that iL ∈ NL ∩ Ni∗ . The argument that iR ∈ NR ∩ Ni∗ is analogous. By definition iL ∈ Ni∗ . If
iL  i ∈ NL, then we are done. Otherwise, there is a path (i , i2 , . . . , im−1 , iL), where each element is
in N \ {i∗}. Since (NL ,GNL ) is a connected component of (N \ {i∗},GN\{i∗}), (NL ,GNL ) is connected.
Since i ∈ NL and there is a path (i , i2), (NL ∪ {i2},GNL∪{i2}) is also connected. But the definition
of a connected component then implies that i2 < N \ ({i∗} ∪ NL). Since i2 , i∗, this implies that
i2 ∈ NL. Repeating this argument yields iL ∈ NL.
Now we define a stage game satisfying Assumption 1 such that there exists a payoff v∗ ∈ F∗
that is not the payoff in any sequential equilibrium for any δ < 1. For each player, let Ai  {C,D}.
Without loss of generality, let vi(D , . . . ,D)  0 and vi(C,D , . . . ,D)  −1 for all i.
For all i < {i∗} ∪ NLi∗ ∪ NRi∗ :
• vi(D , aNi )  0 for aNi  (D , . . . ,D)
• vi(C, aNi )  −1 for aNi  (D , . . . ,D)
• vi(C, aNi )  1 for all aNi , (D , . . . ,D)
• vi(D , aNi )  1 for all aNi , (D , . . . ,D).
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For i ∈ NLi∗ ∪ NRi∗ :
• vi(D , aNi )  0 for aNi  (D , . . . ,D)
• vi(C, aNi )  −1 for aNi  (D , . . . ,D)
• vi(C, aNi )  1 whenever ai∗  C
• vi(C, aNi )  −1 whenever ai∗  D
• vi(D , aNi )  2 whenever ai∗  C
• vi(D , aNi )  1 otherwise.
For i∗, let
• vi(D , aNi )  0 for aNi  (D , . . . ,D)
• vi(C, aNi )  −1 for aNi  (D , . . . ,D)
• vi∗(D , aNi∗ )  0 for all aNi∗
• vi∗(C, aNi∗ )  1 whenever aNRi∗  (C, . . . , C)
• vi∗(C, aNi∗ )  −1 otherwise.
Note that for each player i, 0 < 1 ≤ max(ai ,aNi ) vi(ai , aNi ). Suppose for a contradiction that
there exists a sequential equilibrium σN such thatVi(σN )  1 for all i. This requires that for every
on-path history hi , σi(hi)  C for all i ∈ {i∗} ∪NRi∗ , since vi∗(ai∗ , aNi∗ ) < 1 for all (ai∗ , aNi∗ ) such that
(ai∗ , aNRi∗ ) , (C, . . . , C). As long as no player i ∈ {i
∗} ∪NRi∗ has deviated, Player i∗ can guarantee the
stage game payoff 1 in every period by always playing C. Now, following a history in which no
player has deviated, consider the one shot deviation for some player i ∈ NLi∗ to D. For i ∈ NLi∗ , the
stage game payoff to D when i∗ is playing C is 2, and i ∈ NLi∗ can only receive a stage game payoff
less than 1 if player i∗ plays D.
Without loss of generality, let 1 ∈ NLi∗ . Let h be the one period history where ai  σi() for each
i , 1, and a1  D. Let σhN be the strategy profile induced by the σN after history h. Let σ
′
1 be the
strategy profile where Player 1 plays D in period 1, and follows σ1 from period 2 onwards, and
let {a¯tN }∞t1 be the sequence of action profiles induced by (σ′1 , σN\{1}). Note that in any sequential
equilibrium, β(h |h1)  1. Then Player 1’s payoff is:
V1(σ′1 , σN\{1})  (1 − δ)2 + δV1(σhN )
For this one shot deviation not to be profitable, we need V1(σhN ) < 1, which involves Player i∗
playing D at least once following the deviation. To see this, suppose that ati∗ , D for all t ≥ 2.
Then vi(a¯t1 , a¯tN1) ≥ 1 for all t ≥ 2 and:
V1(σhN )  (1 − δ)
∞∑
t2
δt−2vi(a¯t1 , a¯tN1)
≥ (1 − δ)
∞∑
t2
δt−2 ≥ 1
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But consider the strategy σ′i∗ where Player i
∗ plays C in every period. In this case, all i ∈ NRi∗ will
also play C and:
Vi∗(σ′hi∗ , σhN\{i∗})  1
On the other hand, if ati∗  D for some t ≥ 2, then vi(a¯ti∗ , a¯tNi∗ ) ≤ 1 for all t with a strict inequality
for the t such that ati∗  D. Then:
Vi∗(σhN )  (1 − δ)
∞∑
t2
δt−2vi(a¯ti∗ , a¯tNi∗ )
< (1 − δ)
∞∑
t2
δt−2  1
Therefore, it must be the case that a¯ti∗ , D for all t ≥ 2, and so the one shot deviation must be
profitable for Player 1. This contradicts the assumption that σN is a sequential equilibrium. 
3.5 Strategies
For any payoff v∗ ∈ F∗, construct a finite deterministic sequence of stage game actions {asN }T∗s1
such that 1T∗
∑T∗
s1 v(asN )  v∗. There must be a finite sequence that achieves this payoff because of
the assumption that the weights used in the convex combinations are rational numbers. Now for
T > nT∗, let {asN }Ts1 be T/T∗ repetitions of the length T∗ sequence (we will require T − nT∗ to be
sufficiently large). Note that this implies that T is a multiple of T∗, i.e. T mod T∗  0.
Define s(t) ≡ ((t − 1) mod T) + 1 (i.e. s(t)  t mod T except when t mod T  0, in which
case s(t)  T). In any period t, let Cis(t) denote the i-th element of the vector asN that is s-
th term of the sequence {asN }Ts1. We will refer to Cis(t) as the on-path action for player i in
period t. By construction Cis(t)  Ci(s(t)+T∗) (as long as s(t) + T∗ ≤ T, otherwise Ci(s(t)+T∗) is not
defined), which ensures that on-path actions are repeated at least every T∗ periods. For M ⊂ N ,
let CMs(t)  (C js(t)) j∈M .
The strategy profile ζi : Hi 7→ Ai
The strategy profile ζi : Hi 7→ Ai can be described with the help of:
• A set of states S  {A ,B(1), . . . ,B(2T),A1 , . . . ,An}
• For each state, an output function fi : S ×N 7→ Ai , where:
fi(A , t)  Cis(t)
fi(B(p), t)  D
fi(A j , t)  Cis(t)
• For each history hi , a state function Pi : Hi 7→ S
In the next subsection, we will define Pi(hi) recursively. Then for each hi of length t − 1:
ζi(hi)  fi(Pi(hi), t)
That is, if Player i is in stateA orA j at time t, then Player i plays Cis(t). If Player i is in state B(p),
then Player i plays D. Note that our state function depends on the history, unlike a conventional
transition function that depends on the state and the action profile. Thus, our ‘states’ are not true
states. Moreover, our output function depends on time. Of course it is possible to describe the
strategy profile using a standard automaton representation, but wewould needmanymore states.
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The function Pi
After the initial history:
Pi()  A
Let hti denote a length t history for Player i. Suppose that Pi(ht−1i )  A.
• If atj  C js(t) for all j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}, then Pi(hti )  A
• Otherwise Pi(hti )  B(p(t)), where:
p(t) ≡

T − s(t) for s(t) ∈ {1, . . . , nT∗}
2T − s(t) for s(t) ∈ {nT∗ + 1, . . . , T}
Suppose that Pi(ht−1i )  B(p). Pi(hti ) depends on two functions d1i : Hi 7→ {0, 1} and d2i : Hi 7→
{0, 1}, which we define in a footnote to preserve continuity.1
• If d1i(hti )  1, then Pi(hti )  A j
• If d2i(hti )  1, then Pi(hti )  B(2T − s(t))
• Otherwise, Pi(hti ) 

B(p − 1) if p > 1
A if p  1
Suppose that Pi(ht−1i )  A j .
• If atj  C js(t) and s(t) < T, then Pi(hti )  A j
• If atj  C js(t) and s(t)  T, then Pi(hti )  A
• Otherwise, Pi(ht−1i )  B(2T − s(t))
1Define d1i : Hi 7→ {0, 1} and d2i : Hi 7→ {0, 1} as follows:
d1i(hti )  1 if and only if:
a) s(t)  nT∗
b) aτi , Cis(τ) for some τ ∈ {t − s(t) + 1, . . . , t − s(t) + (n − 1)T∗}
c) There is a unique player j ∈ Ni such that:
i) aτj  C js(τ) for all τ ∈ {t − s(t) + 1, . . . , t − s(t) + nT∗},
ii) aτj , C js(τ) for all τ ∈ {t − s(t) − T + 1, . . . , t − s(t) − T + nT∗}
d2i(hti )  1 if and only if:
a) s(t)  T
b) There is a player j ∈ Ni such that:
i) aτj  C js(τ) for all τ ∈ {t − s(t) + 1, . . . , t − s(t) + nT∗}
ii) aτj , C js(t) for some τ ∈ {t − s(t) + nT∗ + 1, . . . , t − s(t) + T}
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Intuition
After a history ht−1i in which Player i is in state A, if Player i and her neighbours all play the
on-path action C js(t), then Player i remains in state A after history ht . If anyone deviates, then
after history ht Player i will be in state B(T − s(t)) if t is in the first nT∗ periods of a length T
block or B(2T − s(t)) if t is in the last T − nT∗ periods of a length T block. An interpretation of
B(p) is that Player i should play D for p periods; however, this interpretation is not strictly correct
because after a history where d1i(ht)  1, which is possible only when s(t)  nT∗, Player i could
‘transition’ from B(T − nT∗ + 1) toA j (by ‘transition’, we mean that Pi(ht−1i )  B(T − nT∗ + 1) and
Pi(hti )  A j , and after a history where d2i(ht)  1, which is possible only when s(t)  T, Player i
could transition from B(1) to B(T).
s(t) : T∗ nT∗ TT
Deviations fromA in
these periods are punished
by T − s(t) periods of D
If there are no further deviations
A resumes in this period
Figure 3.1: Transitions inA, s(t) ∈ {1, . . . , nT∗}
s(t) : T∗ nT∗ T nT∗ TT
Deviations fromA in
these periods are punished
by 2T − s(t) periods of D
If there are no further deviations
A resumes in this period
Figure 3.2: Transitions inA, s(t) ∈ {nT∗ + 1, . . . , T}
Loosely speaking, deviations fromA in the first part of each length T block are punished until
the end of the block, and deviations in the second part of each length T block are punished until
the end of the next block. The idea is that any player who deviates from A is punished by D for
a sufficiently long time (at least T − nT∗ periods). The reason that first part of the length T block
is nT∗ periods is to ensure that ζN is stable, in the sense that if every player follows the strategy
after an arbitrary history h, after finitely many periods, every player will return to stateA.
To see the intuition behind this result, suppose that the network is connected and for all i,
Cis(t) , D for some s(t) (that is, every player has to play an action other than D in some period
on the equilibrium path). If Player 1 is in state B(T) at the start of a length T block, then she will
play D at least for the first nT∗ periods. To see this, note that for any hti such that s(t) < {nT∗ , T},
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d1i(hti )  0 and d2i(hti )  0, and so if P(ht−1i )  B(p), then P(hti )  B(p − 1). Thus, if Player 1 is in
stateB(T) at the start of a length T block, after the first period of the length T block (when s(t)  1),
she will be in state B(T − 1), and after after nT∗ − 1 periods, she will be in state B(T − nT∗ + 1). So
she will play D in at least the first nT∗ periods.
Since the on-path actions are repeated every T∗ periods, after T∗ periods Player 1 must have
played D in some period t where D , C1s(t), and hence her neighbours will also be in state
B(T − T∗). By the same argument as before, they will also play D until at least the nT∗-th period
of the length T block. Then after 2T∗ periods, all of their neighbours will be in state B(T −T∗), and
after (n − 1)T∗ periods, everyone in the network will be in state B(T − (n − 1)T∗).
After the nT∗-th period of the block, it is possible that some Player i may be in state A j for
some j ∈ Ni ; in the Appendix, we will deal with this case, but under our current assumption that
for all i, Cis(t) , D for some s(t), it is easy to verify that part (i) of condition (c) in the definition of
d1 j will not be satisfied by any j ∈ Ni since everyone in the network is playing D after (n − 1)T∗
periods. Thus, everyone will continue playing D until the end of the length T block.
After the last period of the length T block, when s(t)  T, everyone will be in state A unless
d2 j is equal to 1 after that history for some i. However, since everyone was playingD after (n−1)T∗
periods, part (i) of condition (b) in the definition of d2 j cannot be satisfied; hence after T periods,
everyone will be in stateA. In the next subsection we will discuss stability in more detail.
s(τ) : T∗ nT∗ T
and there is exactly one neighbour j
who (2) played aτj , C js(τ)
in at least one of these periods
(3) and played aτj  C js(τ)
in all of these periods
In this period t such that s(t)  nT∗ ,
d1i  1 if:
(1) i played aτi , Cis(τ) for some
τ ∈ {t − s(t) + 1, . . . , t − s(t) + (n − 1)T∗}
Figure 3.3: Transitions in B: d1
Now we discuss the purpose of d1i and d2i . If we consider the strategy without the transitions
out of B(p) defined by these two functions, there are two types of deviations that are possible
for certain network structures that could be profitable. If Player j deviates towards the end of the
first part of a length T block, it is possible that in the next length T block some neighbours are
in state A and some neighbours are in state B(p) in the second part of that block, and having
some neighbours play C and others play D may yield a high payoff to Player j. Then repeatedly
deviating in this way could improve Player j’s repeated game payoff (note that the one shot
deviation principle does not apply since δ  1, and any finite sequence of deviations will have no
effect on repeated game payoffs owing to stability).
For a concrete example of this type of deviation, consider 4 players connected on a line. Let
Ai  {C,D}, and suppose that on the equilibrium path, C is played in every period (so we can
let T∗  1, nT∗  4). Assume that every player i , 2 will play according to the strategy profile ζi .
Now suppose that there are no deviations up to period 3, so that each player is in state A after
history h3, and Player 2 deviates for the first time in period 4, so that Players 1, 2, and 3 are in state
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s(τ) : T∗ nT∗ T
j played aτj , C js(τ) in at
least one of these periods
j played aτj  C js(τ) in
all of these periods
In this period t such that s(t)  T
d2i  1 if there exists j such that:
Figure 3.4: Transitions in B: d2
B(T − 4) after history h4. Note that Player 4 then does not observe D until period 5, and so Player
4 is in state B(2T − 5) after h5. Thus, after period T, Players 1, 2, and 3 are in stateA, but Player 4
is in state B(T).
In period T + 1, Player 4 will play D, so Player 3 will play D from period T + 2 onwards. Note
however, that if Player 2 does not play D, Player 1 will remain in stateA. Thus, from periods T + 2
to 2T, Player 1 will play C and if Player 3 remains in state B(p) she will will play D, which may
be beneficial for Player 2. The transition out of B(p) when d1i is equal to 1 is designed to rule out
exactly this type of deviation. In this case, if Player 2 plays C in every period from T + 1 to T + 4,
then d13(hT+43 )  1, and Player 3 will be in state A2 after hT+4, and revert to playing C (unless
Player 2 deviates toD again). Intuitively, if a player has already been punished for a deviation, and
refuses to match another player’s punishment, then the latter player should end the punishment
in case it is actually benefiting the former player.
The second type of deviation occurs if a player finds herself being punished by one group of
neighbours but not another. By deviating near the end of the length T block, she can reverse the
pattern, which may also be profitable. Using the same set up as the previous example, suppose
that after some arbitrary history, at the start of a length T block, Player 1 is in state B(T), and
Player 3 is in stateA. Now as long as Player 2 plays C in this length T block, Player 1 will play D
and Player 3 will play C, which may be beneficial for Player 2. It may also be beneficial for Player
2 if Player 1 plays C and Player 3 plays D. Suppose that Player 2 plays D in the last period of the
length T block. Then Player 3 will be in state B(T) after the last period of the length T block, and
play D in every period in the next block. Note that Player 1 is in state B(1) in the penultimate
period of the length T block. If she is in stateA after the last period of the length T block, she will
play C in the next block. The transition out of B(p)when d2i  1 is designed to ensure that in this
situation, Player 1 will instead be in state B(T) after the last period of the length T block and play
D for an additional block. Intuitively, if a player deviates in the second part of a block, playing
on-path actions in the first part, all of her neighbours should punish her until the end of the next
block even if they were already in state B(p). This ensures that even when some neighbours are
in state B(p), any deviation from the on-path actions will be punished with D by every neighbour
for at least T − nT∗ periods.
If Player j is in state Ak , for k , i, then Player j will not punish any deviation by Player i.
However, it is shown in the Appendix that if all players other than i have been playing according
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to ζN\{i} for a sufficiently long time, then Player j cannot be in stateAk , for k , i.
Stability
If everyone plays according to the strategy ζN , CNs(t) will be played for all t ≥ 1. An important
feature of the strategy profile ζN is that if every player plays according to ζhN after an arbitrary
history h of length z, after at most 2T periods, every player will play as if there are no deviations
in h. This is established in the following definition and Lemma.
Definition 3.5.1. For any arbitrary history h of length z, let hˆt , t ≥ z, be the length t history
generated by ζN after h. The strategy profile ζN is stable if for any h there exists a T such that
ζN (hˆt)  CNs(t) for all t > T.
Lemma 3.5.1. The strategy profile ζN is stable. Moreover, for any h of length z, ζN (hˆt)  CNs(t) for all
t > z + 2T − s(z).
Proof of Lemma 3.5.1. Appendix. 
The proof proceeds as follows. Let NC be the set of all players such that Cis(t) , D for some s(t),
and let (N1C , . . . ,NLC) be a partition of NC into connected components, i.e. each (N lC ,GN lC ) is a
connected component of (NC ,GNC ).
First it is shown that for any arbitrary history of length z, for any i ∈ N , either Pi(hˆz+T−s(z)i )  A
or Pi(hˆz+T−s(z)i )  B(T). If for all i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆz+T−s(z)i )  A, then in period z + 2T − s(z), for each
i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆz+T−s(z)i )  A.
Suppose that in period z + T − s(z) there is at least one i ∈ N lC such that Pi(hˆz+T−s(z)i )  B(T).
Using the fact that the on-path actions are repeated every T∗ periods, it is then shown that by
period z+T−s(z)+nT∗, for all i ∈ N lC , eitherPi(hˆz+T−s(z)+nT∗i )  B(T−nT∗) orPi(hˆz+T−s(z)+nT∗i )  A j
for some j < NC . In either case, it follows that in period z + 2T − s(z), Pi(hˆz+2T−s(z)i )  A for all
i ∈ N lC .
Since this is true for any N lC and NC  ∪Ll1N lC , it follows that for any i ∈ NC , i will play
aˆti  Cis(t) for all t > z + 2T − s(z). Since any i < NC always plays Cis(t)  D regardless of history,
it follows that for all i ∈ N , aˆti  Cis(t) for all t > z + 2T − s(z).
3.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Now we will prove Proposition 3.4.1 by showing that the strategy profile ζN is a sequential
equilibrium and supports the desired payoff v∗.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1. First, we show that for any i ∈ N , Vi(ζN )  v∗i . Let {atN }∞t1 be the
sequence of stage game actions generated by ζN , and note that:
Vi(ζN )  Λ
({
1
K
K∑
t1
vi(ati , atNi )
}∞
K1
)
 lim
K→∞
1
K
K∑
t1
vi(ati , atNi )
 v∗i .
The second equality follows from the fact thatΛ(x)  limn→∞ xn for each x ∈ c, the space of all
convergent sequences (Lemma 16.45 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) p. 550). To see that the limit
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of 1K
∑K
t1 vi(ati , atNi ) exists and is indeed equal to v∗i , note that for K > T the following expression
is valid:  1K K∑
t1
vi(ati , atNi ) − v∗i


 1K
K−s(K)∑
t1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) − v∗i +
1
K
K∑
tK−s(K)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))

≤

(
1
K
− 1
K − s(K)
) K−s(K)∑
t1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) +
1
K
K∑
tK−s(K)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))

<
KT maxai ,aNi vi(ai , aNi )
K(K − T) +
T maxai ,aNi vi(ai , aNi )
K
,
which can be made arbitrarily small for large K. In the third line, we have used the fact that when
on-path actions are played over complete length T blocks, the average payoff over those blocks is
v∗, i.e. 1K−s(K)
∑K−s(K)
t1 vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))  v∗i , which is true by construction.
Given a strategy profile σN  (σ1 , . . . , σn) and a history h, let σhN  (σh1 , . . . , σhn) be the profile
induced by the history h. We show that for any history h and any strategy θi ∈ Σi ,
Vi(ζhN ) ≥ Vi(θi , ζh−i).
Since this is true for any history h, it is optimal for player i to follow the strategy at each of her
information sets I(hi), whatever her beliefs about h conditional on hi may be.
Consider any history h ∈ H of length z. Let {aˆtN }∞tz+1 be the sequence of stage game actions
generated by ζhN after history h. By Lemma 3.5.1 and the properties of Banach-Mazur limits,
Vi(ζhN )  v∗i . To see this, first note that for K ≥ 2T − s(z):
1
K
z+K∑
tz+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi ) 
1
K
z+2T−s(z)∑
tz+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi ) +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+2T−s(z)+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi ).
Then by the property that Λ(x1 , x2 , . . .)  Λ(x2 , x3 , . . .) for each (x1 , x2 , . . .) ∈ `∞:
Vi(ζhN )  Λ ©­«
{
1
K
z+K∑
tz+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi )
}∞
K2T−s(z)
ª®¬
 Λ
©­­«
 1K
z+2T−s(z)∑
tz+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi ) +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+2T−s(z)+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi )

∞
K2T−s(z)
ª®®¬
 lim
K→∞
©­« 1K
z+2T−s(z)∑
tz+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi ) +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+2T−s(z)+1
vi(aˆi t , aˆtNi )
ª®¬
 0 + v∗i ,
where third equality follows since the sequence converges (which we will show), and the fourth
equality follows from Lemma 3.5.1 (which implies that for all t > z + 2T − s(z), aˆtj  C js(t) for all
j ∈ N) and the fact that limK→∞ 1K
∑z+K
tz+2T−s(z)+1 vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))  v∗i . To see this, note that for
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K > 3T − s(z) the following expression is valid: 1K z+K∑tz+2T−s(z)+1 vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) − v∗i


 1K
z+K−s(z+K)∑
tz+2T−s(z)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) − v∗i +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+K−s(z+K)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))



(
1
K
− 1
K − κ
) z+K−s(z+K)∑
tz+2T−s(z)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+K−s(z+K)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))

<
3KT maxai ,aNi vi(ai , aNi )
K(K − 3T) +
T maxai ,aNi vi(ai , aNi )
K
,
where κ ≡ s(z+K)+2T − s(z). For the last inequality, we multiply the maximum number of terms
in each summation by the maximum value of the summand and replace κ by its maximum value,
noting that since κ < K, 1/K − 1/(K − κ) is less than zero and decreasing in κ. This bound can
be made arbitrarily small for large K. Since z + 2T − s(z) + 1 is the beginning of a length T block,
1
K−κ
∑z+K−s(z+K)
tz+2T−s(z)+1 vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))  v∗i , which explains the third line.
Thus, we need to show that for any player i ∈ N and any strategy θi ∈ Σi ,
v∗i ≥ Vi(θi , ζh−i).
Let {a¯tN }∞tz+1 be the sequence of stage game actions generated by (θi , ζh−i) after history h, and
let h¯t , t ≥ z, be the length t history generated by (θi , ζh−i) after h. Note the payoff for player i
satisfies:
z+K∑
tz+1
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) 
z+K∑
tz+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) +
z+K∑
tz+1
[
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) − vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
]

z+K∑
tz+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) +Π(K)
where:
Π(K) ≡
z+K∑
tz+1
[
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) − vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
]
(3.1)
≤ 6T max
ai aNi ,a
′
i a
′
Ni
|vi(ai , aNi ) − vi(a′i , a′Ni )|
for all K ≥ 1 (when T − nT∗ is chosen to be sufficiently large). We establish inequality 3.1 as a
Lemma:
Lemma 3.6.1. For an appropriately chosen value of T, Π(K) ≤ 6TM for all K ≥ 1, where M ≡
maxai aNi ,a
′
i a
′
Ni
|vi(ai , aNi ) − vi(a′i , a′Ni )|.
Proof. Appendix. 
Note also:
lim
K→∞
1
K
z+K∑
tz+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))  v∗i .
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To see this, note that for K > 2T the following expression is valid: 1K z+K∑
tz+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) − v∗i

≤
 1K
z+T−s(z)∑
tz+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+K−s(z+K)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))

+
 1K
z+K−s(z+K)∑
tz+T−s(z)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) − v∗i


 1K
z+T−s(z)∑
tz+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t)) +
1
K
z+K∑
tz+K−s(z+K)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))

+

(
1
K
− 1
K − ν
) z+K−s(z+K)∑
tz+T−s(z)+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))

<
2T maxai ,aNi vi(ai , aNi )
K
+
2KT maxai ,aNi vi(ai , aNi )
K(K − 2T) ,
where ν ≡ s(z+K)+T− s(z). This last line can bemade arbitrarily small for large K. The argument
here is similar to when we showed that limK→∞ 1K
∑K
t1 vi(ati , atNi )  v∗i , the difference being that
now we have to ‘trim’ the beginning as well as the end of the summation.
Combining the previous results, we have that:
lim sup
K→∞
1
K
z+K∑
tz+1
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) ≤ v∗i .
Since Λ(x) ≤ lim sup xn for any x  (x1 , x2 , . . .) ∈ `∞ (Lemma 16.45 in Aliprantis and Border
(2006) p. 550),Vi(θi , ζh−i)  Λ
({
1
K+1
∑z+K
tz vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi )
}∞
K0
)
≤ v∗i . 
3.7 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible to sustain as a sequential equilibrium any payoff that can be
achieved by a finite deterministic sequence of stage game actions such that each player receives
strictly more than her Nash equilibrium payoff. We provide incentives to play the equilibrium
strategies by punishing deviations for at least T − nT∗ periods. In order to achieve stability, the
exact number of periods for which each deviation is punished depends on when it occurs. Similar
strategies can be used to prove a folk theorem without the assumption of local interaction as long
as the entire network is a connected component. In this case, we would also need a signalling
action to ensure that deviations spread to the entire network. It may be possible to extend the
result to payoffs that require infinite sequences using a trick similar to Fudenberg and Maskin
(1991). For stability, we would need the non-punishing action to be played sufficiently often, so
that punishment can spread to the entire network quickly enough, and it seems plausible that
sequential rationality would be maintained if the continuation payoff at each date remained close
to the target payoff.
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Appendix 3.A Proof of Lemma 3.5.1
Lemma 3.A.1. For an arbitrary history hti of length t:
1. If Pi(hti )  B(p), p > 0, then p  T − s(t) or p  2T − s(t)
2. If s(t) ∈ {1, . . . , nT∗}, then Pi(ht−1i ) , A j
Proof. We prove part 1 by induction on the history length. For the empty history, the antecedent
is false, and so the statement is true. Now suppose that for all ht−1i , Pi(ht−1i )  B(p) implies
p  T − s(t − 1) or p  2T − s(t − 1). We show that Pi(hti )  B(p) implies p  B(T − s(t)) or
p  B(2T − s(t)). If Pi(ht−1i )  A or Pi(ht−1i )  A j , and Pi(hti )  B(p), then p  p(t)  T − s(t) or
p  p(t)  2T−s(t)bydefinition. Suppose thatPi(ht−1i )  B(T−s(t−1))orPi(ht−1i )  B(2T−s(t−1)).
Note that Pi(hti ) is either A j , B(2T − s(t)), or B(p − 1). For s(t − 1) < T, s(t)  s(t − 1) + 1, so
p − 1  T − s(t) or p − 1  2T − s(t). For s(t − 1)  T, p − 1  T − 1  T − s(t). Thus, in each case,
Pi(hti )  B(p) implies p  B(T − s(t)) or p  B(2T − s(t)).
For part 2, note that Pi(hti )  A j and Pi(ht−1i ) , A j if and only if t  nT∗, and when s(t)  T,
Pi(hti ) , A j . 
Lemma 3.A.2. Take any h , hh′ of lengths t and t + t′ such that s(t), s(t + t′) ∈ {1, . . . , nT∗ − 1}. For
τ ≤ t, let aτN be the period τ action profile in h. Then:
1. For any i ∈ N , Pi(h)  A or Pi(h)  B(T − s(t))
2. If Pi(h)  B(T − s(t)), then Pi(hh′)  B(T − s(t + t′))
3. If for any τ ∈ {t − s(t) + 1, . . . , t}, (aτi , aτNi ) , (Cis(τ) , CNi s(τ)), Pi(h)  B(T − s(t))
Proof. For any history h of length t such that s(t)  T, if Pi(hi)  B(p), then p is at most T by
Lemma 3.A.1. For any h of length t such that s(t) ∈ {1, . . . , nT∗ − 1}, if Pi(ht−1i )  A, Pi(hi)  A
or Pi(hi)  B(T − s(t)), and if Pi(ht−1i )  B(p), Pi(hi)  B(p − 1). Thus, if Pi(hi)  B(p), p < T. By
Lemma 3.A.1, Pi(hi)  A, Pi(hi)  B(T − s(t)), or Pi(h)  B(2T − s(t)), but by the previous claim,
it cannot be B(2T − s(t)).
Part 2 follows immediately from the definition of Pi after noting that for any ht−1i such that
s(t) ∈ {1, . . . , nT∗ − 1}, if Pi(ht−1i )  B(p) then Pi(hti )  B(p − 1). For part 3, the definition of Pi
implies that Pi(hτ) , A, and the claim follows from parts 1 and 2. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5.1. For an arbitrary history h of length t, let hˆτ, τ ≥ t be the length τ history
generated by (ζhN ) after h, and let {aˆτN }∞τt be the corresponding sequence of stage game action
profiles. Let NC denote the set of players who have to play an action other than D in some period
on the equilibrium path. Note that for each player i < NC , aˆτi  Cis(τ) for all τ ≥ t + 1. Thus, we
need to show that for all i ∈ NC , Pi(hˆτ)  A for all τ ≥ t + 2T − s(t), which implies that aˆτi  Cis(τ)
for all τ > t + 2T − s(t) for all i ∈ NC .
Let (N1 , . . . ,NL) be a partition of NC into L connected components. That is, each (N lC ,GN lC ) is
connected component of (NC ,GNC ). Note that a player i ∈ N lC cannot have a neighbour j ∈ N kC , k ,
l, because in that case (N lC ∪ { j},GN lC∪{ j}) would be connected, contradicting the definition of a
connected component. We will consider the connected component N lC , where l is arbitrary, and
show that for all i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆt+2T−s(t)i )  A.
First, we argue that if for all i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆki )  A for some period k, then for all i ∈ N lC ,
Pi(hˆτi )  A for all τ ≥ k. To see this, consider the set B ≡ N lC ∪ { j : j ∈ Ni for some i ∈ N lC}, and
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note that if Pi(hˆτ−1i )  A for all i ∈ N lC , then Pi(hˆτi )  A for all i ∈ N lC . This is because each j ∈ B
is either in N lC or not in NC (since N
l
C is a connected component of NC). Each j ∈ Ni ∩ N lC will
play C js(τ) since P j(hˆτ−1j )  A, each j < NC will play D  C js(τ) regardless of P j(hˆτ−1j ), and i will
play Cis(τ) since Pi(hˆτ−1i )  A. Thus, aˆτj  C js(τ) for all j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}, and so Pi(hˆτi )  A.
By Lemma 3.A.1, for any i ∈ N lC , we have either Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)i )  A or Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)i )  B(T). If
Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)i )  A for all i ∈ NC , then for all i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆτi )  A for all τ ≥ t + T − s(t), so assume
that for some i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)i )  B(T).
Without loss of generality, let Player 1 belong toN lC and let P1(hˆt+T−s(t)l )  B(T). First, we argue
that for all i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗−1i )  B(T − nT∗ + 1). For any player i ∈ N lC , there exists a path
(1, j2 , . . . , jm−1 , i) such that each player in the path belongs to N lC (since N lC is connected), and
m ≤ n. Note that player 1 will play D in every period τ ∈ {t + T − s(t) + 1, . . . , t + T − s(t) + T∗}
according to ζh1 . Since player 1 belongs to NC , it must be the case that C1s(τ) , D for at least one
τ ∈ {t +T − s(t)+ 1, . . . , t +T − s(t)+T∗} (recall that the sequence of on-path actions repeat every
T∗ periods). By Lemma 3.A.2, P j2(hˆt+T−s(t)+T∗j2 )  B(T − T∗). Now j2 will play D in every period
τ ∈ {t+T−s(t)+T∗+1, . . . , t+T−s(t)+2T∗}, and since j2 ∈ NC , the previous argument implies that
P j3(hˆt+T−s(t)+2T∗j3 )  B(T−2T∗). Thus, by period t+T− s(t)+(m−1)T∗, we have Pi(hˆ
t+T−s(t)+(m−1)T∗
i ) 
B(T − (m − 1)T∗). Since, m ≤ n, Lemma 3.A.2 implies that Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗−1i )  B(T − nT∗ + 1).
Now for each i ∈ N lC , Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗i ) depends on whether d1i(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗i )  1. If there
does not exist a unique j satisfying parts (i) and (ii) of condition (c) in the definition of d1i , then
Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗i )  B(T − nT∗). Now we argue that d2i(hτi )  0 for all τ ∈ {t + T − s(t) + nt∗ +
1, . . . , t + 2T − s(t)}, and hence Pi(hˆt+2T−s(t)i )  A. First note that condition (a) in the definition
of d2i implies that d2i(hτi )  0 for all τ such that s(τ) , T. Thus, we only need to show that
d2i(ht+2T−s(t)i )  0. To see this, note that for any j ∈ Ni , there is a path (1, j2 , . . . , jm−1 , j), where
m ≤ n, which implies that P j(hˆt+T−s(t)+(n−1)T∗j )  B(T − (n − 1)T∗), and thus, aˆτj  D for all
τ ∈ {t +T − s(t)+ (n − 1)T∗ + 1, . . . , t +T − s(t)+ nT∗}. Thus, for j to satisfy part (i) of condition (b)
in the definition of d2i , it must be the case that j < NC . But this means that j will play D  C js(τ)
for each τ ∈ {t + T − s(t) + nT∗ + 1, . . . , t + 2T − s(t)}, and so will not satisfy part (ii) of the
condition. Therefore, for each τ ∈ {t + T − s(t) + nt∗ + 1, . . . , t + 2T − s(t)}, if Pi(hτ−1i )  B(p),
then Pi(hτi )  B(p − 1) for p > 1, and Pi(hτi )  A for p  1. Since Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗i )  B(T − nT∗),
Pi(hˆt+2T−s(t)i )  A.
If for some i, d1i(ht+T−s(t)+nT∗i )  1, then Pi(hˆt+T−s(t)+nT∗i )  A j
∗ , where j∗ is the unique neighbour
satisfying condition (c) in the definition of d1i . Note that j∗ cannot be in NC , and therefore j∗ will
play aˆτj∗  C j∗s(τ) for each τ ∈ {t + T − s(t) + nT∗ + 1, . . . , t + 2T − s(t)}, which implies that
Pi(hˆt+2T−s(t)i )  A. 
Appendix 3.B Proof of Lemma 3.6.1
Let ζ′i(hi)  Cis(t) for any hi of length t − 1. That is, ζ′i is the strategy where player i plays the
on-path actions after every history. For any arbitrary history h of legnth t, let h˜τi , τ ≥ t, be the
length τ history generated by (ζ′i , ζN\{i}) after h.
Lemma 3.B.1. The strategy profile (ζ′i , ζN\{i}) is stable. Moreover for all i ∈ NC \ {i}, Pi(h˜τi )  A for all
τ ≥ t + 2T − s(t).
Proof. Replace NC with NC \ {i} in the proof of Lemma 3.5.1. 
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Recall that h is an arbitrary history of length z, {a¯tN }∞tz+1 is the sequence of stage game actions
generated by (θi , ζh−i) after history h, and h¯t , t ≥ z is the length t history generated by (θi , ζh−i)
after h.
Lemma 3.B.2. Suppose that for h¯tj , j ∈ Ni , t > z + 2T − s(t), conditions (a) and (b) in the definition of
d1 j are satisfied. Then d1 j(h¯tj)  1 if and only if Player i satisfies parts (i) and (ii) of condition (c) in the
definition of d1 j .
Proof. Wewill show that no k ∈ N j \{i} can satisfy parts (i) and (ii) of condition (c) in the definition
of d1 j , when conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. Assume that s(t)  nT∗, and take any k ∈ N j \ {i},
and note that for k to satisfy (i), a¯τk , Cks(τ) for some τ ∈ {t− s(t)−T+1, . . . , t− s(t)−T+nT∗}. But
this implies that k ∈ NC . Condition (b) requires that a¯τj , C js(τ) for some τ ∈ {t − s(t) + 1, . . . , t −
s(t)+(n−1)T∗}, which implies that then a¯τk  D for all τ ∈ {t− s(t)+(n−1)T∗+1, . . . , t− s(t)+nT∗},
and in at least one of these periodsCks(τ) , D, and so k cannot satisfy condition (ii). Thus, if Player i
satisfies parts (i) and (ii) of condition (c), then Player i is the unique player satisfying this condition,
and d1 j(h¯tj)  1. If Player i does not satisfy parts (i) and (ii) of condition (c), then no player satisfies
the condition, and d1 j(h¯tj)  0. 
Lemma 3.B.3 says that when i’s opponents play D in every period in a length T∗ block, the value
of Π(K) decreases by at least T∗v∗i .
Lemma 3.B.3. Assume that for all j ∈ Ni , a¯tj  D for all t ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + T∗}, where k is such that k
mod T∗  0. Then:
Π(k − z + T∗) −Π(k − z) ≤ −T∗v∗i .
Proof.
Π(k − z + T∗) −Π(k − z)

k+T∗∑
tz+1
[
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) − vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
]
−
k∑
tz+1
[
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) − vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
]

k+T∗∑
tk+1
[
vi(a¯ti , a¯tNi ) − vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
]

k+T∗∑
tk+1
[
vi(a¯ti ,D , . . . ,D) − vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
]
≤ −
k+T∗∑
tk+1
vi(Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
 −T∗v∗i .

Lemma 3.B.4 says that if each player other than i has been playing according to ζN\{i} for a
sufficiently long time, and i plays an action other than Cis(t) in some period t in the first part of a
length T block, then all of i’s neighbours will punish i with D until the end of the length T block.
Lemma 3.B.4. For any km ≥ z + 2T − s(z) such that s(km)  T, if a¯t∗i , Cis(t∗), where t∗ ∈ {km + 1, km +
nT∗}, then for all j ∈ Ni , a¯tj  D for all t ∈ {t∗ + 1 . . . , km + T}.
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Proof. In period t∗ − 1, for each j ∈ Ni , either P j(h¯t∗−1j )  A or P j(h¯t
∗−1
j )  B(T − s(t∗ − 1)) by
Lemma 3.A.2. Since a¯t∗i , Cis(t∗), in both cases P j(h¯t
∗
j )  B(T−s(t∗)). Since a¯t
∗
i , Cis(t∗), Lemma 3.B.2
implies that d j(h¯km+nT∗j )  0, and so P j(h¯km+nT∗j )  B(T − nT∗). Thus, for all t ∈ {t∗ + 1 . . . , km + T},
P j(h¯t−1j )  B(T − s(t − 1)) or P j(h¯t−1j )  B(2T − s(t − 1)), depending on whether d2i(h¯t−1j )  1, but
in either case for all j ∈ Ni , a¯tj  D for all t ∈ {t∗ + 1 . . . , km + T}. 
Lemma 3.B.5 says that if each player other than i has been playing according to ζN\{i} for a
sufficiently long time, and i plays an action other than Cis(t) in some period t in the first part of a
length T block, then plays Cis(t) in every period t in the first part of the next length T block, then
for every period t starting from the beginning of the second part of that length T block, each of of
i’s neighbours, j ∈ Ni , will play C js(t) until i plays something other than Cis(t).
Lemma 3.B.5. For any km ≥ z + 2T − s(z) such that s(km)  T, if a¯ti , Cis(t) for some t ∈ {km − T +
1, km −T + nT∗} and a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , t∗ − 1}, where t∗ > km + nT∗, then for all j ∈ Ni ,
a¯tj  C js(t) for all t ∈ {km + nT∗ + 1 . . . , t∗}.
Proof. Take an arbitrary j ∈ Ni . LetM be themaximal connected component ofNC \{i} containing
j. As in the proof of Lemma 3.5.1, replacing NC with NC \ {i}, if for all k ∈ M, Pk(h¯kmi )  A, then
for all k ∈ M, Pk(h¯ti )  A, for all t ∈ {km , . . . , t∗}.
If for some k ∈ M, Pk(h¯kmi )  B(T), then after period km + (n − 2)T∗, P j(h¯km+(n−2)T∗i )  B(T −
(n − 2)T∗). This means that a¯tj , C js(t) for some t ∈ {km + (n − 2)T∗ + 1, . . . , km + (n − 1)T∗}, and
therefore j satisfies condition (b) in the definition of d1 j . Note that i satisfies parts (i) and (ii) of
condition (c) in the definition of d1 j after history h¯km+nT∗j . Since, s(km + nT∗)  nT∗, condition (a) of
the definition of d1 j is also satisfied, and by Lemma 3.B.2, for all j ∈ Ni , P j(h¯km+nT∗j )  A i .

Lemma 3.B.6 says that if each player other than i has been playing according to ζN\{i} for a
sufficiently long time, and i plays Cis(t) in every period t in the first part of a length T block, and
then plays an action other than Cis(t) in some period t in the second part of a length T block, then
all of i’s neighbours will punish i with D until the end of the following length T block.
Lemma 3.B.6. For any km ≥ z+2T−s(z) such that s(km)  T, if a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km+1, . . . , t∗−1}
and a¯t∗i , Cis(t∗), where t
∗ ∈ {km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km + T}, then for all j ∈ Ni , a¯tj  D for all t ∈
{t∗ + 1, . . . , km + 2T}.
Proof. Take an arbitrary j ∈ Ni . If P j(h¯t∗−1j )  A or P j(h¯t
∗−1
j )  A i , then P j(h¯t
∗
j )  B(2T− s(t)) (note
that by Lemma 3.B.2, P j(h¯t∗−1j ) , Ak for k ∈ N j \ {i}) and a¯tj  D for all t ∈ {t∗ + 1, . . . , km + 2T},
unless d1 j(h¯km+T+nT∗j )  1. Note that i cannot satisfy (i) and (ii) of condition (c) in the definition of
d1 j because a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , km + nT∗}, so by Lemma 3.B.2, d1 j(h¯km+T+nT∗j )  0.
If P j(h¯t∗−1j )  B(p), p > 0, then we immediately have a¯tj  D for all t ∈ {t∗ + 1, . . . , km + T}.
Note, however, that i satisfies (i) and (ii) of condition (b) in the definition of d2 j after history h¯km+Tj
and s(km + T)  T, so P j(h¯km+Tj )  B(T). Thus a¯tj  D for all t ∈ {t∗ + 1, . . . , km + 2T}, since
d1 j(h¯km+T+nT∗j )  0 by the same argument as in the previous paragraph. 
For Lemmas 3.B.7 and 3.B.8, assume that T is chosen such that Tv∗i > (n + 1)T∗M.
Lemma 3.B.7. Take some Π(km − z), km ≥ z + 2T − s(z), such that s(km)  T, and P j(h¯kmj )  A for all
j ∈ NC \ {i}. For either km+1  km + T or km+1  km + 2T, it is either the case that:
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1. Π(km+1 − z) ≤ Π(km − z)
2. P j(h¯km+1j )  A for all j ∈ NC \ {i}
or
1. Π(km+1 − z) ≤ Π(km − z) − (T − nT∗)v∗i + T∗M
Proof. Assume that km ≥ z + 2T − s(z), s(km)  T, and P j(h¯kmj )  A for all j ∈ NC \ {i}. We need to
show that for either km+1  km+T or km+1  km+2T, it is the case that eitherΠ(km+1−z) ≤ Π(km−z)
and P j(h¯kmj )  A for all j ∈ NC \ {i}, or Π(km+1 − z) ≤ Π(km − z) − (T − nT∗)v∗i + T∗M.
Case 1: a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km+1, . . . , km+T}. Note that in this case, (a¯ti , a¯tNi )  (Cis(t) , CNi s(t))
for all t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , km + T}. Therefore, there will be no change in Π(K). By Lemma 3.B.1,
P j(h¯km+Tj )  A for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Thus, km+1  km + T will do.
Case 2: a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km+1, . . . , km+nT∗}, a¯ti , Cis(t) for some t ∈ {km+nT∗+1, km+T}.
Let t∗ be the first t ∈ {km + nT∗ + 1, km + T} such that a¯ti , Cis(t). There will be no change in Π(K)
over the periods in {km + 1, . . . , t∗ − 1}. By Lemma 3.B.6, all of i’s neighbours will play D in every
period t ∈ {t∗ + 1, km + 2T}. In the length T∗ block containing t∗, Π(K) can can go up by at most
T∗M. By Lemma 3.B.3,Π(K)must go down by at least Tv∗i over the periods in {km +T+1, km +2T}.
So as long as Tv∗i > T∗M, km+1  km + 2T will do.
Case 3: a¯ti , Cis(t) for some t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , km + nT∗}.Π(K) can go up by at most T∗M over the
periods in {km + 1, . . . , km + nT∗}. Lemma 3.B.4 and Lemma 3.B.3 imply that Π(K)must go down
by (T − nT∗)v∗i over the periods in {km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km + T}. So as long as (T − nT∗)v∗i > T∗M,
km+1  km + T will do. 
Lemma 3.B.8. Take some Π(km − z), km ≥ z + 2T − s(z), such that s(km)  T, and P j(h¯kmj )  B(T) for
some j ∈ NC \ {i}. For either km+1  km + T or km+1  km + 2T, it is either the case that:
1. Π(km+1 − z) ≤ Π(km − z)
or
1. Π(km+1 − z) ≤ Π(km − z) + nT∗M
2. P j(h¯km+1j )  A for all j ∈ NC \ {i}
Proof. Assume that km ≥ z + 2T − s(z), s(km)  T, and P j(h¯kmj )  B(T) for some j ∈ NC \ {i}.
We need to show that for either km+1  km + T or km+1  km + 2T, it is the case that either
Π(km+1− z) ≤ Π(km − z), orΠ(km+1− z) ≤ Π(km − z)+ nT∗M and P j(h¯km+1j )  A for all j ∈ NC \ {i}.
Note that if a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km − T + 1, . . . , km}, then by Lemma 3.B.1 P j(h¯kmj )  A
for all j ∈ NC \ {i}. Thus, we only have to consider what happens when a¯ti , Cis(t) for some
t ∈ {km − T + 1, . . . , km}.
First, suppose that a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km − T + 1, . . . , km − T + nT∗}, but a¯ti , Cis(t) for some
t ∈ {km − T + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km}. Thus, Pi(h¯kmi )  B(T) for each j ∈ Ni , and all of i’s neighbours will
play D in every period t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , km + T}, as long as for all j ∈ Ni ∩ NC , d1 j(h¯km+nT∗j )  0.
Take any j ∈ Ni ∩ NC . Note that a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km − T + 1, . . . , km − T + nT∗}, and so i
does not satisfy (i) and (ii) of condition (c) in the definition of d1 j . Then Lemma 3.B.2 implies that
d1 j(h¯km+nT∗j )  0.
By Lemma 3.B.3,Π(K)must fall by at least Tv∗i over the periods in {km + 1, . . . , km +T}, and so
km+1  km + T will do.
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Now suppose that a¯ti , Cis(t) for some t ∈ {km −T +1, . . . , km −T + nT∗}. There are three cases.
Case 1: a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , km + T}. By Lemma 3.B.5, each j ∈ Ni will play C js(t)
for each t ∈ {km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km + T}. Note that if every j ∈ Ni ∪ {i} plays C js(t) in period t,
the value of Π(K) does not change in that period. Thus, Π(K) cannot increase over the periods in
{km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km +T}. The mostΠ(K) can go up by over the periods in {km + 1, . . . , km + nT∗}
is nT∗M. By Lemma 3.B.1, P j(h¯km+Tj )  A for all j ∈ NC \ {i}. Thus, km+1  km + T will do.
Case 2: a¯ti  Cis(t) for all t ∈ {km+1, . . . , km+nT∗}, a¯ti , Cis(t) for some t ∈ {km+nT∗+1, . . . , km+
T}. Let t∗ be the first t ∈ {km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km + T} such that a¯ti , Cis(t). By Lemma 3.B.5, each
j ∈ Ni will play C js(t) for each t ∈ {km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , t∗}. By Lemma 3.B.6, all of i’s neighbours will
play D in every period t ∈ {t∗ + 1, . . . , km + 2T}. This implies that Π(K) can increase by at most
(n + 1)T∗M over the periods in {km + 1, . . . , km + T}. By Lemma 3.B.3, Π(K) must fall by at least
Tv∗ over the periods in {km + T + 1, . . . , km + 2T}. Thus, km+1  km + 2T will do
Case 3: a¯ti , Cis(t) for some t ∈ {km + 1, . . . , km + nT∗}. The maximum Π(K) can go up by over
the periods t ∈ {km+1, . . . , km+nT∗} is nT∗M, but Lemma 3.B.4 implies that every j ∈ Ni will play
D in every period in {km+nT∗+1, . . . , km+T}. By Lemma 3.B.3,Π(K)must go down by (T−nT∗)v∗i
over the periods in {km + nT∗ + 1, . . . , km + T}. For sufficiently large T, (T − nT∗)v∗i > nT∗M, and
so km+1  km + T will do. 
Proof of Lemma 3.6.1. First, note that for any K ∈ {1, . . . , 2T − s(z)}, Π(K) can be at most 2TM.
Let k0  z + 2T − s(z). Lemmas 3.B.8 and 3.B.7 imply that we can find a sequence (k1 , k2 , . . .),
km < km+1 ≤ km + 2T such that Π(km − z) < 4TM for all m ≥ 0 (for sufficiently large T). Since
the maximum amount Π(K) can change in 2T periods is 2TM, this implies that 6TM is an upper
bound for Π(K) for all K ≥ 1. 
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Appendix 3.C Complete payoffs and proof for Example 3.4.1
v(D ,D ,D ,D)  (0, 0, 0, 0)
v(C,D ,D ,D)  (−ε, 0, 0, 0)
v(D , C,D ,D)  (0,−ε, 0, 0)
v(D ,D , C,D)  (0, 2,−ε, 0)
v(D ,D ,D , C)  (0, 0, 0,−ε)
v(C, C,D ,D)  (1, 0, 0, 0)
v(D , C, C,D)  (1, 1, 0, 0)
v(D ,D , C, C)  (0, 2, 1, 1)
v(C,D , C,D)  (−1, 2,−ε, 0)
v(D , C,D , C)  (0,−ε, 0,−ε)
v(C,D ,D , C)  (−ε, 0, 0,−ε)
v(C, C, C,D)  (1, 1, 0, 0)
v(C, C, C, C)  (1, 1, 1, 1)
v(D , C, C, C)  (1, 1, 1, 1)
v(C, C,D , C)  (1, 0, 0,−ε)
v(C,D , C, C)  (−1, 2, 1, 1)
Proposition 3.C.1. If δ < 1, there exists a stage game satisfying Assumption 1, a network structure, and
a payoff v∗ ∈ F∗ such that v∗ is not the payoff in any sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a sequential equilibrium σN such thatVi(σN ) 
1 for all i. This requires that for every on-path history hi , σi(hi)  C. As long as Player 3 and Player
4 have not deviated, Player 3 can guarantee the payoff 1 by always playing C. Now consider the
one shot deviation where Player 2 plays D. For this not to be profitable, Player 3 must play D at
least once following the deviation. But if Player 3 plays D, her payoff is strictly less than 1, which
cannot be optimal. Thus, the one shot deviation must be profitable, contradicting the assumption
that σN is a sequential equilibrium. 
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